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Abstract
Striving for a more sustainable society is strongly dependent on the transition of
the energy system. Concerning the power system, there are three pillars which
are crucial for a sustainable transition: decarbonization, security of supply,
and competitiveness. Trying to balance these three pillars is necessary but has
presented a number of challenges.
Emerging concerns about the long-term generation adequacy and market
adequacy, as well as challenges to the short-term reliability can also be linked
to the three pillars. The decarbonization of the power system has led to a
paradigm shift from technologies with low investment cost and high fuel cost
to new technologies with high investment cost and low fuel costs, as is the
case for Renewable Energy Sources (RES). The question arises if the current
market design can cope with this development. Incentives to invest in long-term
generation adequacy have to emerge from a combination of market signals and
decision-making of individual market participants. Yet, in current markets, the
adequacy of the market signals is doubted. One proposed market mechanism to
address these challenges is a complementary capacity mechanism (CM). A CM
explicitly assigns a value to the contribution of the different technologies to the
generation adequacy.
The purpose of this doctoral research is to better understand the working
principle and the outcome of market designs including a CM. The research
examines the role of a complementary CM in existing energy market designs
including markets for energy output, flexibility and RES. For that purpose, a
modeling framework is developed. By means of this framework, different CM
implementation concepts, including capacity markets and strategic reserves,
can be analyzed. Each model assumes individual market participants, facing
the decision to invest in generation technologies based on their accumulated
revenues across the different markets. The capacity expansion problem is set up
as a non-cooperative game of the market participants. The resulting equilibrium
is analyzed with respect to shares and origins of revenues, impacts on the
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generation mix or total cost for consumers. Specifically three research questions
are addressed.
First, the model is applied to assess the shift of revenues between the markets.
Analysis of the changing decision-making of market participants and the resulting
generation mix is done. The findings show that with increasing RES shares,
the role of energy-based markets is reduced and shifted to more specific market
segments. It is noteworthy that different market settings affect both technologies
participating in the CM, as well as other technologies. The latter are affected
indirectly through changing prices in other market segments and changing
decision-making of their competitors. In addition, the results indicate that
revenues from CMs make scarcity pricing on energy-based markets partly or
fully obsolete. Consequently, revenues for all technologies are less dependent on
scarcity events. In the current case study cost differences between markets with
and without CMs are small. Therefore further research should elaborate on
market participation rules such that all technologies are able to valorize their
contribution in terms of energy output, flexibility and availability.
Second, the model is used to assess the impact of CMs, harmonized or not,
in a multi-zonal market context. The case study focuses on efficient use
of capacity assets by means of cross-border participation in the CMs and
highlights the benefits and pitfalls of implicit and explicit participation models.
Cross-border effects such as capacity leakage, shared generation adequacy, and
cost distribution are taken into account. The findings indicate that differing
incentives in the market zones cause a distortion of the market harmonization.
This leads to disturbed investment signals and in the end to a less efficient market
outcome. However, even with a harmonized approach of CMs, there is a chance
of under- or overestimating the cross-border participation. The consequences
can be either over-investments because of too conservative assumptions about
non-domestic contribution, or insufficient reserve margins because of double
counting of available capacity across multiple markets.
Third, the focus of the research is shifted to the decision-making of individual
market participants in the presence of uncertainties, which create major risks
for capital-intensive investments. Risk-averse decision-making might lead to
inadequate investments and might undermine long-term generation adequacy.
The effect of CMs on risk-averse market participants is examined under different
market settings. The results of the analysis show that CMs have a positive
effect on the security of supply and the overall costs when market participants
are risk-averse. This is due to the more stable investment signal. Furthermore,
the investment signals from the CM remain sufficient, even at very high risk
aversion. Finally, the results show that the positive effect of a CM cannot be
achieved by increasing the price cap for energy in times of scarcity.
Beknopte samenvatting
Het streven naar een duurzamere samenleving is sterk verweven met de transitie
van het energiesysteem. Voor het elektriciteitssysteem zijn er drie pijlers die
cruciaal zijn voor een duurzame transitie: de reductie van broeikasgasemissies,
de competitiviteit en de bevoorradingszekerheid.
Wat betreft de bevoorradingszekerheid is er toenemende bezorgdheid dat het
huidige marktmodel de toereikendheid van de elektriciteitsvoorziening niet
kan garanderen. Er bestaan immers twijfels dat het marktmodel voldoende
incentieven geeft aan marktspelers om te investeren in elektriciteitsproduc-
tiecapaciteit. Met de transitie naar een koolstofarm elektriciteitssysteem zal
er ook een transitie optreden van technologieën met een lage investeringskost
en een hoge brandstofkost, naar technologieën met een hoge investeringskost
en een lage brandstofkost zoals hernieuwbare energiebronnen. De vraag stelt
zich echter of het huidige marktmodel kan omgaan met deze ontwikkeling. Eén
marktmechanisme dat wordt voorgesteld om deze uitdagingen aan te pakken, is
het complementaire capaciteitsmechanisme (CM). Dit CM kent expliciet een
waarde toe aan de bijdrage tot de toereikendheid van de elektriciteitsvoorziening,
geleverd door de verschillende technologieën.
Het doel van dit doctoraatsonderzoek is het beter begrijpen van de werking
en de uitkomst van marktmodellen met een CM. De thesis onderzoekt daarbij
de rol van een complementair CM in bestaande marktmodellen met markten
voor energie, flexibiliteit en hernieuwbare energiebronnen. Hiertoe zijn er
meerdere simulatiemodellen ontwikkeld. Met behulp van deze modellen kunnen
verschillende types CMs, waaronder capaciteitsmarkten en strategische reserves,
beschreven worden. Elk model gaat uit van individuele marktspelers die een
investeringsbeslissing nemen op basis van hun geaccumuleerde inkomsten over
de verschillende markten heen. Het nemen van investeringsbeslissingen wordt
voorgesteld als een niet-coöperatief spel tussen de marktspelers. Dit model
wordt gebruikt om de invloed van CMs op het marktevenwicht te analyseren.
Specifiek worden drie onderzoeksvragen behandeld.
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Ten eerste wordt het model gebruikt om de verschuiving van inkomsten
over de verschillende markten te analyseren. Er wordt gekeken naar de
aangepaste besluitvorming van de marktspelers en de resulterende productiemix.
De bevindingen tonen aan dat met een groeiend aandeel aan hernieuwbare
energiebronnen, het belang van markten voor elektrische energie wordt
gereduceerd en verschoven naar specifiekere marktsegmenten. Opmerkelijk is dat
CMs een invloed hebben op zowel technologieën die deelnemen in deze CMs als
technologieën die dit niet doen. Die laatsten worden onrechtstreeks beïnvloed
door wijzigingen in de prijzen waargenomen in de andere marktsegmenten
en wijzigingen in de besluitvorming van hun concurrenten. De resultaten
geven bovendien aan dat inkomsten van CMs de nood aan piekprijzen op
energiemarkten gedeeltelijk of volledig overbodig maken. In het bestudeerde
systeem zijn de verschillen in de kost tussen markten met en zonder CMs klein.
Verder onderzoek is nodig om de regels voor participatie in een CMs verder uit
te werken opdat alle technologieën hun bijdrage kunnen valoriseren.
Ten tweede wordt het model gebruikt om de impact te bestuderen van
al dan niet geharmoniseerde CMs in de context van geïnterconnecteerde
markten. De uitgevoerde studie richt zich op het efficiënt gebruik van
capaciteit door middel van grensoverschrijdende participatie aan de CMs en
benadrukt de voor- en nadelen van impliciete en expliciete participatiemodellen.
Daarbij wordt rekening gehouden met grensoverschrijdende effecten zoals de
zogenaamde lekkage van capaciteit, gedeelde toereikende energievoorziening en
de kostverdeling. De bevindingen tonen aan dat uiteenlopende incentieven in
verschillende marktzones een verstoring veroorzaken in de harmonisatie van
markten. Dit leidt tot verstoorde signalen voor investeerders en uiteindelijk tot
een minder efficiënt marktresultaat. Ook met een geharmoniseerde aanpak van
CMs, is er echter een kans op onder- of overschatten van de grensoverschrijdende
participatie. Mogelijke gevolgen daarvan zijn overinvesteringen door te
conservatieve aannames over buitenlandse bijdragen of net onvoldoende
reservemarges door dubbel tellen van capaciteit over meerdere markten.
Ten derde wordt de focus van het onderzoek verlegd naar het beslissingsgedrag
van individuele marktspelers in de aanwezigheid van onzekerheden, die
een groot risico vormen voor kapitaalintensieve investeringen. Risico-avers
gedrag kan leiden tot onvoldoende investeringen om de toereikendheid van de
elektriciteitsvoorziening te garanderen. Het resultaat toont aan dat CMs een
positief effect hebben op zowel de bevoorradingszekerheid als de systeemkost
wanneer marktspelers risico-avers zijn. Dit is een gevolg van het stabielere
investeringssignaal. De investeringssignalen van de CMs blijven bovendien
voldoende, ook wanneer marktspelers zeer schuw zijn voor het nemen van risico.
Tenslotte wordt er aangetoond dat het positieve effect van een CM niet kan
bekomen worden door het verhogen van de maximum prijs voor energie.
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ISO Independent System Operator
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NYISO New York Independent System Operator
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PJM Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection
PTDF Power Transfer Distribution Factors
QCP Quadratically Constrained Program
RES Renewable Energy Sources
RO Reliability Options
RR Replacement Reserves
SAPP South African Power Pool
SoS Security Of Supply
SR Strategic Reserves
SRMC Short-run Marginal Cost
TSO Transmission System Operator
V@R Value-at-Risk
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Nomenclature
Markets for Energy, Flexibility and Availability
Sets
t ∈ T Set of time steps t
p ∈ P Set of periods p
i ∈ N Set of generators i
a ∈ A Set of agents a
χa ∈ Xa Set of strategies of agent a
χ ∈ X Set of all strategies of all agents
Parameters
Demp,t Minimum demand on energy-based market MWh
D
em
p,t Maximum demand on energy-based market MWh
Demp,t Reference demand on energy-based market MWh
Eem Slope of demand curve on energy market e/MWh2
λem,0p,t Y-axis intercept of energy demand curve e/MWh
λem# Reference price for energy e/MWh
Dcm Minimum demand on capacity market MW
Dcm# Target demand on capacity market MW
D
cm Maximum demand on capacity market MW
Ecm Slope of demand curve on capacity market e/MW2
λcm,0 Y-axis intercept of capacity demand curve e/MW
λcm# Target price on capacity market e/MW
Dsr Volume of strategic reserves MW
Dres RES target MWh
Drrp Downward reserve requirements MW
Drrp Upward reserve requirements MW
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C invi Annualized investment cost e/MW
Cgi Variable cost for generation e/MWh
Ai,p,t Availability of technology %
Rhi Hourly ramp rate %
Rrri Ramp rate for reserve requirements %
F cmi Derating for capacity market %
F sri Derating for strategic reserves %
F resi Derating for RES market %
F rri Derating for downward reserves %
F rri Derating for upward reserves %
λem Price floor of energy-based market e/MWh
λ
em Price cap of energy-based market e/MWh
λcm Price floor of capacity market e/MW
λ
cm Price cap of capacity market e/MW
λsr Price floor for strategic reserves e/MW
λ
sr Price cap for strategic reserves e/MW
λres Price floor of RES certificates e/MWh
λ
res Price cap of RES certificates e/MWh
λrr Price floor of downward reserves e/MW
λ
rr Price cap of downward reserves e/MW
λrr Price floor of upward reserves e/MW
λ
rr Price cap of upward reserves e/MW
C inv,p Annualized investment cost per capacity e/MW
C inv,e Annualized investment cost per energy storage e/MWh
ηch Charging efficiency %
ηdch Discharging efficiency %
Wp Weight of representative period -
Lh Length of a time step h
Decision Variables
demp,t Cleared energy demand MWh
lemp,t Not served energy demand MWh
gsrp,t Generation from strategic reserves MWh
dcm Cleared capacity demand MW
lcm Not served capacity demand MW
lsr Not served capacity on strategic reserves MW
capi Installed capacity MW
gi,p,t Generation cleared at energy market MWh
capcmi Capacity cleared at capacity market MW
xiii
capsri Contracted capacity in strategic reserves MW
gresi Cleared RES certificates MWh
rrri,p Contracted capacity in downward reserves MW
rrri,p Contracted capacity in upward reserves MW
λemp,t Market clearing price for energy market e/MWh
λcm Market clearing price for capacity market e/MW
λsr Market clearing price for strategic reserves e/MW
λres Market clearing price for RES certificates e/MWh
λrrp Market clearing price for downward reserves e/MW
λrrp Market clearing price for upward reserves e/MW
p Installed storage capacity MW
e Installed energy storage MWh
chp,t Charging energy MWh
dchp,t Discharging energy MWh
ep,t Energy storage state-of-charge MWh
Dual Variables
βemp,t Dual of energy demand curve e/MWh
βcm Dual of capacity demand curve e/MW
µgsrp,t Dual of activation strategic reserves e/MWh
µemi,p,t Dual of generation limit e/MWh
ρem,i,p,t Dual of downward ramping limit e/MWh
ρem,i,p,t Dual of upward ramping limit e/MWh
µcmi Dual of offered capacity limit to capacity market e/MW
µsri Dual of offered capacity limit to strategic reserves e/MW
µresi Dual of offered RES certificates e/MWh
µrri,p Dual of downward reserves limited by ramping e/MW
µrr gi,p,t Dual of downward reserves limited by generation e/MW
µrri,p Dual of upward reserves limited by ramping e/MW
µrr gi,p,t Dual of upward reserves limited by generation e/MW
νemp,t Dual of price floor on energy market MWh
νemp,t Dual of price cap on energy market MWh
νcm Dual of price floor on capacity market MW
νcm Dual of price cap on capacity market MW
νsr Dual of price floor for strategic reserves MW
νsr Dual of price cap for strategic reserves MW
νres Dual of price floor for RES certificates MWh
νres Dual of price cap for RES certificates MWh
νrrp Dual of price floor for downward reserves MW
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νrrp Dual of price cap for downward reserves MW
νrrp Dual of price floor for upward reserves MW
νrrp Dual of price cap for upward reserves MW
µep,t Dual of energy storage limit e/MWh
µchp,t Dual of charging limit e/MWh
µdchp,t Dual of discharging limit e/MWh
βe# Dual of energy state-of-charge e/MWh
βep,t Dual of hourly energy state-of-charge e/MWh
Auxiliaries
Πa Utility of agent a e
Interconnected Markets
Sets
t ∈ T Set of time steps t
z ∈ Z Set of market zones z
zcm ∈ Zcm Set of market zones zcm with capacity market
zsr ∈ Zsr Set of market zones zsr with strategic reserves
i ∈ N Set of generators i
a ∈ A Set of agents a
χa ∈ Xa Set of strategies of agent a
χ ∈ X Set of all strategies of all agents
Parameters
Demz,t Reference demand on energy-based market MWh
Eemz Slope of demand curve on energy market e/MWh2
λem#z Reference price for energy e/MWh
Dcm#zcm Target demand on capacity market MW
Dcm,exzcm Explicit capacity demand MW
Dcm,imzcm Implicit capacity demand MW
λcm#zcm Target price on capacity market e/MW
Dsrzsr Volume of strategic reserves MW
Dsr,imzsr Volume of strategic reserves (implicit) MW
Dresz RES target MWh
C invi,z Annualized investment cost e/MW
xv
Cgi,z Variable cost for generation e/MWh
Ai,z,t Availability of technology %
Rhi,z Hourly ramp rate %
F cmi,zcm Derating for capacity market %
F sri,zsr Derating for strategic reserves %
F resi,z Derating for RES market %
C inv,IOz,z Annualized investment cost for interconnection e/MW
F cmz,zcm Derating of interconnection capacity %
F srz,zsr Derating of interconnection capacity %
λemz Price floor of energy-based market e/MWh
λ
em
z Price cap of energy-based market e/MWh
λcmzcm Price floor of capacity market e/MW
λ
cm
zcm Price cap of capacity market e/MW
λcm,pz,zcm Price floor for cross-border permit e/MW
λ
cm,p
z,zcm Price cap for cross-border permit e/MW
λsrzsr Price floor for strategic reserves e/MW
λ
sr
zsr Price cap for strategic reserves e/MW
λsr,pz,zsr Price floor for cross-border permit e/MW
λ
sr,p
z,zsr Price cap for cross-border permit e/MW
λresz Price floor of RES certificates e/MWh
λ
res
z Price cap of RES certificates e/MWh
Wt Weight of representative time step -
Lh Length of a time step h
Decision Variables
demz,t Cleared energy demand MWh
lemz,t Not served energy demand MWh
gsrz,t Generation from strategic reserves MWh
dcmz Cleared capacity demand MW
lcmz Not served capacity demand MW
lsrz Not served capacity on strategic reserves MW
capi,z Installed capacity MW
gi,z,t Generation cleared at energy market MWh
capcmi,z,zcm Capacity cleared at capacity market MW
capsri,z,zsr Contracted capacity in strategic reserves MW
gresi,z Cleared RES certificates MWh
icapz,z′ Interconnection capacity MW
f emz,z′,t Energy exchange between market zones MWh
xvi
λemz,t Market clearing price for energy market e/MWh
λcmz Market clearing price for capacity market e/MW
λcm,pz,zcm Price for cross-border permit on capacity market e/MW
λsrz Market clearing price for strategic reserves e/MW
λsr,pz,zsr Price for cross-border permit on strategic reserves e/MW
λresz Market clearing price for RES certificates e/MWh
Dual Variables
βemz,t Dual of energy demand curve e/MWh
βcmz Dual of capacity demand curve e/MW
µgsrz,t Dual of activation strategic reserves e/MWh
µemi,z,t Dual of generation limit e/MWh
ρem,i,z,t Dual of downward ramping limit e/MWh
ρem,i,z,t Dual of upward ramping limit e/MWh
µcmi,z,zcm Dual of offered capacity limit to capacity market e/MW
µsri,z,zsr Dual of offered capacity limit to strategic reserves e/MW
µresi,z Dual of offered RES certificates e/MWh
µIOz,z,t Dual of energy flow limit by interconnection e/MWh
νemz,t Dual of price floor on energy market MWh
νemz,t Dual of price cap on energy market MWh
νcmzcm Dual of price floor on capacity market MW
νcmzcm Dual of price cap on capacity market MW
νcm,pz,zcm Dual of price floor on capacity permit MW
νcm,pz,zcm Dual of price cap on capacity permit MW
νsrzsr Dual of price floor for strategic reserves MW
νsrzsr Dual of price cap for strategic reserves MW
νsr,pz,zsr Dual of price floor for SR permit MW
νsr,pz,zsr Dual of price cap for SR permit MW
νresz Dual of price floor for RES certificates MWh
νresz Dual of price cap for RES certificates MWh
Auxiliaries
Πa Utility of agent a e
xvii
Risk Aversion and Capacity Mechanisms
Sets
t ∈ T Set of time steps t
s ∈ S Set of scenarios s
i ∈ N Set of generators i
a ∈ A Set of agents a
χa ∈ Xa Set of strategies of agent a
χ ∈ X Set of all strategies of all agents
Parameters
Dems,t Reference demand on energy-based market MWh
Dcms Minimum demand on capacity market MW
Dcm#s Target demand on capacity market MW
Ecms Slope of demand curve on capacity market e/MW2
λcm,0s Y-axis intercept of capacity demand curve e/MW
Dress RES target MWh
C invi Annualized investment cost e/MW
Cgi Variable cost for generation e/MWh
Ai,s,t Availability of technology %
Rhi Hourly ramp rate %
F cmi Derating for capacity market %
F resi Derating for RES market %
βi Interval for Value-at-Risk -
γi Weighting of utility function -
λem Price floor of energy-based market e/MWh
λ
em Price cap of energy-based market e/MWh
λcm Price floor of capacity market e/MW
λ
cm Price cap of capacity market e/MW
λres Price floor of RES certificates e/MWh
λ
res Price cap of RES certificates e/MWh
Ws,t Weight of representative time step -
Lh Length of a time step h
Ps Probability of each scenario
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1.1 Sustainability – Balancing Decarbonization,
Security of Supply and Competitiveness
The outlook for the catastrophic consequences of a human-induced climate
change requires a transition of our society towards a more sustainable coexistence
protecting ourselves and future generations. A development that meets “the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.” [1] is the core of the motivation for initiated transition
of the energy system to a more sustainable one.
The transition towards a more sustainable system rests on three pillars:
Decarbonization, Security of Supply, and Competitiveness as illustrated in
Figure 1.1. As stated in the Energy Roadmap 2050 by the European Commission
[2]: “People’s well-being, industrial competitiveness and the overall functioning
of society are dependent on safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy.”
So far, trying to balance these three pillars has presented a number of challenges.
For example, the cost of ensuring security of supply might threaten the
competitiveness. In turn, concerns about the competitiveness might reduce the
ambitions to decarbonize the energy system.
These challenges come at a time where electricity, more than ever, is a vital
good for society. The unavailability of a functioning power system often has
1
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Decarbonization
CompetitivenessSecurity of Supply
Figure 1.1: Three pillars of a sustainable energy system
tangible impacts within a few hours or even minutes/seconds. As a part of
the energy system, the power system also has to become more sustainable.
Consequently, the ambitions for the sustainable transition of the power system
must also consider all three pillars. First, this implies a decarbonized power
system based on Renewable Energy Sources (RES), which requires intelligent
use of technologies like storage, demand flexibility and shared assets on a wider
geographical area. With respect to operations, this includes cooperation and
coordination across national borders. Second, the quality of service needs to be
ensured in the short- and long-term. Security of supply means that the power
system functions well in situations with scarce supply, potential oversupply and
situations in which a quick reaction to changing conditions is required. Ideally,
the probability of ending up in one of these situations is reduced to a sufficiently
low level upfront. Finally, all this must be aligned with consistent ways for
investors to recover costs and consumers to pay socially acceptable prices that
reflect the received service.
Introduction
The balance between decarbonization, security of supply and competitiveness is
subject to public debate. It is a topic for policy-making and relies on inputs from
the market participants, social partners as well as researchers. Consequently, in
order for researchers to give input for a sustainable European power system, a
coherent look at all three pillars is crucial.
The research questions addressed in this thesis intersect with all three pillars:
decarbonization, security of supply and competitiveness. In what follows, each
of the three pillars is briefly outlined and the important elements for this thesis
are highlighted.
1.1.1 Decarbonization: Moving to Renewable Energy
The power sector, or more precisely, the generation of electrical energy, has been
identified as the major driver for decarbonization of the European energy system.
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The European Union has agreed on the ambition to completely decarbonize
the power sector by 2050 [2]. In order to achieve this target, the shares of RES
need to be increased. The 2030 climate & energy framework [3] targets a share
of minimum 27% of RES in the energy system, with the majority in the power
system.
As a result, the following developments can be observed in most European
markets: The EU Member States have initiated an ongoing change in the
capacity mix towards more RES, often triggered by support mechanisms, e.g.
subsidies. Already today, RES reach a substantial share in terms of both energy
and capacity. In many market zones in Europe, the cost reduction has made
RES competitive with conventional generation technologies. Therefore, RES
push more and more existing conventional technologies out of the market.
This development has also led to a paradigm shift from an Operational
Expenditure (OPEX) to a Capital Expenditure (CAPEX)-based power system
[4]. Investments rather than fuel and operations are the predominant cost. This
is especially true for wind and solar PV , for which the operational cost is close
to zero.
The development towards a system more and more driven by CAPEX rather
than OPEX is addressed in this thesis. It examines several market mechanisms
and their ability to account for this development. The market mechanisms
should create incentives for RES and conventional technologies to facilitate
the transition towards a sustainable power system in the years to come. In
addition, the research takes into account the increasing impact of variability
of RES translating into more variable energy prices and uncertainties for all
market participants.
1.1.2 Security of Supply: Keeping the Lights On
Even before the expansion of RES in the power system, security of supply was
a major point of attention for all actors involved. According to Eurelectric, the
Union of Electricity Industry [5], “security of electricity supply is the ability of
the electrical power system to provide electricity to end-users with a specified
level of continuity and quality in a sustainable manner, relating to the existing
standards and contractual agreements at the points of delivery.”
Security of supply can be further distinguished into the short-term operational
reliability and the long-term adequacy (Figure 1.2). The short-term operational
reliability or security of supply “relates to the actual delivery [...], and means
the operational reliability of the system [...], including the ability to overcome
short-term failures of individual components” [5]. With increasing shares of RES,
the concept of short-term operational flexibility must be broadened. Today’s
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Figure 1.2: Security of Supply and associated subconcepts [5, 6]
power system requires more and more fast-responding reserves from supply
side, demand side, storage and interconnection to ensure balancing supply and
demand. In the short-term, this is a matter of providing flexibility rather than
sufficient capacity [6].
In the long-term, according to the definition by European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) [7], the system
adequacy describes the “ability of a power system to supply the load in all
the steady states in which the power system may exist considering standard
conditions”. Generation adequacy, as a subpart of system adequacy, describes the
ability of the system to generate the amount of electricity demanded. Moreover,
the system has the capability to generate electricity in a flexible manner such
that fluctuations in both demand and supply can be accommodated. In contrast
to short-term flexibility, the concept is broader, and addresses the availability
and technical characteristics to follow expected demand and supply patterns.
Equally important is that the market has to provide an adequate platform for
trading electricity and providing incentives to aim for system adequacy: the
concept of market adequacy.
Similar to dividing security of supply into a short-term and long-term component,
the responsibilities are also differentiated among market actors. The roles
and responsibilities for the short-term operational security are clearly defined.
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) have put in place services and markets
that allow the TSO to balance demand and supply in real-time. These markets
for ancillary services include the common operating reserve products [8].
For long-term adequacy, and in particular for generation adequacy, no direct
responsibility is assigned to a specific actor. In turn, in a liberalized market,
the market signals should provide sufficient incentives for market participants
to invest in technologies contributing to generation adequacy. In line with
this, the European Commission [9] states that an adequately interconnected,
SUSTAINABILITY 5
market-based energy system should create incentives for necessary investments
in generation and transmission. Such a market would yield the economically
most effective outcome and minimize the need for state-planned investments. At
the same time, the European Commission [9] acknowledges that shortcomings of
the current market arrangements reduce the attractiveness of new investments.
Consequently, there are doubts about the capability of the current market to
attract adequate investments to ensure that the current level of generation
adequacy, and consequently security of supply, can be maintained in the future.
The presented research examines to what extent markets with a capacity
mechanism (CM) are adequate in the sense that they provide incentives for
the investments needed. In addition, it examines if market adequacy can be
achieved without inherent technology-choices. The interaction of generation
and market adequacy are essential (Figure 1.2).
1.1.3 Competitiveness: Markets and Decision-making
Market mechanisms, through their impact on market participants, are the main
tool for achieving security of supply and decarbonization while maintaining
competitiveness. In Europe, vertically integrated utilities for generation,
transmission, distribution and retail were split up over the last decade into a
multitude of market participants. Next to the classical generation companies
and system operators, today’s electricity markets involve storage operators,
aggregators for demand response, and active individual electricity consumers.
Hence, investment has become more and more subject to individual decision-
making rather than central planning.
Decision-making is mainly driven by assumed future electricity prices. The
electricity price is an aggregation of many cost elements resulting from market
clearings and regulation. The European Commission [10] provides a schematic
overview of the cost elements (Figure 1.3).
The price of electricity includes regulated cost elements for the transmission
of electricity and associated services for both transmission and distribution
networks. In addition, taxes, levies and exemptions, associated to specific
policies or a general budget, form a substantial part of the electricity price.
The main focus here is on the component of the electricity prices related to the
energy cost. The energy cost is composed of the requirements for retail and the
price for energy on the wholesale electricity market. The wholesale electricity
market is a series of markets that are put in place to bring together the supply
and demand side. CMs are discussed as one element in this series of markets.
Consequently, the research of this thesis focuses on the wholesale element in
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Figure 1.3: Origin of cost in electricity end-user price formation [10]
the energy component of the electricity price. Reported costs in the thesis are
therefore only to be seen as a part of the end-user price.
Taking a more detailed look at the wholesale market, the different sub-markets
can be grouped in multiple ways. Figure 1.4 shows a grouping in two dimensions.
The first dimension is the temporal distance of a market to the physical delivery
of electricity in real-time. Typically, the markets are distinguished in forward,
day-ahead and real-time, including intra-day and balancing. However, their
detailed implementation can be very market zone-specific. The second dimension
is linked to the product type traded. Most common is the trading of electrical
energy based on the output, valued in e/MWh. Hereby, forward markets take
place up to multiple years in advance, while day-ahead markets take place one
day before actual delivery. Closer to delivery, also availability of capacities is
contracted in ancillary service markets to deliver energy output and/or flexibility
in real-time. These products often have a combined valuation in e/MWh and
e/MW.
CMs are a complementary sub-market in which capacity providers are solely
remunerated for their availability, valued in e/MW. Capacity providers are not
only conventional generation capacities but can also include demand response,
storage applications or capacities from adjacent market zones.
Linked to offered availability of capacity providers, three different dimensions of
availability can be differentiated [11]: security, firmness and adequacy. Security
summarizes the readiness of existing capacity to respond to the actual load
as part of real-time ancillary services. Firmness describes the availability of
installed capacity to operate. It depends on short and medium-term management
of generator maintenance, fuel supply contracts, reservoir management, start-up
schedules, etc. Adequacy means sufficient installed and/or planned capacity is
available to meet demand in the long-term.
The three terms, adequacy, firmness (or firm capacity), and availability return in
the literature to describe CMs. Therefore, in this thesis, CMs are also referred to
as markets for availability. In addition, offered capacity to a CM is understood
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Figure 1.4: Wholesale market framework including capacity mechanisms
as firm capacity.
CMs are embedded in a wider market framework, which has different temporal,
as well as product specifications (Figure 1.4). The interaction of these
complementary sub-markets is the core of the research presented. Special focus
is on the role of the CMs. The insights obtained from models incorporating
CMs helps to understand how competitiveness and security of supply can be
maintained, while advancements in the decarbonization can be achieved.
1.2 Research Question and Strategy
The objective of this thesis is to get better insights in the working principle and
the resulting outcome of market designs including CMs. Therefore, the research
examines the role of a CM next to existing energy market designs, including
day-ahead markets for energy output and markets for flexibility. Short-term
markets are typically based on output and defined by technical and operational
constraints, while CMs are based on availability and long-term investment
decisions. The combination of the two temporal resolutions is one of the crucial
points of the research.
Results of the research are price signals from different markets resulting in
incentives for generation and demand response (DR), which eventually lead to a
change of the generation mix. Next to the temporal scope, also the spatial scope
is important. A CM in one market zone might affect neighboring market zones
with different market designs. The research is important for the assessment
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and resulting policy input for the future model of the Internal Energy Market
(IEM).
Therefore, the following research questions have been formulated:
• How does a capacity mechanism look like that equally contributes to short-
term reliability, long-term adequacy and market adequacy?
This research question has been subdivided in four subquestions and
consequently transferred into the research strategy. Each of the subquestions is
addressed in the consecutive chapters of this thesis:
1. Do existing market designs such as energy-only markets and revenues from
ancillary services provide enough incentives for appropriate investments?
2. How does the integration of capacity mechanism affect existing electricity
markets?
3. Can capacity mechanisms influence the technical development and
integration of demand response?
4. How can the researched capacity mechanisms be implemented in reality?
How do they perform compared to recent schemes?
1.3 Scope and Contributions
During the course of the research, CMs have been constantly and intensively
discussed in both the academic literature and public debate. Throughout the
duration of the doctoral research, new implementations and redesigns of existing
CMs have taken place in many market zones. Moreover, CMs have also turned
out to be highly political and of interest to opposing stakeholder groups.
In this context, researchers have proposed economic models to assess the impact
of CMs on constructed examples, mostly with simplification in the operational
details of the power system. At the same time, long-term system planning
models with increasing operational details are constantly applied for future
scenarios. However, they are limited in the representation of different market
mechanisms and individual decision-making. Despite their shortcomings to
combine the equally important elements, these types of models are frequently
used for policy advice on design of CMs and assessment of projected outcomes.
The scope of the thesis is to bridge the gap between typical optimization and
economic models. The proposed model formulations take findings from detailed
modeling of technologies, typically found in long-term planning models, and
detailed representation of market mechanisms, in particular, CMs.
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Moreover, the discussion is either driven by participating technologies, which
often perceive a CM as positive, or by non-participating technologies, which
expect a disadvantage. The assessment and quantification of revenues in market
frameworks including a CM is the aim of the research. The objective is to
understand the effects for all market participants, both participating and non-
participating in a CM. It includes the direct effect through remunerating firm
capacity and the resulting technology choices, as well as indirect effects for
market participants through changing market prices for energy and flexibility.
Transmission and energy exchange as source of adequacy are the basis for the
European IEM. As such, they are part of the discussion on market mechanisms
for firm capacity. The presented research analyzes how CMs interact with other
markets. Hereby, two developments are considered. First, the model framework
is used to analyze market zones that implement CMs independent from each
other. The aim is to quantify possible inefficiencies in this patchwork of different
CMs. Second, the research quantifies the potential of harmonizing CMs on
European level, to reduce the inefficiencies by allowing capacities to participate
in neighboring markets.
All case studies are based on conceptual test systems and simplified assumptions
on available technologies. As such, the analyses do not account for capacity
legacy, i.e., pre-existing generation mixes in place for example prior to the
implementation of a CM. In the same way, the presented model is not dynamic
in the sense that it spans a development over multiple years. In fact, the
presented results should be interpreted as the endpoint of a development after
sufficient time for generation mix and investors to adapt.
Another important aspect that has not been addressed in detail is the decision-
making of authorities and regulators on the implementation of a CM. None of
the models include a decision for a specific CM: the CMs in the case studies are
imposed conditions by the scenarios. As such, the results contain the response
of the market participants to the predefined configurations of the CMs. At
several points in the thesis, possible extensions of the model framework, to
research the authority’s decision-making, are suggested.
Keeping the scope and limitations in mind, the four main contributions of the
thesis to the state-of-the-art research of CMs are:
Modeling Framework for Capacity Mechanisms: A coherent modeling
framework is developed, which allows quantifying the impact of
the different implementations of CMs. Distinguishing mathematical
formulations for five CMs are proposed. These CMs cover the major
concepts currently implemented or discussed in the literature. In addition,
the model describes markets for energy, flexibility and RES certificates.
Technically, it is based on an equilibrium model and the formulation of a
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non-cooperative game of individually and simultaneously acting agents.
The level of operational detail approaches that of power system planning
models.
Impact of Capacity Mechanisms on Market Participants: The devel-
oped model framework is used to assess the impact of CMs on all relevant
market participants. To do so, the model represents the individual decision-
making of the market participants, including generation technologies
(conventional and RES), storage, interconnection, and consumers. In
addition, a distinction is made between those participating in CMs and
those only indirectly affected by them. The assessment of the CMs is
based on changing shares and origins of revenues from different markets.
Consequently, it allows identifying benefits for technologies translating
into the resulting generation mix. Moreover, the market outcome is
analyzed from a systems perspective, including indicators like average
cost of electricity supply, Energy Not Served (ENS) or reserve margins.
Additional focus is put on the decision-making of individual market
participants, which can be risk-neutral or risk-averse. Risk-averse means
that negative outcomes have a higher impact on the agent’s decision-
making. The model allows to quantify the impact of a CM on the
decision-making taking into account the agent’s risk aversion.
Role of Capacity Mechanisms in an Interconnected Market: CMs are
implemented in an international and interconnected power system. As
such, a CM triggers effects in its own market zone, but also in adjacent
market zones. The proposed model framework facilitates a quantifying
assessment of these so-called cross-border effects. Multiple interconnected
market zones with different CMs can be analyzed. In particular, the model
framework is used to study a multi-zonal setting with three different CMs.
An assessment is done based on the impact on energy flows, shifts of costs
among the market zones, individual ENS, and shared reserve margins. It
is enriched by a quantification of the impact of cross-border participation
in CMs, i.e., participation of capacity in neighboring market zones.
Methodology to Compute a Risk-Averse Equilibrium: Finally, a new
algorithm is proposed to compute a risk-averse equilibrium for the non-
cooperative games in the modeling framework. It utilizes an iterative
process and transfers concepts of the Alternating Direction Method of
Multipliers (ADMM) from distributed optimization to equilibrium models.
The algorithm allows performing larger case studies combining hourly
temporal resolution and annualized investment decisions with a larger
number of scenarios. The algorithm is able to compute an equilibrium in
a stable and reliable way, even for mathematically challenging problems
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with risk-averse agents. For larger case studies, it outperforms the
state-of-the-art solver based on Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP)
reformulations.
1.4 Research Environment
Throughout the research, many research groups, institutions and colleagues
contributed to the results presented in this thesis. By stating them here, I
would also like to thank them for their help and support. From the beginning,
the research was embedded in the Electa group of the department of electrical
engineering (ESAT) at the KU Leuven and energy market team at VITO, both
part of EnergyVille. Within Electa, researching electricity markets and having
close cooperation with colleagues working on technical advancements in power
systems had a valuable influence. In particular, the team of researchers on
electricity markets made this thesis possible. Especially, the work of Cedric De
Jonghe [12], Kristof De Vos [8], Benjamin Dupont [13], Ariana Ramos [14], Tom
Brijs [15], Kristof May, and Arne van Stiphout [6] should be highlighted.
In addition, the research topic was awarded with a PhD fellowship by
the Research Foundation - Flanders (Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek -
Vlaanderen, FWO) in collaboration with VITO (Vlaamse Instelling voor
Technologisch Onderzoek). Therefore, as integral part of the research, a close
cooperation with the VITO energy market team has been established. This
exchange with the whole team lead to valuable contributions to the modeling,
the analysis, and evaluation of the results and findings. Special thanks go to
Daan Six, Hélène Le Cadre and Ana Virag, who also co-authored the academic
publications. In addition, my research found its way to many academic and
industry research projects. Moreover, it facilitated the collaboration with other
VITO-doctorandi, to mention Kris Poncelet from mechanical engineering (TME,
KU Leuven).
Outside the familiar working environment, the research was enriched by
three cooperations with international partners. First, work that is presented
in Chapter 2 of the thesis is based on a collaboration within the Conseil
International des Grands Réseaux Electriques (CIGRE) working group C5.17 on
capacity mechanisms [16]. Throughout the two year duration, the research has
benefited from the work in an international expert group. Special thanks go to
professor Laurens de Vries and professor Gerard Doorman whose dissertations
on CMs [17, 18] form a basis for the conducted research.
Second, the work on CMs in the European IEM is the result of a framework
project conducted for the European Commission and published in a report [19].
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The findings of the report that partially come back in Chapter 5 came forth
from the fruitful cooperation with Berit Tennbakk and her team from THEMA.
Third, during the last part of the doctoral research, a research visit “abroad”
at the Université catholique de Louvain was realized. Professor Anthony
Papavasiliou and professor Yves Smeers from the Center for Operations Research
and Econometrics (CORE) have helped tremendously to transfer my model
findings to conclusions and to bring the content of this thesis to a higher scientific
level.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The outline of the thesis and the consecutive chapters are visualized in Figure 1.5.
The schematic overview summarizes the chapters and their content. In addition,
it highlights the different building blocks of the conducted research and their
relationships. The arrows provide a guideline for the reader to see the gradual
extension of the model framework. The chapters of the thesis are organized as
follows:
Chapter 2
Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Literature Review
a
• Generation Adequacy
• Terminology of CM
• Current Implementations
Models for Markets including
Capacity Mechanisms
• Equilibrium model
• Non-cooperative game
• Mathematical formulation
Market Response to
Capacity Mechanisms
• Price-elastic demand
• Storage operator
Flexibility and
Capacity Mechanisms
• Reserve requirements
• Higher RES targets
• Non-participating technologies
Interconnected
Capacity Mechanisms
• Shared generation adequacy
• Patchwork of CM
• Cross-border effects
Cross-border
Participation
• Explicit participation
• Implicit participation
• Derating of interconnection
Risk aversion &
Capacity Mechanisms
• Risk-averse decision-making
• Stable investment signals
• Risk-adjusted expected cost
Risk-Averse
Equilibrium
• Stochastic equilibrium
• Scenario-based
• ADMM-based methodology
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Figure 1.5: Schematic overview of chapters and their summarized content
Chapter 2 provides an introduction into the topic of CMs. It summarizes
relevant terminology and taxonomy. A categorization is done of the most
common CMs. Current implementations in Europe and in the rest of the
world are listed. The chapter reviews the literature on CMs. The work in
this chapter is based on:
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• H. Höschle and G. Doorman. “Capacity Mechanisms: Results from a
World Wide Survey”. In: CIGRE Sci. Eng. 7 (2017), pp. 117–124. url:
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/584883.
• H. Höschle and K. De Vos. “Implementation of a Strategic Reserve in
Belgium: Product Design and Market Results”. In: CIGRE Sess. 2016.
2016. url: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/548717.
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, and D. Van Hertem. “Capacity mechanisms
driving dynamic capacity investment decision making with increased
renewable energy sources”. In: 13th Eur. IAEE Conf. 2013. 2013. url:
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/411816.
Chapter 3 introduces the model framework developed to analyze the impact
of CMs in a quantitative manner. The chapter includes a discussion
of the used model type and its solution concept: equilibrium models
resulting in a Nash Equilibrium (NE). The main part of the chapter
provides the mathematical formulation of the optimization problems for
the market participants including generators, storage operators, consumers
and market operators. The work in this chapter is based on:
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, H. Le Cadre, and R. Belmans. “Electricity markets
for energy, flexibility and availability - Impact of capacity mechanisms on
the remuneration of generation technologies”. In: Energy Econ. 66 (July
2017), pp. 372–383. issn: 01409883. doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.06.024.
• K. Poncelet, H. Höschle, E. Delarue, A. Virag, and W. D’haeseleer.
“Selecting Representative Days for Capturing the Implications of Integrating
Intermittent Renewables in Generation Expansion Planning Problems”. In:
IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 32.3 (May 2016), pp. 1936–1948. issn: 0885-8950.
doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2016.2596803.
Chapter 4 is the first application of the proposed modeling framework. The
context is a deterministic isolated market that includes generators, storage
operators, consumers and market operators. The considered market
settings combine markets for energy, RES certificates, flexibility (reserve
requirements) and availability (capacity mechanisms). The research
questions addressed in this chapter relate to the changing shares of revenues
as a consequence of different CMs. A sensitivity analysis for an increasing
RES target is included. The work in this chapter is based on:
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, H. Le Cadre, and R. Belmans. “Electricity markets
for energy, flexibility and availability - Impact of capacity mechanisms on
the remuneration of generation technologies”. In: Energy Econ. 66 (July
2017), pp. 372–383. issn: 01409883. doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.06.024.
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, D. Six, and R. Belmans. “Capacity remuneration
mechanisms and the transition to low-carbon power systems”. In: Int. Conf.
Eur. Energy Mark. EEM. IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–5. isbn: 9781467366915. doi:
10.1109/EEM.2015.7216647.
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Chapter 5 is the second application of the proposed modeling framework. The
chapter applies a deterministic equilibrium model in an interconnected
market context. The effect of different CMs in interconnected market zones
is studied. The chapter extends the discussion of CMs in the previous
chapter by assessing the consequences of a CM on neighboring markets.
These consequences are quantified in terms of combined average cost,
reserve margins and achieved generation adequacy. A sensitivity analysis
examines the benefits and pitfalls of allowing capacity from neighboring
markets to participate. The work in this chapter is based on:
• H. Höschle, H. Le Cadre, and R. Belmans, “Inefficiencies caused by non-
harmonized capacity mechanisms in an interconnected electricity market”.
In: Sustain. Energy, Grids Networks, vol. 13, pp. 29–41, Mar. 2018. doi:
10.1016/j.segan.2017.11.002
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, D. Six, and R. Belmans. “Influence
of non-harmonized capacity mechanisms in an interconnected power
system on generation adequacy”. In: 2016 Power Syst. Comput.
Conf. IEEE, June 2016, pp. 1–11. isbn: 978-88-941051-2-4. doi:
10.1109/PSCC.2016.7540839.
• B. Tennbakk, P. Capros, H. Höschle, Å. Jenssen, J. Wolst, and
M. Zampera. “Framework for cross-border participation in capac-
ity mechanisms”. Final project report for European Commission,
Dec. 2016. url: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/
documents/cross-border_crm_study_-_final_report_-_170106.pdf.
• H. Höschle. “Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms – Implementations in
Europe and Implications for the European Internal Energy Market”. In:
CIGRE Int. Symp. - HVDC Syst. Mark. Integr. Lund, Sweden: CIGRE,
2015. url: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/500149.
Chapter 6 is the third application of the proposed modeling framework. The
chapter applies a stochastic equilibrium model in an isolated market. A
centralized capacity market is implemented next to markets for energy
and RES certificates. The chapter extends the discussion of CM in the
previous chapters by introducing scenario-based uncertainties during the
investment in generation capacities. A distinction is made between risk-
neutral and risk-averse investors. The research question addressed in this
chapter is a comparison of a capacity market and an increased energy
price cap, based on their capability to provide stable investment signals.
Moreover, an iterative algorithm based on ADMM is developed to compute
a risk-averse equilibrium. The work in this chapter is based on:
• H. Höschle, H. Le Cadre, Y. Smeers, A. Papavasiliou, and R. Belmans. “An
ADMM-based Method for Computing Risk-Averse Equilibrium in Capacity
Markets”. In: IEEE Trans. Power Syst. (Feb. 2018). issn: 0885-8950. doi:
10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2807738.
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Chapter 7 summarizes the main contributions, findings, and conclusions of
the thesis. Next to that, the chapter provides a short outlook including
ideas for future research in the context of CMs.
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2.1 Introduction
Capacity mechanisms (CMs) have been widely discussed in the literature over
the last years due to concerns about a distortion in the long-term investment
equilibrium, which could result in insufficient generation adequacy. Publications,
reports and dissertations among others [17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], have
studied interactions between CMs, existing electricity markets and investment
decision-making. It is not the purpose of the chapter to repeat the extensive
literature of qualitative assessments and market case studies available. This
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chapter is a condensed guideline for interested readers to find the most relevant
and elaborated literature. It focuses on the theoretical background necessary
for modeling and economic analysis in the following chapters.
Capacity
M
echanism
s
The chapter starts with an overview on the discussion of long-term generation
adequacy and the long-term investment equilibrium. It describes the theory of
marginal pricing and possible distortions that may promote the implementation
of a CM. The discussion is supported by an evaluation of a survey that examines
dependencies of system characteristics and the decision for a CM [26]:
• H. Höschle and G. Doorman. “Capacity Mechanisms: Results from a World
Wide Survey”. In: CIGRE Sci. Eng. 7 (2017), pp. 117–124. url:
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/584883.
A terminology on CMs forms the second part of this chapter. It contains the
purpose of a CM and its working principle. Note that there is not a single CM,
but CM is a collective term for a set of implementation concepts. The most
common concepts are shortly introduced and categorized. The categorization is
done along the type of product, the type of buyer and the proxy for availability.
In order to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts and actual implemen-
tations, an overview of current CM implementations is given. It is based on
literature review and the above-mentioned survey. During the course of this
doctoral research, many markets have changed their design, introduced new
CMs or re-designed existing ones. Given the ongoing discussion, it is expected
to continue over the next years.
In the literature, CMs are also often referred to as “capacity remuneration
mechanism”. However, the latter term implies that there is a remuneration,
which is not necessarily true in case of excess capacity. Therefore, the term
“capacity mechanism” has gained preference and is used throughout the thesis.
The remainder of the chapter is organized in the following way. The
literature on long-term generation adequacy and on the investment equilibrium
are summarized in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides a terminology and
a categorization of concepts describing a CM. Section 2.4 lists current
implementations of CMs. Section 2.5 concludes and outlines how the findings
in the chapter are translated into the modeling framework.
2.2 Long-term Generation Adequacy
The concept of system adequacy can be derived from the concept of long-term
adequacy as depicted in Figure 1.2. System adequacy can be subdivided in the
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concepts of network adequacy and generation adequacy, which depend on each
other.
Network adequacy covers the ability of the existing grid to transmit and
distribute the generated electricity including cross-border flows. Moreover,
it covers the ability of the grid to withstand loss of critical power plants and
power lines and resulting shifts in the power flow [5]. The concept of network
adequacy and the linked discussion on optimal investment in transmission lines
are out of scope. Nevertheless, Chapter 5 discusses interactions of generation
adequacy and interconnected markets. In the presented case study, a link
between the concepts of generation and network adequacy is established.
Generation adequacy describes the ability of the system to generate the
amount of electricity demanded. Moreover, the system has the capability
to generate electricity in a flexible way to balance demand and supply at all
times. Therefore, a distinction is made in the temporal resolution: short-term
operational flexibility and long-term generation adequacy.
On the one hand, the short-term operational flexibility adequacy includes the
ability to cover demand and withstand sudden disturbance or loss of system
elements, i.e., capacity, which can be rapidly regulated up- or downward, in
order to keep the total injection in balance with the off-take [27]. As such, it is
also indirectly linked to the long-term generation adequacy. Recently, due to
the substantial shares of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and the uptake of
new storage technologies, operational flexibility in a power system has gained
importance.
On the other hand, in the long-term, generation adequacy is the ability of the
system to cover demand. This long-term generation adequacy can be further
distinguished into three subcategories [28] (Figure 2.1).
First, generation adequacy includes the upward adequacy, i.e., the capability
of the generation mix to cover peak demand by having enough installed
capacity available. It is the traditional definition of generation adequacy and
most commonly referred to if threats to generation adequacy are discussed.
Here, a distinction between the types of capacity is made in terms of reliable
capacity. Typically, conventional technologies are valued higher than, e.g., RES
technologies.
Second, downward adequacy, i.e., the ability of the system to cover the minimum
residual load, is part of generation adequacy. It ensures fulfilling technical
constraints for grid stability and constraints of running power plants, e.g.,
must-run units [7]. Downward adequacy becomes vital in periods when demand
is low, and incompressible supply, e.g., from nuclear or non-dispatchable RES
covers or even exceeds demand.
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Figure 2.1: Downward, flexible and upward adequacy
Third and finally, flexibility adequacy covers the degree of flexibility of the
generation portfolio to facilitate the increasing share of RES to cope with
more steep ramping requirements. This subcategory is obviously linked to the
operational flexibility. Yet, flexibility adequacy describes being able to cope
with more flexibility needs at the supply side in the long run, as opposed to
short-term flexibility to react to, e.g., forecast errors. As such, the long-term
flexibility adequacy should be an incremental part of investment decisions taken
for or against technologies with certain flexibility characteristics.
The importance of generation adequacy is highlighted by the value given
to annual adequacy assessments prepared by national Transmission System
Operators (TSOs), e.g., Belgian TSO Elia’s adequacy reports [29, 30] or
the supra-national European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity (ENTSO-E) [7, 31]. Such assessments are typically part of the
process to fulfill European legal requirements [32]. They provide an overview
of generation, demand and their adequacy in different scenarios with a focus
on the power balance, margins, energy indicators and the generation mix. The
generation adequacy is assessed among others based on indicators such as Energy
Not Served (ENS) and Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) taking into account
interconnections and associated cross-border exchanges. Similar indicators are
used to evaluate the model outcomes in the following chapters of the thesis.
Ideally, generation adequacy, including all three subcategories, should be the
result of private investors reacting to adequate price signals in liberalized
electricity markets. From a systems perspective, generation adequacy is achieved
if the installed generation capacity is sufficient to meet demand during all
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periods including base and peak periods [5]. In order to have adequate installed
capacities, investment has to take place in sufficient quantity, appropriate
technologies, and in time. If, on the one hand, excess capacity is avoided and,
on the other hand, ENS is limited to operational problems, a social optimum
in terms of investments is achieved [17]. Under ideal conditions, the social
optimum coincides with an investment equilibrium.
2.2.1 Investment Equilibrium
In the discussion of investment equilibrium, technologies are often looked at
from a systems perspective rather than from an individual project decision.
The technologies are therefore mostly grouped according to their technical
and economic parameters, as well as their typical exploitation in the system.
Figure 2.2 shows a common distribution of technologies according to their
characteristics. In the stylized example, the load is divided in Base, Mid
and Peak. The technologies are ordered on the y-axis along the merit order,
i.e., with increasing operational cost. It is the result of their average cost
to generate based on the operating hours. Demand levels that cannot be
covered by the installed capacities is referred to as ENS. The distribution of the
technologies schematically describes the investment equilibrium for the given
demand assuming the ENS is valued with a Value of Lost Load (VOLL).
However, this approach, also referred to as screening curve approach [35], neglects
substantial characteristics of the technologies and markets. For example, the
load-duration curve represents the demand in a system sorted in descending order
and therefore losing the sequential information. Consequently, the approach
cannot account for ramping capabilities. In addition, market specifications and
different traded products are neglected, which is why an investment equilibrium
cannot be assessed without a discussion of the market setting.
In order to describe the investment equilibrium of the different technologies, it
is worth to first look at the theory of an energy-only market. In energy-only
markets as predominant in most European markets, marginal pricing is applied.
The theory of marginal pricing, as introduced by Sweppe [36] and Caramanis
et al. [37, 38], is supposed to achieve an efficient market outcome under ideal
conditions. Under these ideal conditions, the theory yields both an ideal short-
term and long-term market outcome, i.e., resulting in an optimal dispatch as
well as generation investment.
Marginal pricing is based on a short-term market clearing, e.g., the common
hourly market clearings on today’s wholesale markets [39]. A supply curve is
formed by ordering the bids along the merit order (Figure 2.3). Typically, the
bids represent the short-run marginal cost. The clearing with the demand curve
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Figure 2.2: Determination of optimal generation mix using screening curves
(based on [33, 34])
yields a market clearing price that is at the level of the marginal unit, i.e., the
price-setting unit.
All accepted suppliers receive the same market clearing price. Consequently, all
committed units with marginal cost lower than the cleared market price receive
an infra-marginal rent ( ) equal to the difference between the market clearing
price and the marginal cost of the unit. Figure 2.3a shows the situation during
peak demand in which the most expensive unit is setting the price. All units
except the price-setting unit receive the infra-marginal rent.
In case of scarcity, i.e., the supply is insufficient to cover the full demand, prices
are set higher than the marginal cost of the most expensive unit. Either the
price is determined by price-elastic demand, or by a price cap to ensure that
the markets yields a feasible market price. During these hours, the accepted
suppliers can earn an additional scarcity rent ( ). Figure 2.3b shows a situation
in which the price is determined by the price-response of the demand. All
suppliers, including the most expensive technologies earn the additional scarcity
rent. The distinction between infra-marginal a scarcity rent is an arbitrary one.
It only helps distinguishing the situation that is responsible for setting the price
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Figure 2.3: Peak and scarcity pricing in electricity markets
in a given hour.
Investment in generation depends on the revenues from selling the produced
electricity to cover its full costs. According to the given theory with marginal
clearing price, bidding at marginal costs ensures the coverage of the operational
cost reflected while infra-marginal and scarcity rents are necessary to cover the
fixed costs of the power generators [40]. Especially, peak generators rely on
price spikes or scarcity rents to cover their fixed costs [34].
According to this theory, investment in generation is then justified if the
accumulated infra-marginal and scarcity rents over the lifetime of an investment
at least cover the investment cost. In the long-term, on the one hand, often-
occurring scarcity rents are a sufficient price signal to give incentives for new
investment in generation. On the other hand, prices that never exceed peak
prices indicate sufficient or overcapacity in the system and defer new investments
until market clearings yield higher prices again. As such, a long-term equilibrium
of installed capacities emerges.
However, there are major concerns that this theory is affected by the inherent
characteristics of the electricity system and the market functioning that leads
to distortions. Summing up the state of the literature, [17] claims that there is
no consensus in the scientific literature whether liberalized electricity markets
can be expected to produce adequate capacity levels continuously.
2.2.2 Distortions to the Equilibrium
Often-discussed flaws of current markets and potential distortions are listed.
The list is based on a detailed discussion by de Vries [17]. The discussion on
the individual elements is intended to be a summary only.
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1. Absence of price-elastic demand
2. Price restrictions or price caps
3. Imperfect information
4. Regulatory uncertainty and restrictions
5. Risk aversion
6. Uncertainty of input markets and other externalities
Absence of price-elastic demand
The problems arising from missing demand flexibility and the coinciding lack
of demand reacting to prices has been widely discussed [34]. The absence of
price-elastic demand is often mentioned as a notorious problem for electricity
markets to find a proper market signal, i.e., a market price, which reflects the
value of reliability. In other words, due to consumers’ missing possibilities
to express their value properly, often due to limited technical infrastructure,
information necessary to provide an optimal reliability level is not revealed [41].
Therefore, an energy-only market with limited demand flexibility would be
always characterized by prices that alter between prices following relatively low
operating costs of generators and the high spike prices that are close to the
VOLL in times of scarcity [42]. As such, according to [41], given low demand
flexibility, prices for energy cannot solve the reliability problem without selling
a reliability product, e.g., in form of a CM.
Two developments are possible to introduce the consumer’s value back into the
price signal. One the one hand, market mechanisms are discussed that reflect
the value of reliability in a market price, such as for example operation reserves
demand curve (ORDC) or via another market in form of a CM. On the other
hand, using advanced infrastructure, the demand could be enabled to express
its value directly to the market. This could be done via a more explicit price
signal, e.g., real-time pricing, or direct subscription models for reliability, as for
example capacity subscription (Section 2.4.1).
Price restrictions or price caps
Often-linked to the absence of price-elastic demand, price restrictions or price
caps are introduced to the market to avoid the abuse of market power at the
supply side in times of scarcity [43]. However, such regulatory intervention with
the market prices suppresses the possibility to find the true value of reliability
by a market-based mechanism, especially if the price cap is set too low [44].
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Consequently, if the price cap is reached often, it prevents necessary market
signals for investment [45], also referred to as the missing money problem.
However, [34] argues that even with VOLL-pricing the effect on supply side
investment is limited. The price signal might not be strong enough to outweigh
the risk linked to the frequency and amplitude of price spikes in a VOLL-pricing
scheme, cfr. the after next paragraph on risk aversion. Therefore, VOLL-pricing
is in the first place rather a means to stimulate the demand side rather than to
win investors over.
In combination with CMs, the level of the price cap and the form of remuneration
are interlinked. Yet, [46] highlights that a CM is not only meant as a motivation
for allowing a low energy price cap and still providing compensation for
generators. A CM is more a mechanism to value availability in times of scarcity
rather than replacing a regulatory intervention.
Missing market
As hinted in the previous paragraph, even if the missing money problem could
be solved by changing the rules for the price formation, problems remain. One
of these problems is often referred to by the term missing market [47].
According to [48], missing markets exist if markets do not allow or limit market
participants in transferring risks or other externalities into market signals. A
well-known example where the missing market was resolved is the pricing of the
externalities linked to CO2-emission, now partly covered in an Emissions Trading
System (ETS). Newberry [48] states that the problem of missing markets is also
relevant for the electricity market because policy makers are often not willing
to put markets in place that could affect market participants’ profits.
With respect to generation adequacy, the absence of a market for reliability
either in form of a dedicated market or adequate market signal through energy-
based prices is identified as a missing market [42]. In other words, the problem
with missing markets arises because there is no market that internalizes security
of supply externalities [49]. In that way, a CM could transform consumers’
preferences for security of supply into an explicit capacity target that can be
channeled via a CM independently of the actual implementation.
Risk aversion
In combination with a missing market and price spikes, the absence of investment
in adequate generation capacity is also linked to the risk aversion of potential
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investors [50]. This risk aversion is not exclusive to investors for generation, but
can also affect other technologies and the demand side.
As mentioned above, occurrences of energy-based prices that reflect scarcity, and
thus are high enough to justify investments in additional generation capacity,
are rare and difficult to predict. Extreme price volatility due to both inelastic
and volatile demand and supply is the consequence [41]. The volatility of, and
uncertainty about, future revenues in combination with significant sunk cost
of large investments motivates rational investors to delay investment decisions
[33]. Typically, the investors’ behavior is characterized as risk-averse. As stated
[51], this has the consequence that even if an investment would be justified by
expected revenues, investors defer or even discard a potential investment. In
other words, prices must account for the risk and consequently be higher than
just necessary to cover the cost [33]. This effect is addressed in Chapter 6.
Mechanisms to reduce the uncertainty and volatility of prices are common in
most electricity markets. Opportunities to hedge risks and generate revenues are
necessary to recover the costs of investments [52]. Typically, forward contracts,
either via an organized market or in bilateral negotiations, are used to hedge the
risk of price volatility in the short-term [53]. However, those markets address
the bulk value of energy and often cover only parts of the market. By extension,
a CM can be seen as a regulated mechanism for a product close to forward
contracts, sold by all market participants and purchased by a demand side that
represents generation adequacy.
Regulatory uncertainty and policy interference
While the above-mentioned factors are associated with the nature of power
systems and capital-intensive investment, regulatory uncertainty and other
restrictions are of a different origin. Regulatory interventions and policy
interference is a consequence of risk-averse demand side and regulators [54].
The mentioned elements are hard to measure and are more reliant on market
observations.
Electricity is a vital good for modern society. Consequently, shortages of
electricity have significant social and political implications [55]. It is argued that
given the importance of security of supply, it is often treated as public good and
regulators are encouraged to act early to ensure adequate capacity [56]. At the
same time, market participants base their decision on the assumption that the
regulator’s decision-making will always prevent supply shortfalls or inordinately
high prices [57]. Therefore, politicians, regulators and system operators tend
to interfere with the market to ensure a reliable electricity supply at an early
stage.
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Moreover, often regulatory decisions are taken to achieve other policy
goals interlinked with the electricity markets, e.g., environmental policies.
Independent of the intention for the interference, the decisions taken affect the
development of the long-term generation mix. This is especially the case if far-
reaching decisions are taken with a higher frequency than market participants
can adapt. As such, uncertainty about future policies can create a hurdle for
investments [58].
Regulatory interference can be of short- and long-term nature, with both having
an impact on the development of the long-term generation mix [50]. On the
one hand, as an example for a decision that distorts the long-term development,
policy choices for or against technologies can be mentioned. In turn, in many
markets, it is also not possible for market participants to leave the market, even
if the operation of an asset is non-profitable. The suppressed possibility to
exit the market might form a hurdle to enter the market in the first place. As
example, the grid reserve in Germany prevents generation units to leave the
market if they are classified as system-relevant [59]. Another problem arises
from unstable policy-making about subsidy schemes for both the investor’s
technologies as well as competitors.
On the other hand, short-term regulatory uncertainty emerges from decisions
that prevent the forming of price signals. Politically motivated actions
might distort the allocation of cost in the short-term, independent of the
consumers’ preferences [60]. As an example, the Belgian plan for controlled
load interruptions (“Afschakelplan”) [61] can be mentioned. Meant to ensure
the security of supply, the actions prevent that prices for reliability can emerge
from the market. Another example, which is more difficult to verify, is the fierce
reaction by policy makers, often supported by the media, to price spikes at the
supply side in times of scarcity even if prices are well below the price cap [62].
Such an implicit “price cap of acceptance” might be an additional distortion to
the markets.
Uncertainty input markets and other externalities
Finally, distortions to the electricity market may arise from the uncertainty
about the input markets and other externalities. These externalities may be
caused by various reasons and can also be specific to a market or country.
Common uncertainties to almost all markets are linked to the increasing share
of RES or the future prices for primary fuels including coal, oil or gas.
The uncertainty about the availability of RES is caused by its intermittent
generation patterns. RES have a significant impact on the operating hours as
well as the capacity factor of the remaining generators [52]. In addition to the
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above-mentioned impact on the market prices, the uncertainty exacerbates the
risk of generators, limited in hedging their risk. This problem is expected to
become more severe with further increasing RES generation [41]. Chapter 4
takes up this issue in the discussion of the case study presented.
Another uncertainty linked to the availability of a technology is the discussion
of phasing-out certain technologies. In fact, this potential distortion overlaps
with regulatory uncertainty. For example, the Belgian nuclear phase-out in
combination with potential lifetime extensions can be put forward. The schedule
for the phase-out of the nuclear units in Belgium, that make up for about 50%
of the conventional generation capacity, has been changed multiple times in
the last decade [63, 64]. Even today, the planned phase-out in 2022/2025 is
still a subject at the political agenda. The ongoing decision process of the
(un-)availability of this large share of Belgium’s base load units is assumed one
of the biggest factors for the investment climate.
2.2.3 Dependencies of System Characteristics
In order to enrich the theoretical discussion above, this section presents the
results of a survey. It was conducted during the doctoral research as part of the
work for the Conseil International des Grands Réseaux Electriques (CIGRE)
working group C5.17 on “Capacity Mechanisms: Needs, Solutions and State
of Affairs” [16]. The purpose of the survey is to get an overview of worldwide
implemented CMs and to identify common critical system characteristics that
lead to the implementation of a CM in a market.
A remark on the data basis: The information was collected in 2014. This needs
to be considered when talking about CMs in place (referred to as present) as
well as planned or discussed CMs (referred to as planned). Planned or discussed
CMs refer to plans for the introduction or the revision of existing mechanisms.
The results are based on two publications [26], [65].
Thanks to 31 contributions, the survey provides a good sample of existing and
implemented CMs around the world. Each contribution contains the information
for an individual market zone. The extent of market zones differs. Market
zones follow political borders as for example the market zones for Belgium.
Alternatively, a market zone covers a region within a country, e.g. Pennsylvania-
New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM). It is also possible that a market
zone spans multiple countries, e.g., South African Power Pool (SAPP).
The collected information about the power systems presents a full range of
characteristics. The size of the systems range from a few 1000 MW to more than
160 GW annual peak load. The market zones have different fuel supply mixes –
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ranging from single-fuel to multi-fuel (coal, nuclear, hydro), different market
structures and consumption patterns ranging from peak capacity-constrained
to energy-constrained systems. By capturing these characteristics, the survey
can reveal relations between system characteristics and the implementation of a
CM.
In what follows, the focus is on the relations between CM implementations and
power system size, generation mix, RES share, and available interconnection
capacity. Hereby, no distinction is made between different implementation
concepts of CMs. Section 2.3 discusses these different concepts in detail and
provides examples that again refer to this survey.
First, the system size and demand characteristics like summer-winter and day-
night ratios are examined. Typically, one would expect the urge for CMs bigger
in countries with higher ratios as they give an indication on the operating hours
for rarely-used peak technologies.
Figure 2.4 gives an overview of the market zones in terms of annual peak
demand (in GW) and total annual consumption (in TWh) for the years 2012
respectively 2013. Both, systems with winter (^) and summer (☼) peaks are
represented. There is not a direct link between the existence of a CM and the
system size in general. Market zones with summer or winter peak can be found
with and without a CM. Neither the peak demand of a system, nor the annual
consumption, nor the ratio of them, can be identified as a direct argument for
or against the need of a CM.
Similarly, the ratios of the peak levels of day and night and winter and summer
are compared. The ratios represent a rough estimate of the daily, respectively
seasonal, demand volatility (Table 2.1). While high day/night ratios indicate
a need for operational flexibility, the winter/summer ratios hint at the longer-
term need for adequate generation to follow demand patterns throughout the
whole year. The higher the winter/summer ratio deviates from one, the more
seasonal a system is. A more seasonal system might indicate that there are fewer
operating hours of peaking units and an (emerging) need for a CM (France,
Finland, Sweden, Great Britain). On the other hand, this cannot be observed
for example in Norway. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the generation mix
simultaneously.
Figure 2.5 shows the installed capacities as shares grouped by main technologies.
In addition, Figure 2.6 presents the resulted shares in terms of generated
electricity for the years 2012/2013 as far as provided by the contributions. The
existence of a CM is indicated with a check mark X below each bar.
The evaluation of power systems based on the generation mix is especially
interesting for systems dominated by one resource, i.e., nuclear-, fossil fuel-,
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Table 2.1: Ratio of winter and summer peak levels and average ratio peak levels
of day and night. (Based on data from 2012/13 [26])
Market AU AU BE BR CL CN CZ DE ES FI FR GB GCCIA GR IE
zone NEM WA
Winter/
Summer
- 0.75 1.19 0.93 0.98 0.84 1.24 1.17 1.16 1.33 1.3 1.26 0.53 0.97 1.17
Day/ Night 1.56 1.95 1.33 1.49 1.03 0.67 1.21 1.71 1.43 1.25 1.13 1.28 0.8 1.06 1.75
Market IL IN IS IT JP NL NO PL SAPP SE US US US US
zone ERCOT ISONE NYISO PJM
Winter/
Summer
1.2 0.85 1.04 1 1.03 1.06 1.55 1.12 1.2 1.5 0.8 0.8 0.76 0.69
Day/ Night 1.6 0.9 1.08 1.3 1.69 1.47 1.2 1.46 0.75 1.4 - 1.73 0.57 1.56
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Figure 2.5: Overview of generation mixes in shares of installed capacity per
technology. A check mark X indicates the implementation of a CM, a check
mark in brackets indicates a planned/discussed CM. (Based on data from
2012/2013 [16])
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Figure 2.6: Overview of generation mixes in shares of generated electricity
per technology. A check mark X indicates the implementation of a CM, a
check mark in brackets indicates a planned/discussed CM. (Based on data from
2012/2013 [16])
and hydro- or RES-based systems. However, similar to previous characteristics,
no direct relation between specific generation mixes and the existence of a CM
can be drawn. As an example, hydro-based systems exist both with (Brazil,
Colombia) and without CM (Norway).
Especially, the comparison of different hydro-based systems shows that the
constraining factor that leads to the implementation of a CM to stimulate
generation adequacy is not necessarily the installed capacity in form of pumps
or turbines. In fact, the CM in the Brazilian hydro-based system has the
purpose to represent sufficient energy (firm energy obligations). This means,
obligations are sold to represent firm water levels in the reservoirs, rather than
installed turbines [16, 24]. This example reveals the main purpose of a CM.
Rather than subsidizing installed capacity, a CM is a mechanism to remunerate
necessary contributions to generation adequacy.
Next to the description of the individual system characteristics, the intercon-
nection of the power system and the implementation of CMs is analyzed. In the
European context, historically, CMs have been implemented mainly in countries
less interconnected with neighboring markets, e.g., the Iberian peninsula, Ireland,
Greece.
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Figure 2.7: Share of interconnection capacity with other market zones and peak
demand (%) (Based on data from 2012/13 [26])
Figure 2.7 displays the level of interconnection of a market zone expressed
as share of interconnection capacity on the peak demand level. Isolated and
less interconnected market zones (left part of Figure 2.7) depend more on
domestic capacity and might therefore decide earlier to implement a mechanism
to remunerate domestic capacity. Similarly to the characteristics above, a
coherent relation between interconnection and CM cannot be observed. Strongly
interconnected market zones like Finland and Sweden still opt for a CM to cover
seasonal peaks. France or UK with low interconnection capacities compared
to other European market zones, are in the process of implementing a CM.
However, a direct link to the interconnection is not stated as motivation for
implementation.
Figure 2.8 displays the level of RES integration in a market zone expressed
in the share of generated energy from intermittent RES (Wind, PV) and the
total generation. The assumption that CMs are more often present in market
zones with a high share (right part of Figure 2.8) of intermittent RES is not
confirmed by the survey responses. Both systems with a high share and CM
(Spain), and high share without CM (Germany) are observed.
The displayed results date from 2014. In the future, these shares are expected
to grow. Conventional generation operating in markets that will be dominated
by high shares of intermittent RES will face more challenges. In addition, the
ratios, both for winter/summer and night/day will alter as the residual demand
and generation will be further reduced in volume, but not necessarily in their
amplitudes.
34 CAPACITY MECHANISMS IN MULTI-SERVICE MARKETS
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
N
o
C
M
C
M
(p
re
se
nt
)
C
M
(p
la
nn
ed
)
NEMWA
CAISO
ERCOT
ISONE
NYISO
PJM
Share of energy from intermittent RES [%]
Figure 2.8: Share of energy from intermittent RES (wind, PV) and energy
generation (%) (Based on data from 2012/13 [26])
In conclusion, the implementation of CMs in a market design cannot be clearly
linked to a single characteristic of a system. CMs in large and smaller systems
are identified. As expected, CMs occur more often in systems with large seasonal
differences or lower operational hours for peak technologies. The large variety
and combination of CMs in place indicates that country-specific characteristics
lead to individual designs.
Moreover, the results do not address another important dimension, namely
whether the implementation of a CM in a specific market fulfilled its intended
purpose like for example providing incentives for new investments or activating
the participation of demand response (DR). A what-if analysis is hard to do in
case of the introduction of a CM in a specific market. Although out of scope for
this thesis, such an analysis could zoom in on investment decisions, technology
choices and changing market prices before and after an introduction. Main
challenge would be to trace the impact on market prices in other markets that
would also indirectly affect the decision-making of the market participants.
Motivated by the inconclusive findings of this survey on whether there are
system characteristics that would benefit more from a CM, some of the system
characteristics discussed in this section are explicitly considered in the modeling
and the examined case studies in the forthcoming chapters. The role of available
flexibility together with an increasing share of RES is part of the study in
Chapter 4. The impact of interconnection on markets with and without a CM
is researched specifically in Chapter 5.
TERMINOLOGY OF CAPACITY MECHANISMS 35
2.3 Terminology of Capacity Mechanisms
In order to address the threats for long-term generation adequacy that may
result from the distortions of the energy market discussed in Section 2.2.2, CMs
are seen as means to overcome these impediments. However, a unique definition
of the term capacity mechanism has not gained acceptance and often terms
such as capacity markets are used in an ambiguous way.
This section, as well as the following, aim at providing a short but structured
overview of the most common CMs. First, the working principle and
categorization of CMs are discussed. Thereafter, an overview of different
implementation concepts is given. The implementation concepts are supported
by examples of market zones that have the respective mechanism in place.
2.3.1 Working Principle and Purpose
Capacity Mechanism are described as policy instrument for ensuring an adequate
level of electricity generation capacity [66]. A summary proposed in [16] defines
a CM as follows:
A CM is a mechanism to value generation or demand response capacity,
generally but not always leading to a revenue stream to owners of such
capacity in addition to revenues from the energy market.
The main elements of the working principle that is uniform to all mechanism
are as follows:
A CM values availability or firm capacity, as introduced in Section 1.1. The
CM introduces an additional and complementary mechanism besides the energy
market to influence the volume of installed generation capacity as well as the
type of installed capacity [67]. The value is typically remunerated via a payment
expressed in e/MW. Note that the origin of the capacity is not specified by the
mechanism. Hence, while mostly CMs are perceived mechanisms for conventional
generation, there is no limitation to the technology of capacity providers.
Participation of demand response, storage applications, interconnection cables,
RES are equally possible if they can provide the respective value of firm capacity.
A CM is intended to provide a steady revenue stream. Instead of hourly or
more frequent energy and reserve markets, the steady revenue stream of a
CM originates from a periodic, often annual, determination of the level of
remuneration. Consequently, the remuneration fluctuates less. Moreover, it
only depends on the installed capacity, rather than more and more decisive
elements on the short-term markets [46]. With respect to investment into new
capacities, the flattened revenue stream adds to the incentives from price spikes
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and scarcity rents to a steadier and hence more reliable market signal [68].
Depending on the mechanism, a CM might also completely replace incentives
from price spikes and scarcity rents.
The purpose and desired outcome of a CM is to resolve potential distortions
emerging from market malfunctioning. In order to correct these distortions,
CMs form a complementary mechanism to the current markets in place rather
than being designed to replace them [69]. Via the mechanism, the objective is
to positively influence investments leading to long-term generation adequacy
[28]. Finon and Pignon [70] state that market design that includes a CM should
create conditions to guarantee sufficient capacities to supply the aggregated
electrical demand and energy requirements. A CM is often characterized as
a mechanism that “guarantees” generation adequacy. However, a guarantee
cannot be provided by a market design that depends on individual decision-
making. A CM is rather a mechanism that reduces the risk of having insufficient
capacity by providing an adequate market signal.
Other positive effects of CMs hint at the market distortions as described in the
previous section. According to [41], a CM reduces the possibility to abuse market
power due to scarcity. At the same time, it protects investment in capacity
against the missing money problem caused by the consumers’ limitations to
directly express their value of reliability and regulatory interventions like price
caps [68]. The reason is that CMs transform implicit social preferences for
security of supply into explicit target capacity demand [49] and consequently
into an added remuneration for capacity contributing to the security of supply.
From a regulators and consumers’ perspective, a CM can also be interpreted
as an insurance against ENS. In terms of social optimum there is a trade-off
between the social cost of electricity shortages and the cost of excess capacity
[71] (Figure 2.9).
If the social optimum is assumed to be reached if installed capacity is equal to the
peak demand leading to lowest cost, both excess capacity and capacity shortage
result in additional cost. The cost of excess capacity can be approximated with
the additional cost for new peak power plants, i.e., the Cost Of New Entry
(CONE). The additional cost for capacity shortage is linked to the ENS and
the associated VOLL. Typically, the VOLL is assumed to be high enough, that
even after deducting the deferred investment for peak capacity the additional
cost is positive. Even more, the increase of additional cost is assumed to be
steeper on the side of capacity shortage as opposed to excess capacity.
Typically, from a social point of view a CM seems beneficial as it decreases the
risk of ending up with capacity shortage. In other words, given uncertainty, the
socially optimal volume of generation capacity is higher than the theoretical
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Figure 2.9: Social cost of electricity shortages and excess capacity
optimum in the presence of perfect knowledge [72]. The potential additional
cost of excess capacity is considered a reasonable price for the insurance not to
end up with a shortage. Even more, for policy makers, the VOLL is often higher
than the consumers’ perspectives. In the context of very risk-averse national
policy makers that want to prevent lights from going out in the country, one
could also speak of a value of lost vote. Like the VOLL, it is very hard to
determine, however, often it is incentive enough to promote a CM at a national
level.
2.3.2 Categorization of Capacity Mechanisms
As stated in Section 2.1, there is not a single CM, but CM is a collective term for
different implementation concepts. In this section, the different implementation
concepts are categorized using three different approaches available in the
literature [73, 74, 75, 16, 24]. The categorization helps pointing the similarities
and differences of the concepts. The following common list of concepts is used:
• Capacity Payments (CP)
• Strategic Reserves (SR)
• Centralized Capacity Market (cCM)
• Reliability Options (RO)
• Decentralized Capacity Markets (dCM)
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• Capacity Subscription (CS)
A detailed introduction to the individual concepts follows in Section 2.4.1.
Regulated or market-based
A first categorization of different CMs describes the degree of administra-
tion/regulation that is involved to determine the value and consequently the
remuneration linked to the security of supply. While the energy-only market
(EOM) forms the most market-based mechanism to reveal the value of security
of supply in hourly price for energy, Capacity Payments (CP) are described as
the mechanism which is most determined by administration. All CMs can be
placed in this range (Figure 2.10).
Starting from the left, CP involve a direct influence of the administration to
set the level of remuneration. The volume of strategic reserves (SR) is also
still very much influenced by the regulator and system operator. Next, four
market-wide CMs follow. By increasing the resolution of the demand side, the
administrative impact is further reduced and the market clearing is left to more
and more market participants. The capacity subscription at the right end of
the CM spectrum forms the most market-based mechanism as it offers each
individual consumer the possibility to reveal its value of reliability.
Price-based or volume-based
The second categorization follows the distinction based on the quantity
considered as a market outcome. Hence, there is a distinction made between
price- and volume-based mechanisms. It follows the categorization proposed in
[74, 75] (Figure 2.11). It is the most common form of categorization and comes
back with possible small adaptations in many publications and reports on CMs.
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Price-based mechanisms drive investment by providing financial incentives. The
structure of these incentives determines the resulting installed capacity where
the prediction of the response of investors is crucial for its success. It is a
complicated matter, requiring detailed knowledge of the market. Therefore, a
wrong estimate can easily cause undesired under- or overinvestment.
Alternatively, in quantity-based mechanisms, a regulating authority sets a
desired amount of installed capacity and the price evolves from the market
clearing. In this way the amount of installed capacity can be controlled and
ensured directly by the authority [28]. In case of very steep demand curves, as
it is the case for capacity demand, it is preferable to establish a quantity-based
mechanism [43].
In an additional level of distinction, the volume-based mechanisms are separated
based on the involvement of the supply and demand side. While in targeted
mechanisms like the SR, only a limited share of the market actors participate, a
market-wide mechanism is considered to be a mechanism in which the majority
or all market actors linked to the supply side are active. The distinction to
an individual mechanism is linked to the even more detailed resolution of the
demand side. In the previous mechanisms, the demand for capacity is either
organized via a single buyer or an aggregated representation of the demand
side. An individual mechanism is characterized by individual end-consumers
expressing their value for security of supply.
Product, Volume & Procurement
The third way of categorizing CMs combines and extends the previous two
categorizations. The categorization summarizes the key design choices outlined
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in [16]. The CMs are described based on three design choices considered the
most relevant distinguishing factors:
• Traded product: While all CMs are based on a product for availability, the
traded product can be distinguished between physical capacity and a
financial instrument. Most common is the reference to physical capacity:
the traded volume represents real existing assets that contribute fully
or partly to the security of supply. Physical capacity is the basis for
almost all major concepts including capacity payments, strategic reserves,
centralized or decentralized capacity markets or capacity subscription. As
opposed to physical capacity, it is also possible that a CM uses a financial
product to represent the value of physical capacity. An example for such
a financial product are reliability options. If desired, the latter would
also allow for intermediaries to participate without having a physical
representation of the capacity.
• Determination of the volume: In order for a CM to result in a market
clearing, a demand for capacity must be established. As in most cases it
is not feasible to assess the capacity demand based on individual decision-
making, the determination is often aggregated. Consequently, CMs can
be distinguished based on the method the capacity demand is established.
From the list of discussed CMs, four different methods can be described.
First, with capacity payments, the volume is actually determined by the
market response to the payment set by an authority. The next choice is
that the volume, or the associated demand curve, is set centrally by the
authority. This often includes the advice from system operators. In a
decentralized approach, the authority distributes the demand among other
market actors, typically retailers. This can be via a direct obligation for
a certain volume or indirectly via a communicated methodology that only
determines the volume after realization. Finally, the most decentralized
choice is based on individual consumers determining their volume.
• Responsibility for procurement: The last design choice is a follow-up of the
choice on how to determine the volume. It describes how the market is
organized and which market participant is responsible for the procurement
of capacity. Basically, two options are available. On the one hand, a
market with a single buyer can be put in place. In this case, the authority
itself or the system operator on assignment by the authority are responsible
for the procurement. On the other hand, a double-sided market can be
established: the demand side explicitly participates in the market-based
mechanism for capacity. Either aggregating market participants like
retailers or individual consumers are responsible for the procurement of
capacity to cover their demand.
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Figure 2.12: Categorization of capacity mechanisms along the design choices
Applied to the same six implementation concepts, the categorization is
summarized in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.12 visualizes the same information in a three-dimensional plot to make
the relationship of the different concepts clearer. The figure does not present the
end of developments. Also other mechanisms might be thinkable that combine
the design choices in a different way and fill out the empty spots.
Other design choices
For completeness, more design choices can be added to describe a CM. They
can be attributed to all implementation concepts, in one way or the other. The
description is kept short as they are, on the one hand, very implementation-
specific and on the other hand, only limited represented in the modeling
framework. Yet, a non-exhaustive list of design choices based on [16, 24]
is the following:
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Table 2.2: Categorization of capacity mechanisms along the design choices
(based on [16])
Traded Determination Responsibility
Mechanism product of volume for procurement
Capacity Payments Physical capacity Price set by authority,volume found via market
Payments by
authority
Strategic Reserves Physical capacity
Volume demand
determined by authority
with system operator
Single buyer
(authority, assigned
system operator)
Centralized
Capacity Market Physical capacity
Volume demand
determined by authority
Single buyer
(authority, assigned
system operator)
Reliability Options Financial instrument Volume demanddetermined by authority
Single buyer
(authority, assigned
system operator)
Decetralized
Capacity Markets Physical capacity
Volume demand /
methodology determined
by authority
Double-sided market
(aggregated with retailers
or individual consumers)
Capacity
Subscription Physical capacity
Volume demand
individually determined
by consumers
Double-sided market
(individual consumers)
• Lead-time: Market clearing for CM can be held with a certain lead-time to
for example allow new projects to participate prior to commissioning.
• Contract duration: Instead of annual market clearings, CMs can offer
contracts with a duration of multiple years to further decrease the risk
for capacity providers.
• Penalties for non-delivery: All implementations of CMs include a kind of
penalty system. The penalty for non-delivery at a single event can be
based on a fixed payment, on a share of the initially received remuneration
or on a full compensation.
• Price caps: The price cap and by extension the shape of the demand curve
can be decisive for the market-based mechanism. Depending on the extent
of the mechanism typical price caps are oriented towards the CONE or
the missing difference to the net revenues from other markets.
• Derating and pre-qualification: The derating of capacity based on its ex-
pected availability can either be organized in an administrative process
supervised by for example the system operator. However, it is also possible
to let capacity providers decide on the offered value based on a trade-off
of expected revenues and penalties for non-delivery. Another element of
pre-qualification, i.e., access to the mechanism, is linked to the design
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choice if capacity providers need to have real assets or can also be financial
traders.
• Auction type: CMs may also vary in the type of auction or market clearing
used. Mechanisms exist that implement sealed-bid auctions, descending-
clock auctions, sequential auctions or contracting based on tendering
processes.
• Self-supply: The topic of self-supply is important for decentralized CMs where
capacity providers might coincide with participants of the demand side.
In this case, a distinction is made if capacity is traded mandatory via a
market clearing or can be accounted for self-supply.
• Locational elements: CMs can include a locational element in both the pre-
qualification phase and the market clearing if technical limitations require
it such as grid congestions.
2.4 Current Implementations
This section describes the different implementation concepts for a CM. Same
as for the design elements, there is a wide range of literature available that
describes the concepts in all details among others [75, 16, 74]. If applicable,
for each implementation concept, one or more country examples are provided.
Figure 2.13 shows a world map. Current implementations of CMs are highlighted.
A detailed map of Europe is shown in Figure 2.20. The findings are based on
[16].
Given the scope of the thesis, the description is focused on the main elements.
Additional emphasis is put on the interactions of entities involved. The
interactions are visualized in diagrams showing the main actors in a CM. These
interactions set the stage for the modeled agents in the following chapters.
2.4.1 Implementation Concepts
In what follows, the six different implementation concepts are outlined following
the concepts shown in Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12.
Capacity Payments
The concept of capacity payments is the simplest type of CM. Capacity payments
are direct payments from an authority to all generators according to the installed
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Figure 2.13: Map showing capacity mechanisms worldwide [26]
or available capacity [76]. The payment is estimated by the authority and may
vary with the technology, the definition of availability, and the total amount
of installed capacity for each generating unit. The authorized system operator
typically does the verification of the capacity. The interaction of market
participants is shown in Figure 2.14a.
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Figure 2.14: Capacity Payments
Capacity payments are a relatively easy to understand and implement
mechanism. They provide a signal for generators and stimulate investments in
new generation capacity by reducing the fixed costs. Moreover, the authority
can directly distinguish among technologies through different payment levels.
In this way, the quality of capacity can be directly rewarded. In addition, other
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criteria can be incorporated in the reward assessment of the technologies, i.e.,
fewer emissions or more flexibility.
Deciding on the level of payment typically follows from the assessments done
by the authority and is therefore subject to political decision-making. The level
of payment depends on the assumption on future demand and the investment
response to the payments, which is not trivial. Setting a wrong level of payment
can lead to unexpected investment behavior and adjustments of the mechanism
might be necessary. Being a price-based mechanism, already small errors in the
estimation of the investment response may lead to a large shift in the equilibrium
of generating capacity. Beyond the level of payment, there is no direct control
on the volume [73]. Currently, capacity payments are implemented e.g. in
Columbia, Spain, Portugal [16, 73].
Figure 2.14b shows the expected working principle on the electricity market.
Because of capacity payments, lowered fixed cost give incentive to new
investments. When entering the market, the new investments lead to an
extended supply curve in the long run.
Strategic Reserves
Strategic reserves are an amount of back-up capacity operated by the system
operator in charge. As such, the mechanism targets only a limited share of the
installed capacity. The strategic reserve mostly consists of old units purchased
or contracted from the generating companies, but it can also include newly built
units. The contracted volume of the reserves is determined by the authority
(Figure 2.15a). This happens typically in coordination with the system operator.
If implemented, strategic reserves are normally contracted and verified by the
system operator. The owner of the contracted capacity hands over the control
of the activation to the system operator. The capacity can solely be used during
an activation of the strategic reserves.
The capacity in the strategic reserves is offered to the energy market as soon as
a specific trigger requires the activation. It can either be a technical trigger,
i.e., the reserve margin between demand and supply is very low, or, as soon
as the market price reaches a certain price limit. The strategic reserves are
then offered to the market at a fixed activation price. The activation price is
set high enough to avoid market distortion and to provide a market signal for
new investments. However, if being contracted as part of the strategic reserves
becomes too attractive, there is also the danger of a “slippery slope”. The
slippery slope describes the effect that capacity providers leave the market to
become part of the strategic reserves, again requiring a bigger strategic reserves.
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Figure 2.15: Strategic Reserves
This might lead to a market situation in which major shares of the capacity is
under control of the system operator [77].
Figure 2.15b shows how the volume of the strategic reserves (SR) extends the
supply curve on the energy market during peak demand and situations where
supply is scarce. Often, in order to avoid distortion, the activation price is set
to the price cap [78] or at least equal to the highest supply bid in the energy
market with an additional mark-up [16].
Currently, strategic reserves are implemented, e.g., in Belgium [78], Sweden [79]
and Finland. In addition, long-term reserves with a specific technical purpose
such as the German grid reserves or the Polish cold reserves can be seen as a
strategic reserves [16].
Centralized Capacity Market
A centralized capacity market is an example of a market-based mechanism. An
additional market for capacity is created. By means of, e.g., capacity credits,
the required capacity is traded between capacity providers and a central buyer.
A central buyer, often the system operator, procures the capacity based on a
determined capacity demand (Figure 2.16a). The demand, either represented
by a fixed volume or a demand curve, is determined by an authority, typically
in coordination with the system operator.
The centrally determined demand for capacity should represent the total capacity
demand to ensure generation adequacy. It takes into account peak loads, imports,
and reserve margins. The market is normally cleared annually and may also
include a certain lead time to allow new projects to participate. As opposed
to the strategic reserves, the decision-making over activation and utilization of
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the capacity assets stays with the owner. The system operator only tests and
verifies that the capacity is available during scarcity.
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Figure 2.16: Centralized capacity market
The shape of the capacity demand curve is a downward-sloped curve based on
the target volume and a target price (Figure 2.16b). The target price is based
on the expected net revenues of the generators on the energy market. This is
referred to as Net Cost Of New Entry (Net CONE). The capacity price should
be sufficient to close the gap between Net CONE and CONE, hence, a peak unit
could recover its full cost. Moreover, a minimum demand level is set at which
the capacity price reaches the price cap, typically set to the CONE. A maximum
demand level often defines a level above which no capacity-based remuneration
is paid. The target demand levels and the slope of the demand curve based
on the net revenues allow for directly controlling the capacity volumes and
reducing the price volatility over multiple years. Many researchers discuss the
optimal shape of the capacity demand curve [46, 80, 41].
The targeted long-term effect is again an extension of the supply curve on the
energy-based market (Figure 2.16c). The revenues from the capacity market
attract new investments that are sufficient to cover peak demand and enhance
generation adequacy. In turn, this would lead to lower prices on the capacity
market reducing the incentive for new investments. In a long-term equilibrium,
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there is a balance between capacity- and energy-based remuneration. It is
possible to operate capacity markets with a lead time: clearing capacity demands
of consecutive years. Because of the lead time, the capacity market becomes
constrained before the energy market. This means, new investments should be
triggered before scarcity situation on the energy market emerge.
A market-based mechanism such as the centralized capacity market requires
the effort for implementing and administrating an additional market. This
includes the administration and control of supply and demand. The system
operator is required to track and verify the equivalence of traded and available
capacity. It includes for example the actual contribution or delivery during
scarcity situations.
Examples are the Great Britain (GB) capacity auction [81, 82], the PJM capacity
market, Reliability Pricing Model, [83, 84] or the Wholesale Electricity Market
of Western Australia [85].
Reliability Options
Reliability options are an extension of a centralized capacity market. The
mechanism based on reliability options is also a market-based mechanism
implementing an additional market for capacity next to the energy market.
The main difference is that instead of procuring a capacity product, reliability
options are procured [51, 86]. These options are based on the principle of call
options. A single buyer, for example the system operator, defines the demand
for the options. Capacity providers offer these options (Figure 2.17a). Capacity
providers selling the option to the system operator receive a payment based on
the cleared capacity price.
The authority and system operator upfront must determine two parameters.
A capacity demand, either in form of a fixed volume or a capacity demand
curve, describes the demand for the options, similar to the demand in a capacity
market. The volume of options represents, e.g., the forecasted peak demand
plus a reserve margin (Figure 2.17b).
Once contracted, the options are called based on the result of the hourly energy
market. The options are called if the energy price exceeds a strike price. This
strike price is determined together with the capacity demand prior to contracting
the options. In case the energy price exceeds the strike price, the capacity
providers that have sold an option need to compensate the system operator
with the difference of the strike and energy price independent of their actual
generation (see Figure 2.17c).
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Figure 2.17: Reliability Options
Consequently, the level of the strike price is crucial for the frequency of an
option being called. Capacity providers need to account for these events in
their bidding for the options’ auction: if the strike price is set higher, lower
capacity prices are possible because the amount of compensation is expected
to be lower. In that way, reliability options give a strong incentive to make
capacities available in time of high energy prices. The underlying assumption
is that high energy price typically indicate scarcity situations. An additional
effect is the net loss, resulting from not producing in times the option is called
because the compensation is independent of the actual generation. This prevents
providers from keeping units out of the market to manipulate prices.
As opposed to the capacity market in which the certification and verification
of capacity is centralized by the system operator, reliability options require
each capacity provider to assess its own reliability. It is a trade-off between the
revenues from selling the option, and expected costs for compensations during
hours when energy prices exceed the strike price. The evaluation and control is
shifted and gives an additional incentive to keep the capacity in an available
status.
Italy implements a system based on Reliability Options [87, 16]. Currently, the
Irish capacity mechanism is changed from capacity payments to a system based
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on Reliability Options [88].
Decentralized Capacity Markets
The decentralized capacity market is an alternative to a market-based mechanism
with a single buyer as was the case for the two previous mechanisms. The main
difference is the organization of the demand side. In a decentralized market, the
capacity is contracted by either the consumers directly, or the retailer taking
the role as intermediary for the end-consumers. As the consumers are obliged
to contract capacity to serve their needs for reliable capacity, the mechanism is
sometimes also referred to as capacity obligations.
The need for capacity is assessed by a central authority (Figure 2.18a) and
distributed to the demand side. It can be distinguished between an ex-ante and
ex-post methodology to determine and distribute the obligations among the
demand side [16]. In an ex-ante methodology, the demand is allocated to the
retailers prior to realization, for example based on the forecasted demand of
all end-consumers of the retailer. In an ex-post methodology, the demand is
calculated based on a predefined procedure, which can also be based on the
combined peak demand of the retailers’ end-consumers.
Depending on the methodology to determine the obligation volume, a link
between energy and capacity demand is established. Consumers have an
incentive to reduce the energy-based peak demand (arrows in Figure 2.18b). In
turn, the capacity demand can be reduced accordingly (arrows in Figure 2.18c).
Note that in this mechanism also small units can generate a value by reducing
the demand for capacity obligations. In general, two possibilities for flexible
demand to participate can be distinguished. Larger storage applications and
aggregated demand response can be verified and part of the capacity providers.
Smaller units and decentralized demand response can participate indirectly by
reducing the obligation of consumers through reducing peak demand levels. In
that sense, the value of generation adequacy is to some extent made transparent
to the end-consumers.
The certification and verification of capacity remains centralized with the
system operator. A market platform between capacity providers and retailers
or end-consumers must be established. In the end, an accurate measurement
of the capacity obligation needs to be put in place and verified. Moreover, the
methodology must be made transparent in order to trigger the desired response
of the market participants.
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Figure 2.18: Decentralized capacity market
Capacity Subscription
Capacity subscription builds further on the idea of making the value of generation
adequacy more transparent to the end-consumers. End-consumers subscribe
individually to contracts that reflect their preference and value of generation
adequacy or reliability. In other words, the willingness to pay for capacity
reflects consumers’ preference for quality of supply. It requires an acceptance
and understanding by the consumers that unlimited uninterrupted supply
independent of the system state is no longer a public but a private good [89].
The mechanism relies on the technical possibility to directly measure and control
load from each consumer. Such an additional infrastructure can be realized
through the installation of smart meters with an extended functionality to
remotely controllable loads. In times of scarcity, the controllable loads are
disconnected according to the chosen subscription of the end-consumers. The
system operator can use the controllable loads during scarcity (Figure 2.19).
Capacity providers are remunerated via a market that reflects the demand for
capacity according to the capacity subscriptions and more importantly the value
that individual consumers attach to the uninterrupted supply.
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Alternatively, the remote control can also be replaced with a very strong financial
signal in the form of very high prices for the demand that exceeds the subscribed
capacity. However, this would require consumers to be very price-elastic and
react quickly to the signal. A similar approach is priority service pricing [90].
There are no examples of market where the concept of capacity subscription
is implemented. In the end, this mechanism aims at revealing the consumers’
preferences for uninterrupted supply during scarcity [16]. In a sense, it is similar
to time of use tariffs or priority service pricing. The difference is the contract
with a longer commitment that in turn provides a more stable signal for capacity
providers.
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Figure 2.19: Capacity subscription
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Instead of implementing a single concept of a CM as presented above, markets
may also implement a mechanism that combines elements of different concepts.
As an example, the Chilean mechanism is a hybrid solution where capacity
payments are combined with mandatory contracting [16].
Finally, it is important to highlight that also various other markets exist that
combine elements of mechanisms or have a completely different approach to
address the issue of market distortion. However, these concepts are not discussed
in detail, but just mentioned to widen the perspective. Two interesting examples
are quickly described:
In the hydro-dominated system of Brazil, fuel, i.e. hydro, depends on natural
precipitation. As such, the limiting factor is not the capacity, but the provision
of energy in a dry year. The Brazilian market for firm energy highlights an
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implication that when targeting a capacity product, energy is implicitly assumed
available, while targeting an energy product, capacity is implicitly assumed
available [16].
Another example are scarcity pricing or Operating Reserve Demand Curves.
They are implemented in for example the US ERCOT system based on an idea
described in [42]. During market clearing of the energy-based market, a mark-up
is added to the market price. The mark-up increases the price in situations of
scarcity. Often the mark-up depends on the remaining reserve margin. The
resulting increased price indicates scarcity earlier and creates incentives for new
investments in time. In addition, it especially rewards flexible peak generators
by adjusting the energy price to a level that reflects the value of capacity under
conditions of scarcity [91]. Instead of a flat price signal of an annual CM, this
mechanism especially benefits the flexible peak generators that are active during
scarcity.
2.4.2 Developments in Europe
The development of CMs in market zones that are part of the European Internal
Energy Market (IEM) has seen various changes over the last year. Figure 2.20
shows an overview of current implementations. Due to national initiatives, the
number of markets that have a CM implemented in any form has increased.
Major market zones of the Central Western Europe (CWE) region have changed
their market setting. The settings have been adapted from an EOM towards
a setting including a mechanism that remunerates capacity providers that
contribute to generation adequacy.
Traditionally, CMs have been implemented in the peripheral markets that were
due to their geographical location more dependent on domestic generation.
Examples are Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Portugal, Spain or Greece. However,
in recent years especially markets in central Europe have introduced a CM.
Among the most discussed are Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany or
Poland.
More important, most of the CMs in the national market zones have been
implemented without major concerns about a future harmonization process.
Each market zone developed its own design and implementation ending up in an
individually customized solution roughly following one of the implementation
concepts. In addition, most of the designs do not foresee a possibility for
non-domestic capacity, neither interconnection nor generation capacity, to
participate in neighboring markets. However, this contradicts to the directive
2015/89 of the European Union [92], stating that Member States are to define
transparent, stable and non-discriminatory policies on security of electricity
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Figure 2.20: Capacity mechanisms in European markets (based on [26, 59])
supply compatible with the requirements of a competitive internal market for
electricity. Up to now, it is still under discussion how a European participation
model could be implemented [16]. Currently, an exception forms the GB capacity
auction that allows interconnection to participate [82].
Instead of a harmonization process, currently the development resembles more
a patchwork of non-harmonized CMs. The consequences of such a patchwork
are cross-border or seams effects. These effects might distort cross-border trade
and reduce market transparency [93]. There is an ongoing debate on how CMs
in the European IEM could evolve in the future to avoid or at least minimize
these negative effects [19, 94, 95, 96, 97]. With increasing integration of the
CMs, the steps could look as follows [98]:
• A set common guidelines and requirements that should be reflected in the
individual design of market zones, as for example proposed by Agency for
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) [99].
• The development of an EU default design that could be adapted to the
market zones’ needs and pre-requirements for a CM individually by the
implementing market zone [19].
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• A target capacity mechanism model consisting of a European CM that
is implemented in all market zones and has a common approach for the
assessment of capacity demand and market coupling.
In the most recent developments, the role of the European Commission has
been further emphasized. The documents for approval of six CMs (Belgium,
Germany, France, Poland, Greece and Italy) [100] show the concerns of the
European Commission. Each of the proposed mechanism is thoroughly reviewed
for compliance with the State Aid regulation [101]. Mainly, this includes if the
mechanisms involve of State resources which can be already the facilitation
of a market, selective advantage for individual technologies and the distortion
of competition and effects on intra-EU trade. If the Commission finds that
the measure constitutes State aid like in the case of the Belgian SR [102], a
motivation must be provided by showing that a security of supply risk is clearly
identified and quantified. Moreover, accompanying measures must ensure that
potential distortions to competition are limited.
The discussion is similar to the one at the beginning of the harmonization process
of the energy-only market after the liberalization of electricity markets. As for
instance stated by [103] for the IEM development, a best market design might
be discovered by experiment, however, it is time to consolidate best practices
at the European level. A harmonization process needs to be started up. Given
the incremental steps listed above, it does not necessarily mean that all market
zone must converge to the same implementation concept. Comparable products
and market rules need to be established to form a level playing field for capacity
providers. In addition, a competition of national CMs to offer the most beneficial
investment incentives should be avoided to not reduce economic efficiency. In
Chapter 5, this discussion is picked up and supported by a quantitative study.
2.5 Conclusions
Concerns about generation adequacy and its sub-categories of upward, downward
and flexibility adequacy opened up the discussion of a long-term investment
equilibrium that emerges from the market itself. The distortions of the long-term
investment equilibrium due to market imperfections have paved the way for the
research of capacity mechanisms (CMs) during the last decade. A CM as means
to overcome or at least to restore some of the distortions by a market-based
mechanism has been discussed widely. Research on CMs has become important
for the understanding of electricity markets. Even more because CMs are
already today implemented in many markets worldwide. Both policy-makers
and market participants are not only required to understand and distinguish
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different concepts, but they are also expected to estimate the changes that come
with the implementation of a CM in their own or neighboring market zones.
This chapter provides a condensed guideline to find the most relevant and
elaborated work on the qualitative assessment of CMs. The review is enriched
with a survey conducted on the current state of implementation that also tries
to link system characteristics to the implementation of a CM. The conclusions
of the literature review and survey can be summarized as follows.
The main objective of a CM is to provide price signals that trigger adequate
investment to ensure the long-term generation adequacy. Consequently, it
should overcome potential distortions. In order to do so, a CM remunerates
market participants reliably available. As such, a CM is always meant to be
an integral part of the market framework and act complementary to existing
markets. The introduction of a CM does not replace existing markets, even
more because it is important to consider the interaction with other sub-markets
of a market framework.
However, the implementation of a CM is not uniform. Although the objective
is the same, different concepts of CMs with differing working principles exist in
markets worldwide. A categorization of the different implementation concepts
is done along the type of product, the market actors and the traded good
that represents a proxy for availability. CMs range from price-based capacity
payments, over targeted volume-based strategic reserves to volume- and market-
based mechanisms. The market-based mechanisms distinguish in the resolution
on the capacity demand side and range from centralized markets with a single
buyer to decentralized markets up to mechanism in which end-consumer can
express their value for generation adequacy.
The implications of the different implementation concepts for participating as
well as non-participating market actors has led to controversial discussions. The
discussion on whether a CM is suited for a future market framework comes
down to three main points of attention:
• First, a CM may take up an active role in the energy transition of the
power system towards major shares of Renewable Energy Sources (RES)
with zero marginal costs. The question whether price signals for adequate
investment should come from energy markets with or without price caps,
markets for flexibility with higher temporal resolutions as they are in
place today, or from CMs with an annual or at least periodic market
clearing is undecided. As the covered services of all three types of markets
are different, a combination of associated markets might offer the most
transparent price signals.
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• Second, the power system and the energy markets in the European Internal
Energy Market (IEM) strive for more benefits from harmonization and
efficient use of shared assets across borders. In this process of market
harmonization, the implementation of CMs is best embedded. While
currently national policy-making has led to a non-harmonized patchwork,
international efforts among others enforced by European policy-making,
are necessary to make best use of CMs in an international context. Only
a coherent approach towards cross-border participation in one form or
another prevents the undermining of efficient use of shared assets across
borders. Eventually, similar to other markets, a harmonized CM develops
into a regional CM based on a combined assessment for shared generation
adequacy.
• Finally, the role of a CM in an electricity market is often linked to the risk-
averse behavior of its participants. The expected changes for providing
energy, flexibility and availability that come with the energy transition
will weigh on investment decisions. While prices for energy and flexibility
are expected to become more unpredictable and also more emphasized
in their extremes in both directions, capacity-based prices as a result
of annual or periodic auctions can offer a countervailing effect. In turn,
market participants would see a stabilizing price signal in a changing
market context.
The description of the current state of implementation of CM as well as research
on its effects for the market framework as a whole lead to the development of
the model framework. The consecutive chapters 3-6 transfer the open points of
attention about CMs into a model framework. By using the model, educated
statements supported by quantitative case studies can be made.
For this reason, the quantitative case studies address the above-mentioned three
main discussion points with respect to CMs. In particular, Chapter 4 addresses
the expected changes with respect to the energy transition, adequate price
signals of multiple markets, and the interaction of different technologies with
a CM. Chapter 5 opens up the this discussion to a context of interconnected
markets and shared generation adequacy. Finally, Chapter 6 raises concerns
about absent investments in a risk-averse market environment and how a CM
can play a role to reduce uncertainty for different market participants.
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3.1 Introduction
The qualitative findings are transferred to mathematical formulations resulting
in a modeling framework used to study capacity mechanisms (CMs) in a more
quantitative way.
In the first part, different modeling types for CMs available in the literature are
reviewed including system dynamics, agent-based modeling, optimization models
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and equilibrium models. In the second part, the developed model framework is
introduced, based on equilibrium models existing in the literature. The theory
of the associated solution concept, a Nash Equilibrium (NE), is summarized.
Thereafter, standard approaches to compute a NE are described. These
approaches include the Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) reformulation
and an iterative trial-and-error process.
The third and main part of this chapter outlines the mathematical formulation
used in the modeling framework. It introduces a capacity expansion planning
implemented as a non-cooperative game among agents representing major
market participants. The modeled market participants include generators, a
storage operator, a consumer and a market operator acting in a single market
zone. The non-cooperative game is formulated for multiple market settings
including different CMs. The focus is on the changing market participant’s
decision-making in an energy-only market (EOM), a centralized Capacity Market
(cCM) or in a market with strategic reserves (SR). The market participant’s
decisions combine long-term investment decisions in generation and storage
capacities and short-term offered market volumes to the markets for energy,
reserve requirements and eventually a CM.
M
arket
M
odels
The model description has been published in two academic articles [69, 104]:
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, H. Le Cadre, and R. Belmans. “Electricity markets
for energy, flexibility and availability - Impact of capacity mechanisms on the
remuneration of generation technologies”. In: Energy Econ. 66 (July 2017), pp.
372–383. issn: 01409883. doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.06.024.
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, D. Six, and R. Belmans. “Capacity remuneration
mechanisms and the transition to low-carbon power systems”. In: Int.
Conf. Eur. Energy Mark. EEM. IEEE, 2015. isbn: 9781467366915. doi:
10.1109/EEM.2015.7216647.
The presented mathematical formulation of the modeling framework forms
the baseline of the consecutive three chapters. Chapter 4 uses the presented
formulation. Chapters 5 and 6 use an extended formulation applied in a multi-
market respectively stochastic model setting. The aim of this chapter is to
provide a basic model formulation of a non-cooperative game including different
CMs. Moreover, the model description can serve as inspiration and starting
point for including additional market participants in a market with CM.
Section 3.2 provides an overview of different modeling approaches proposed
in the literature to study CMs. Section 3.3 introduces the formal description
of an equilibrium model. Two methods to compute an equilibrium for the
described model are briefly outlined. The assumptions on the modeled markets
are described. Section 3.4 presents the formal mathematical description of
the equilibrium model for three different market settings (EOM, cCM, and
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SR). Section 3.5 reflects on the model implementation and the used software
packages. The findings are concluded in Section 3.6.
3.2 Models for Capacity Mechanisms
Four different modeling approaches are reviewed that are proposed in the
literature to study CMs. Each of the approaches is shortly described and
the necessary assumptions and limitations are discussed. Advantages and
disadvantages are outlined from an observing position, to the extent deemed
possible.
3.2.1 System Dynamics
The main idea of applying system dynamics to modeling power systems originates
from the feature of directly seeing feedback loops in the represented system
[105]. As such, the approach allows describing interactions among economic
and/or social components constrained by a physical system [106].
In order to describe a market and its participants, system dynamics rely on
modeling decision rules and causal relationships. For power system models,
an example of a decision rule is the investment decision taken by a market
participant. A new investment has a causal relationship with, e.g., the electricity
prices by changing the merit-order. In turn, changing electricity prices might
influence the decision-making of the investor.
The application of system dynamics models for markets with CMs have found
increasing interest in recent years. Figure 3.1 shows an example of the feedback
loops in a model for CMs [107]. The negative feedback loop, indicated with
a “-”, combines the energy and capacity prices via the investment decision to
the installed capacity. In a similar approach, [106] studies the effect of fixed
or variable payments on the investment decisions. The authors in [72] extend
system dynamics to a stochastic model to investigate the impact of uncertainty
for different CMs. A hybrid CM of capacity markets and capacity payments
is studied in [108]. The impact of capacity markets and SR on the investment
cycles are studied in [23]. Petite et al. extends existing models by introducing
risk aversion and studying the effect of scarcity pricing [107]. A system dynamics
model that analyzes the interaction of CMs and wind power developments is
described in [109].
In summary, the system dynamics models provide a tool to simulate CMs in
a similar context to this dissertation. It is possible to include different CMs,
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Figure 3.1: System dynamics model for market with capacity mechanisms [107]
research effects of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) expansion plans, and even
extend those models to stochastic models in combination with risk-averse market
participants.
In comparison, the advantages of all discussed examples are the possibility to
simulate multiple years in a dynamic model. Next to the investment decisions,
decision on the closing of capacity assets are part of some models [107]. As
such, the models are able to sketch transition pathways and simulate long-term
developments including for example temporary mothballing or construction
times [72].
On the other hand, the presented models with focus on CMs have some
shortcomings in the operational details and the temporal resolution. The
models neglect the representation of technical details of the technologies [110],
crucial for studies with high shares of RES. Following this, the models often
rely on a simplification of operational constraints to simulate markets. They
use, e.g., a simplified price-duration curve [72] or merit-order tables. Finally,
investment decisions in the model strongly depend on modeling the expectation
of future profits. If future investment decisions are not considered, there is a
missing feedback between expected investment decision and prices [69].
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3.2.2 Agent-Based Modeling
The agent-based modeling approach is similar to system dynamics. Individual
agents are modeled by decision-making and interaction with the environment.
The Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) uses programmed decision rules and models
a system in a bottom-up approach based on autonomous agents [20].
Modeling individual agents with their own set of expert rules allows creating a
very heterogeneous behavior of a large set of agents. Moreover, the individual
expert rules allow for a high level of detail. Typically, the agents also interact
with other agents through a model environment, that can capture exchange of
information, externalities or similar.
The application of agent-based models in the power system has produced models
of different granularity. Either models use multiple agents of which similar agents
use a common set of decision rules, or models limit themselves to specifying
agents in detail surrounded by an approximated market environment, e.g., a
decision-maker on generation investment. The latter assumes an aggregated
behavior of other market agents.
Well-established examples of the first category of agent-based models that
include CMs are the PowerACE [111] and the EMLab model [112]. Both
models incorporate the decision-making of investors based on net present value
(NPV) computation. The PowerACE model [111] includes both a cCM and SR.
Mostly, the simulated time horizon spans multiple decades. As such, it combines
short- and long term strategies of the agents. Similarly, the EMLab ABM also
models a cCM and SR. It includes Monte Carlo-style simulations to account
for uncertainty of, e.g., demand or RES. Additionally, this tool is also used to
study cross-border effects of CMs by modeling agents in two interconnected
zones [113].
Alternatively, [114] proposes a model that focuses on a single agent, representing
an individual investment decision-maker. The surrounding markets are simulated
based on market clearings summarizing and incorporating the behavior of other
market participants. Focus is on a detailed modeling of investment decisions.
The model is extended for studying capacity payments [115] and to account for
uncertainties [116].
The context of modeling CMs, agent-based models offer the possibility of
modeling a very heterogeneous agent behavior. It allows modeling different
responses to given market settings. A major advantage is that the decision rules
can be tested under different market settings without assuming the reaction of
the system [117]. The models can even incorporate agents that learn and adapt
to changing market settings, e.g., a new implementation of a CM after some
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years.
Mostly, agent-based models do not impose a common restriction towards
generation adequacy upfront. In fact, the overall system performance is always
the result of individual decision-making [118].
In terms of model size and simulation horizon, agent-based models can describe
very complex systems while computational problems are controllable as opposed
to large-scale optimizations due to the individual execution of the decision rules
[20]. All discussed models allow simulating long-term dynamic developments and
at the same time incorporating an hourly resolution. This is a major challenge
for equilibrium models that rely on solving the optimization problems of all
agents simultaneously. A decomposition technique as proposed in Chapter 6 is
one possible way to overcome this and achieve similar long-term model horizon
as agent-based models already currently do.
The drawbacks of agent-based models are often related to the link between
predetermined decision strategies and optimality of the system-wide results
with respect to the individual decision-making of the agents. While agent-
based models rely on defining specific strategies, equilibrium models are able
to describe the set of all possible strategies from which a strategy is chosen
endogenously based on the applied objective function. Hence, agent-based
models describe the system based on predefined decision rules rather than
performing optimized decisions [20]. In turn, it is difficult to deduct direct
recommendations for influencing the decision-making to achieve a desired system
outcome.
3.2.3 Optimization Models
Using optimization models to study long-term planning in energy systems has a
long tradition. More precise, long-term power system models have been used in
capacity expansion planning for both generation and network. Their target is to
determine long-term investment plans achieving one or more objectives. Mostly,
models minimize the total cost of energy provision or optimize the level of
supply of electric energy at minimum cost [119]. The result of a planning model
contains an investment plan for each technology together with an operational
schedule. Both decisions are taken accounting for fixed investment and variable
operational cost [119].
Alternative approaches look at, e.g., the maximization of social welfare (often
assumed to coincide with minimal cost), or the minimization of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. Given the global perspective and objectives, a lot of attention
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is given to modeling technical details and interaction among involved industries
and sectors.1
As such, these models are often used to draw pathways or provide guidelines
with respect to energy system transitions and policy advice [121]. Concrete
used power models for policy advice are for example the TIMES model [122] or
the PRIMES power system model [123]. Other models with similar approaches
are the LIMES-EU model [124], LUSYM invest [125, 126, 127].
Currently, these models are more and more extended to account for higher
operational details, for example, to represent different storage technologies
[128] or increasing flexibility demands [27]. However, compared to operational
power system models, long-term investment models often need to find a trade-off
between the level of temporal detail and the level of techno-economic operational
detail, which comes at an increased computational cost [126].
One of the limitations of optimization models including long-term investment
plans is linked to the limited possibility to represent complex aspects of market
design. In fact, optimization models implicitly assume perfect competition. This
includes, for example, the assumptions of price-taking and perfectly rational
forward-looking agents or the limited representation of policy aspects in market
settings. Moreover, often the representation of networks is limited. In order
to overcome such limitations, optimization models are often combined with
additional models.
As an example for the models including CM, the PRIMES power model has an
additional module to estimate investment decision in markets with a capacity
market [19]. In a two-part approach, market outcomes are first simulated based
on an optimization model, whereas in a second step the results are corrected
for a market response in a market with CM.
Another model for simulating the impact of Reliability Options (RO) is
presented in [129]. In this example, the market is represented through a
model that simulates the market for the RO based on the results of a short-term
market. This short-term market is represented by means of a deterministic unit
commitment model assumed to produce the market outcome with prices of an
hourly market with perfect competition. The prices are used to estimate bids
for the market for the RO assuming that the generators have the possibility
to predict these prices. Both models show that there is often a gap between
optimization models and the representation of market mechanisms.
Another approach would be the integration of a minimum capacity constraint
1Long-term investment models and the impact of different modeling approaches is
extensively discussed in the dissertation of Kris Poncelet [120]. His work has largely contributed
to the Section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.
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in a similar way as done for describing, e.g., reserve requirements or minimum
RES shares. However, this can only approximate the impact of a very generic
CM. The consequence is that distinguishing design parameters of CM, e.g.,
cCM, SR or RO, cannot be represented.
With respect to detailed modeling of CMs, only a scarce number of examples
are available due to the limitations of optimization models. Modeling
approaches with more focus on the interaction of individual decision-making and
market settings often use equilibrium models. Reusing similar mathematical
formulations allows building largely on developed optimization models. At the
same time, the equilibrium models relax the assumption of a central planner
optimizing the combined global utility, e.g., minimizing cost.
3.2.4 Equilibrium Models
In order to overcome the limitations of optimization-based investment models
for electricity markets, equilibrium models based on agents in competition have
been developed [119]. They express the interaction of individual decision-making
market participants in a competitive environment. Therefore, they are more
suited to represent markets that do not necessarily follow the same behavior as
a centralized planner minimizing cost. Consequently, they are used especially
for modeling liberalized energy markets [130].
Individual agents are modeled such that each agent optimizes its own utility
function, given a number of decision variables and a set of constraints defining
its set of choices. Similarly to the optimization models, the individual decision-
making is formalized in a mathematical optimization. A formal introduction is
provided in Section 3.3.
The requirement of a mathematical description of each agent’s decision-making
is the major difference with agent-based modeling. At this point, the modeler
needs to make a trade-off. On the one hand, an equilibrium model offers less
freedom in modeling the interaction and decision-making. On the other hand,
it offers more traceability from the described decision-making to the results.
By means of the mathematical description, differentiated decision-making of
individual agents in the power system on all levels of supply and demand can be
modeled, e.g., generators, consumer groups, storage operators, etc. Moreover,
individual preferences and state of information, risk-averse behavior, or behavior
towards competitors, can be taken into account.
An additional advantage of equilibrium models is the explicit modeling of
both primal and dual decision variables. This is mostly directly required by
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the applied methodology to solve an equilibrium model, such as an MCP
reformulation. An often-appreciated side effect is the economic interpretation of
these dual variables. They reveal direct interactions between constraints and the
value of decision variables in the optimization problem of the individual agents.
Examples are additional scarcity rents for limited resources in the market prices.
Moreover, it provides the possibility and flexibility to directly incorporate both
dual and primal variables in the objective function and/or apply constraints on
those [130].
Finally, equilibrium models are widely used for the representation of hierarchy
and strategic behavior in markets. For example, equilibrium models allow
modeling sequential decision-making: one or more market participants react
on the decision of other market participants. As such, the strategic actors can
achieve additional benefits. This can be interesting for several applications.
Most common are different competition models for similar market participants,
e.g., investors in generation technologies with market leaders and followers [131].
An additional application is different market participants with different timing
in decision-making, e.g., investments in generation and transmission assets [132].
Decision-making on different spatial levels could also be modeled using hierarchy,
e.g., residential investment in RES following regional decision-making on tariff
or subsidies schemes [133].
As equilibrium models offer opportunities to represent market designs and
interactions of market participants in a detailed way, they have been applied to
CMs as well. However, the focus and level of abstraction are very diverse and
require a closer look at the models available in the literature.
Models can be found that rely on a strong simplification of the temporal
resolution as well as demand and supply. [134] propose a model to study
capacity markets in a system of two interconnected markets. However, demand
and supply are simplified by aggregating functions for two time steps representing
average and peak demand. The decision variables are cleared market volumes
and resulting prices. Therefore, investments in new generation technologies,
i.e., a change of the supply function, as response to the market prices are not
foreseen. Similarly, [135] propose a model to study SR in two markets with
identical demand. Consequently, in order to analyze the long-term equilibrium
both models require assuming the investors’ reaction. The reaction is implicit
in the assumptions on the supply curve, rather than having an endogenous
decision-making that affects the available supply.
Other models incorporate endogenous investment of generation capacity. [136]
proposes a model that analyzes the impact of three different CMs (RO, capacity
market and Capacity Payments (CP)) on the investment decisions. However, the
energy market is approximated by three seasonal market clearings. The weighted
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Table 3.1: Comparison of modeling approaches linked to modeling of capacity
mechanisms
Modeling
approach
Advantages Disadvantages Selected
references
System
Dynamics
Dynamic (multi-year) investment
Mothballing and closure
Visualization of feedback loops
Aggregated decision-making [23, 72, 108,
109, 106, 107]
Agent-based
Modeling
Dynamic (multi-year) investment
Delays and incomplete information
Detailed decision-making
Traceability of results [111, 112,
113, 116]
Optimization
Models
Based on established power system models
High operational details
Combined model approach
Assumptions on competition
[129, 19]
Equilibrium
Models
Detailed competition models
Individual decision-making
Risk-averse behavior
Computational feasibility
Reduced operational details
[21, 135, 134,
138, 137, 139,
140, 141]
revenues for energy together with the revenues from the CM are then used to
justify investments. The seasonal market clearings are considered unconnected.
Hence, the operational details that distinguish generation technologies and the
impact of variable RES cannot be captured by the model.
Finally, models with more operational details and stochastic demand are
presented in [21] and [137]. They extend the investment models for CMs
by introducing the decision-making based on expected profits in a multi-nodal
context. Therefore, the models incorporate a detailed formulation of the
underlying power flow in a nodal model. Moreover, the models take into account
uncertainty in the decision-making. However, the models limit the representation
of a generic CM by a lower bound for installed capacity summarized across all
nodes.
Modeling CMs is always linked to imperfect markets and individual behavior
towards risk. Existing models accounting for risk are presented in [138, 139,
140, 141]. [138] relax the assumption of perfect competition and propose a
model assuming that investors in generation capacities have influence on the
resulting prices observed on the energy-based market. The interaction of CMs
and risk aversion in stochastic equilibrium models is introduced in [139]. Similar
to [140] and [141], risk measures are used to model risk-averse utility functions
of individual agents. However, the introduction of risk-averse behavior creates
additional challenges limiting the number of represented agents as well as the
temporal resolution in the proposed models. A discussion of the computational
limitations and a method to overcome them is presented in Chapter 6.
The proposed models in this dissertation belong to the group of equilibrium
models. The goal of the proposed models is to overcome the shortcomings
of the discussed equilibrium models and bridge the gap to well-established
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optimization models and agent-based models with high temporal resolution and
operational details.
Additionally, they aim at assessing the effects of CMs on all relevant market
participants including conventional generators, RES, consumers, storage and
interconnection. A sufficiently high temporal resolution is incorporated to
represent operational details. At the same time, investment decisions are taken
on the basis of annualized cost. Therefore, the models combine individual
agent’s investment decision-making under different market settings and at the
same time take changing operational patterns in future low-carbon systems
into account. By extending the model to a stochastic equilibrium model, it can
include decision-making characterized by risk aversion.
3.3 Equilibrium Models for Capacity Mechanisms
The developed framework of equilibrium models for CMs used in the following
chapters consists of different elements combined in function of the respective
research questions. Figure 3.2 shows the different building blocks, used to
customize the equilibrium model. In order to introduce the basic modeling
framework, this section discusses the modeled markets and the agents used
in Chapter 4. It includes a deterministic model for an isolated market with a
market operator, generators, a consumer, and a storage operator competing in
an energy-only market (EOM), centralized Capacity Market (cCM), or strategic
reserves (SR).
Additional developed models for a decentralized Capacity Market (dCM),
Reliability Options (RO), or Capacity Payments (CP) are only briefly discussed.
The full mathematical formulation is provided in Appendix A for completeness.
3.3.1 Non-Cooperative Game and Nash Equilibrium
In all generality, for all proposed models, a non-cooperative game with market
clearing conditions is set up. Different agents compete and take decisions on
market volumes and market prices independently and simultaneously. The set
of agents is defined as A.
Formally, each agent a ∈ A decides on its strategy χa that is in its set of
strategies Xa. The product of all set of strategies is given by X := ×a∈AXa.
The utility function of each agent a ∈ A is defined as Πa : X → R. This
setting gives rise to a non-cooperative game Γ := (A, X, (Πa)a∈A) formulated
in strategic form. Figure 3.3 shows a graphical representation of the game.
70 MODELS FOR MARKETS INCLUDING CAPACITY MECHANISMS
Chapter 3 & 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Appendix
Deterministic StochasticModel type
Energy-only market
RES certificates
Flexibility markets
Centralized capacity market
Strategic reserves
Decentralized capacity market
Reliability options
Capacity payments
Market
mechanisms
Market operator
Generator
Consumer
Storage
Interconnection
Agents
Isolated IsolatedInterconnectedSpatialresolution
Risk-neutral
Risk-averse
Decision-making
Figure 3.2: Modular set up of the modeling framework
Each agent maximizes selfishly its utility function Πa. The strategies of all
agents in A other than a are defined as χ-a. Formally, given the strategies
of all the other agents in A, χ-a, each agent a ∈ A solves independently and
simultaneously:
max
χa∈Xa
Πa(χa, χ-a). (3.1)
The set of strategies of agent a, Xa, does not depend on the decision of the
other agents. As such, when taking the decision to maximize its utility Πa, the
strategy of the other agents, χ-a, is considered as a given parameter. Hence,
the interaction among the agents only takes place via their utility function.
In case of an energy-only market model, this means for example that the
profit of each generator depends on all agents’ installed capacities and sold
energy. Therefore, it is linked with other generator’s actions through the market
prices. However, the set of strategies, e.g., the installed capacities or generated
electricity is not directly constrained by other generators’ decisions.
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Agent 1
max Π1(χ1, χ-1)
s.t.
χ1 ∈ X1
Agent 2
max Π2(χ2, χ-2)
s.t.
χ2 ∈ X2
Agent a
max Πa(χa, χ-a)
s.t.
χa ∈ Xa
. . .
Non-cooperative game Γ := (A, X, (Πa)a∈A)
Figure 3.3: Representation of non-cooperative game Γ
The associated solution concept is that of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) [142, 143]:
a strategy profile χ? ∈ X is a NE if, and only if:
Πa(χ?a, χ?−a) ≥ Πa(χa, χ?−a),∀χa ∈ Xa,∀a ∈ A. (3.2)
In an equilibrium, none of the agents a ∈ A has an incentive to deviate from its
strategy given the strategies of the other agents. Alternatively, no individual
agent can deviate to improve its further increase its utility. Under the strategy-
bounded assumption, it is possible to prove the existence of a NE.
Each agent’s utility function, the set of strategies, and the optimization problem
faced by each agent are described in detail in Section 3.4.
3.3.2 Computing a Nash Equilibrium
Two different methods for computing a NE are used. The classical method for
computing NE from non-cooperative games uses a MCP reformulation. The
second method is a more intuitive and iterative approach based on updating
agents’ decision and checking the reaction of the other agents.
Mixed Complementarity Problem
A classical way to compute a NE of a non-cooperative game (Figure 3.3) is
using an MCP reformulation. A MCP is defined as the following [144]. Let a
pair of vectors (u, v) belong to Rn1 × Rn2 and G, H be two mappings from
Rn1 × Rn2 into Rn1 and Rn2 respectively. The MCP is to find a pair of vectors
(u, v) belonging to Rn1 × Rn2 such that:
0 ≤ u ⊥ G(u, v) ≥ 0, (3.3a)
H(u, v) = 0 , v free. (3.3b)
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The MCP reformulation utilizes the first-order optimality conditions (Karush
Kuhn Tucker (KKT)-conditions) of all agents. However, instead of solving
each agent’s optimization problem individually, the optimality conditions and
constraints are combined to a set of equations. The obtained squared set of each
agent is solved simultaneously, giving rise to a NE. This approach is commonly
used as described for various applications in [145]. It is a standard tool in
economics [144].
Assuming an agent has the utility function F (x, y) and its set of strategy,
χ = (x, y) ∈ X , is described by a number of inequality constraints g(x, y) and
equality constraints h(x, y), its constrained optimization problem is:
max
x,y
F (x, y) (3.4a)
s.t. g(x, y) ≥ 0 (µ) (3.4b)
h(x, y) = 0 (ν) (3.4c)
x ≥ 0, y ∈ R (3.4d)
The variables in brackets, ν and µ, are the associated dual variables (or
Lagrangian multipliers) to the constraints. Formally, they describe the possible
improvement of the objective value if the constraints would be marginally
relaxed.
Consequently, the optimality conditions or KKT-conditions of the optimization
problem are:
0 ≤ −∂F
∂x
+ µ∂g
∂x
+ ν ∂h
∂x
⊥ x ≥ 0 (3.5a)
0 = −∂F
∂y
+ µ∂g
∂y
+ ν ∂h
∂y
, y ∈ R (3.5b)
0 ≤ g(x, y) ⊥ µ ≥ 0 (3.5c)
0 = h(x, y) , ν ∈ R (3.5d)
The ⊥ sign indicates the complementarity of each condition with an associated
variable. Formally, it can also be read as:
0 ≤ g(x) ⊥ µ ≥ 0
⇔ 0 ≤ g(x), µ ≥ 0, µ · g(x) = 0 (3.6)
For the later interpretation of the dual variables, the complementary slackness
is used [144]. This means that if a constraint is not binding (g(x) < 0), the
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associated dual variable µ is zero because relaxing the constraint does not
lead to an improvement of the objective. In turn, the dual variable only takes
a positive value (µ > 0) if the associated constraint is binding (g(x) = 0).
Applied on the definition of an MCP in (3.3a)-(3.3b), u corresponds to (x,µ)
and v to (y,ν). The mapping G corresponds to the constraints g (3.5c) and the
stationarity conditions of variable x (3.5a) and H to the constraints h (3.5d)
and the stationarity conditions of variable y (3.5b).
In the presented models, this concept is for example used to reveal the interaction
of prices and associated scarcity and flexibility rents (dual variables of the
capacity limits and ramping constraints) to explain the investment decisions of
the agents.
In order to solve the MCP for all agents simultaneously, each agent’s optimality
conditions and constraints are combined to a squared set of complementarity
conditions. In the squared set, the number of equations, i.e., optimality
conditions and constraints are equal to the number of variables, including
primal decision variables and dual variables. The solution of the set is found
using a dedicated solver for complementarity problems, e.g., the PATH solver
[146] (Section 3.5).
Iterative process - tâtonnement process
An alternative approach to compute a NE is an iterative process, in particular,
a tâtonnement (trial and error) process. This diagonalization process is a
variant of the Gauss-Seidel method used for numerical solution of simultaneous
equations. [145] (Figure 3.4).
In each iteration k, each agent a ∈ A solves its optimization problem and
updates its decision, χa, using the most recent available decisions of the other
agents, χ-a. The updated decision χk+1a , is used in the optimization problems of
the other agents. This process is repeated until a stopping criterion is reached.
The stopping criterion is based on the change of decision variables from one
iteration to the next one, on which a norm (| · |) is applied. The method stops
if this difference is below a certain threshold  for all agents.
If an equilibrium is reached, no agent has an incentive to change its decision in
order to improve its own utility. The convergence of the process is linked to the
existence of an equilibrium and the reaction of one agent’s decision to the other
agents’ decisions.
The method based on Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
for computing a risk-averse equilibrium presented in Section 6.4 uses the same
principle. The convergence of the presented method is improved by borrowing
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Agent 1
χk+11 = arg max Π1(χ1, χ-1)
χ1 ∈ X1
χ-1 = (χk2 , χk3 , χka)
Agent 2
χk+12 = arg max Π2(χ2, χk-2)
χ2 ∈ X2
χ-2 = (χk+11 , χk3 , χka)
Agent 3
χk+13 = arg max Π3(χ3, χk-3)
χ3 ∈ X3
χ-3 = (χk+11 , χk+12 , χka)
Agent a
χk+1a = arg max ΠA(χa, χk-a)
χ2 ∈ X2
χ-2 = (χk+11 , χk+12 , χk+13 )
Iterative process:
Iteration k
k = k + 1
stop if:
∀a ∈ A : |χk+1a − χka| ≤ Ô
Figure 3.4: Iterative process to obtain Nash-Equilibrium
concepts like the regularization term from the ADMM methodology for perfect
exchange [147].
3.3.3 Capacity Expansion Planning as Non-Cooperative Game
The non-cooperative game Γ forms the structure for the capacity expansion
planning models throughout the thesis. The set of agents is defined as A :=
(Gi)i∈N ∪ c ∪MO ∪ SO. It consists of a finite number of generators (Gi)i∈N ,
one consumer c as an aggregation of a multiplicity of atomic consumers, a
price-setting market operator MO, and a storage operator SO. Figure 3.5 gives
a schematic overview of the agents, and the considered markets for the model
applied in Chapter 4.
On the left-hand side of Figure 3.5, the competing generators are depicted. Each
generator (Gi)i∈N represents a generation technology. The generator decides
on its installed capacity and operates the generation technology on the different
markets. In general, they offer generated energy gi,p,t, available capacity capcmi
in case of a cCM, capsri in case of a SR, up- and downward flexibility rrri,p , rrri,p ,
and RES certificates gresi to the respective markets.
The right-hand side of the figure depicts a single storage operator SO. It solely
participates on the energy market through charging, chp,t, and discharging,
dchp,t, based on price arbitrage. It is chosen to introduce a single storage
operator. However, the extension to multiple storage operators, similar to the
generators, is straightforward.
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Market Operator MO
Energy-based market
(Energy output)
λemp,t , ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T
RES certificates
(Emission-neural)
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(Availability)
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Generator G1
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s.t. Constraints
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rr
1,p
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Generator G2
max Profit
s.t. Constraints
Generator Gi
max Profit
s.t. Constraints
...
Storage SO
max Profit
s.t. Constraints
dchp,t
chp,t
Consumer c
max Surplus
s.t. Constraints
demp,t , l
em
p,t
dcm, lcm
or lsr
Inelastic demand
without possibility
to shed demand
Figure 3.5: Market model scheme showing the competing agents. The four
different markets and their prices are shown in the middle (colored). The arrows
show the decision variables of the agents for the respective markets.
The consumer c is an aggregation of atomic consumers representing their demand
in form of an aggregated demand curve. The consumer combines the demand on
all individual markets. In addition, multiple groups of consumers are possible,
which would require the formation of a combined demand curve that reflects
demand and the willingness to pay of all consumer groups.
The market operator MO is depicted at the center. It is the price-setting agent.
The market operator sets the prices such that the market clearing conditions
are satisfied. Its objective is to reduce excess demand respectively excess supply.
It does so by setting the prices neither too low nor too high. All markets
are summarized in one market operator, while in reality not all markets are
necessarily operated by the same entity. However, the problem of the market
operator is defined such that it could also be separated along the markets
without altering the outcome of the model.
The representation of the temporal resolution uses two types of intervals
(Figure 3.6). A finite number of time steps, t ∈ T , is used to represent
the hourly resolution used to model the hourly market clearing and the actual
technical constraints such as ramping of generators or the energy balance of
storage. All time steps, t ∈ T , have the same length Lh. For all presented
models, the length of a time step is t ∈ T = 1h. In the future, this could be
adapted to 15 minutes to cope with new developments in the markets or to
account for more details in the technical operation.
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t ∈ T
p ∈ P
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∑
p∈PWp = 365
Lh = 1
. . . . . .
. . .
Figure 3.6: Schematic representation of temporal resolution for 30 periods
The time steps are grouped into a finite number of periods, p ∈ P. Each
period contains the same number of time steps. In the given model, each period
consists of 24 time steps. The number of periods is selected in order to control
the computation time. The periods are selected and assigned with a weight,
Wp. The weight of each period may be different, but the sum of all weights is
equal to 365. This means the results of the individual markets are scaled up to
one year. In the following case studies, 30 representative periods are selected.
The selection and weighting of representative days is based on a methodology
developed together with Kris Poncelet [148]. In short, these periods are
carefully selected from a full time series to account for the characteristics.
Typical used time series are load profiles and RES capacity factor profiles.
Moreover, the methodology takes into account the correlation of the different
time series (Appendix D). For more details, the interested reader is referred to
the dissertation of Kris Poncelet [120] and the joint paper [148].
This approach offers two significant advantages. First, the computational time
can be reduced without jeopardizing the outcome of the model significantly.
Second, because of the individual weights, scarcity events can be represented
more precisely. An equal division of the periods, i.e., equal weights, would
lead to an overrating of periods with scarcity pricing. This would disturb the
assessment of the impact of CMs.
In what follows, the reason behind the modeling of the different markets is
outlined.
Hourly energy-based market
An hourly market for energy represents the predominant energy markets
implemented in many market zones, i.e., day-ahead markets. Two alternatives
are modeled based on different demand curves (Figure 3.7). The energy demand
is assumed either inelastic or price-elastic up to a certain price cap.
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Figure 3.7: Modeled hourly demand curves for the energy market
In case of inelastic demand, the demand curve is defined by the initial demand,
Demp,t . The demand varies for each period, p, and time step t. It is inelastic up to
the exogenously set price cap, λem. The supply curve is formed by the offered
generation of all generators, gi,p,t, sorted along the variable costs. The uniform
hourly market clearing price, λemp,t , results from the intersection of demand and
supply.
Price-elastic demand is modeled following the proposed methodology in [149]
based on own-price elasticities. The hourly demand for energy is assumed
moderately price-elastic up to the price cap. It results in a sloped demand curve
tilted at the point of initial demand, Demp,t , and a reference price, λem#. The
slope is given by an assumed inverse price-elasticity, Eem reflecting the voluntary
adaptation of the demand based on the given price. The assumed reference
price can be obtained, e.g., by using a weighted average price of a model run
with inelastic demand. Price-elasticities can for example come forward from
analyzing the shape of typical demand bid curves in a top-down approach or in
a bottom-up approach by assessing flexibility and price response on individual
consumer level [150].
For both cases, if the supply is insufficient to cover demand (possibly reduced
by voluntary adaptation to Demp,t), involuntary load shedding occurs. This load
shedding or Energy Not Served (ENS), lemp,t , always results in the market price
equal to the price cap.
Market for RES certificates
Next to the energy-based market, a market for RES certificates is introduced
(Figure 3.8). This market represents a minimum demand, Dres, for energy
originating from RES. The market translates the policy targets for the
integration of RES into a market-based demand. It is similar to a system
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Figure 3.8: Modeled demand curves for RES certificates
for green certificates in which certificates are given to RES generators per
generated electrical energy and consumers are obliged to cover a share of their
demand by certificates. This results in a price for the certificates valuing
emission-neutral injection. In this market-based mechanism, in case of RES
generation exceeding the target, the certificate price drops to zero. This indicates
that RES generators recover their cost already via other markets.
Alternatively, one could also model a cap on emissions for generation. It would
require tracing of the emissions of all technologies. The resulting emissions price
is comparable to the CO2-emission price at the European Emissions Trading
System (ETS).
The demand in the market for RES certificates, Dres, is assumed to be inelastic
and the price for RES certificates is limited by a maximum price, λres. The
resulting price, λres, forms an additional revenue stream for RES.
Flexibility market - reserve requirements
The need for flexibility in the power system is modeled by means of reserve
requirements. Reserve requirements are introduced in a simplified and
aggregated way. There is no distinction made between different types of reserve
products. In fact, two additional market clearings are added, one for up- and one
for downward reserves. Both markets assume an inelastic demand representing
the need for flexibility by the system operator. The activation of the reserves in
real-time is not included in the model.
The demand for upward flexibility, Drrp , and downward flexibility, Drrp are
covered by the offered flexibility from the generators, rrri,p respectively rrri,p
(Figure 3.9). In order to approximate the longer time horizon of sizing and
allocation of reserve products in reality, the reserve requirements are periodically
contracted (per period p) resulting in a price for up- and downward flexibility
per period, λrrp and λrrp .
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Figure 3.9: Modeled periodic demand curves for the flexibility market
Similar to the hourly energy-based market, one could possibly change the sizing
and allocation time horizon to more frequent market clearings. For instance,
one could align the market for energy and flexibility in order to enable RES to
take up a more active role in providing flexibility.
A discussion on how the offered flexibility influences the operational constraints
of the generators is described in the Section 3.4.1.
Centralized capacity market
Optional to the other markets, a market-wide cCM can be included in the model.
The modeling of the cCM in line with current implementations in Great Britain
(GB) [82] and Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) [84].
In general, a sloped capacity demand curve is defined around three price-quantity
points. A target capacity demand, Dcm#, is valued with a target price, λcm#,
typically set to the Net Cost Of New Entry (Net CONE). The Net CONE is the
difference of the Cost Of New Entry (CONE) and the expected revenues from
other markets. The maximum capacity demand, Dcm, defines the maximum
volume for which a minimum capacity price is paid, typically zero. Consequently,
if there were excess installed capacity, generators would receive no remuneration
from the cCM.
The minimum capacity demand, Dcm, is valued with the maximum price, λcm.
If supply from capacity providers is insufficient, involuntary not-served capacity
emerges similar to the energy-based market. However, the maximum price is
typically set to the CONE equal to the investment cost of the peak technology.
As a result, the model chooses the installation of new peak capacity of involuntary
not-served capacity. Consequently, there is always enough capacity to supply at
least the minimum demand.
80 MODELS FOR MARKETS INCLUDING CAPACITY MECHANISMS
Dcm dcmDcm# D
cm
λcm#
λcm
λ
cm
capcm1 cap
cm
2
capcm3 cap
cm
4
λ cm
=
E
cm
· d cm
+
λ cm
,0
Demand [MW]
Pr
ic
e
[e
/M
W
]
(a) Uniform slope
Dcmdcm Dcm# D
cm
λcm#
λcm
λ
cm
capcm1 cap
cm
2
capcm3 cap
cm
4
Demand [MW]
Pr
ic
e
[e
/M
W
]
(b) With break point
Figure 3.10: Modeled annual demand curve for the capacity market
Figure 3.10a shows a special case in which the three target points result in
a linear-sloped demand curve. In a more general form, (Figure 3.10b), the
demand curve has has a piecewise-linear shape with two break points. The
offered capacities of the generators form the supply curve. The market clears
the capacity volume, dcm, at a uniform market clearing price, λcm.
The piecewise-linear shape causes mathematical challenges to model the resulting
consumer surplus in an equilibrium model. For readability, it is chosen to use
the linear-sloped demand curve (Figure 3.10a) in the model description. A
specially developed model adaptation for piecewise-linear demand curves with
one or more break points is provided in Appendix B.
Strategic Reserves
The second optional CM discussed in detail is the tendering of strategic reserves
(SR). The model follows the current market implementation of the Belgian
Strategic Reserves [78].
The volume of the SR is assumed inelastic as it is typically defined up front
by the system operator. Figure 3.11 shows the resulting demand curve with
a fixed demand, Dsr: inelastic up to the price cap, λsr, of the tendering. The
price cap is set equal to the CONE being equal to the investment cost of a peak
technology. The supply of the strategic reserves originates from the different
technologies, capsri , selected based on increasing costs. The contracted capacity
is remunerated with the resulting capacity price λsr.
Capacities contracted in the SR are taken out of the energy and flexibility
markets. Hence, the generator can no longer use the capacity for its own utility
because the contracted capacity can only be activated by the system operator.
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Figure 3.11: Demand curve for strategic reserves auction
It is only activated to prevent ENS, hence, only if the energy market cannot
clear demand and supply.
3.4 Mathematical Formulation
of Agents’ Problems
This section presents the mathematical formulation for the agents. The agents’
optimization problems are adapted to the different market settings. It builds
upon the description of market settings in Section 3.3.3. The models for
energy-only market (EOM), centralized Capacity Market (cCM), and strategic
reserves (SR) are provided in detail. Models for other CMs, as well as necessary
assumptions and limitations linked to the model formulations, are discussed at
the end of this section.
The EOM is used as reference for all analyses throughout the next chapters.
Therefore, these optimization problems of the agents are discussed first.
Thereafter, the necessary changes to accommodate for the CMs (cCM or SR)
are outlined. For each type of agent, the optimization problem is described in
form of the utility function and the constraints defining the strategy set.
The typesetting of the models and each agent’s optimization problem are done
in the following way: The agent’s decision variables are typeset with lower case
letters, e.g., gi,p,t. Exceptions to this rule are market prices as decision variables
of the market operator. All price-related variables and parameters are presented
by the Greek letter λ. All exogenous model input parameters are typeset with
upper case letters, e.g., Ai,p,t. Greek letters appended to the constraints in
brackets give the associated dual variables. The dual variables are used for
computing the NE using the MCP reformulation as described in Section 3.3.2.
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3.4.1 Energy-only Market
This market setting of the EOM is the most basic one. It serves as starting
point for all consecutive model formulations. It is presented in primal form as
the agent’s individual decision problems:
Generator (Gi)i∈N
Each generator (Gi)i∈N represents a grouped technology that differentiates
along its economic and technical characteristics. The economic characteristics
include the variable cost for generation, Cgi , and annualized fixed costs for
investment, C invi . The short-term availability, Ai,p,t, and ramping capabilities
Rhi , R
rr
i , describe the technical constraints. In case of RES, the availability
represents the capacity factor given in an hourly profile for, e.g., solar or wind.
Each profile takes values between 0 and 1 representing for example the weather
conditions or outages. Zero means that in the given period and time step
the installed capacity is not available for generating electrical energy. For
conventional generators, it is typically close to one.
The utility function, Πi, of each generator, i ∈ N , is defined as the aggregated
profit it can obtain in all markets. Each generator maximizes its profit defined
as the difference between the revenues from all markets and the sum of variable
and fixed cost. The revenues are the (weighted) supplied volume times the
price on the associated markets. In order to calculate its profit each generator
takes into account the strategy of the market operator, λMO, which contains
prices for energy, λemp,t , flexibility, λrrp , λrrp , and RES certificates, λres. Again,
this does not influence the generator’s set of strategies.
The strategy for each generator, χi = (capi, gi,p,t, rrri,p , rrri,p , gresi ) ∈ Xi, is defined
by the installed capacity, capi, and the market volumes. The market volumes
are the supplied volumes for energy output, gi,p,t, flexibility, rrri,p , rrri,p , and RES
certificates, gresi . This results in the following profit maximization:
max
χi∈Xi
Πi(χi, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
(λemp,t − Cgi ) · gi,p,t
]
+ λres · gresi
+
∑
p∈P
Wp · (λrrp · rrri,p + λrrp · rrri,p )− C invi · capi. (3.7a)
The offered volumes are subject to economic and technical constraints and can
be grouped along the markets. The energy output (in one time step with the
length Lh) is constrained by the short-term availability, Ai,p,t, of the installed
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capacity (3.7b) and hourly ramping capabilities, Rhi , (3.7c) and (3.7d):
gi,p,t ≤ Ai,p,t · capi · Lh, (µemi,p,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.7b)
gi,p,t ≤ gi,p,t-1 +Rhi · capi · Lh, (ρem,i,p,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.7c)
gi,p,t ≥ gi,p,t-1 −Rhi · capi · Lh, (ρem,i,p,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.7d)
The offered flexibility to the reserve requirements is constrained in two ways.
For the upward flexibility, rrri,p , the limits are the short-term ramping capability
(3.7e) and the possibility to theoretically further increase the output if activated
(3.7f). In other words, if the capacity is already fully used for energy output in
any of the time steps of the period then no upward reserves can be provided.
The downward flexibility, rrri,p , is limited similarly by the short-term ramping
capability (3.7g). In contrast to the upward flexibility, the downward flexibility
requires a minimum energy output for every time step of the period to be able
to theoretically further decrease the output if activated (3.7h).
Moreover, the participation is limited by the factors F rri and F rri . These
factors may vary between zero and one. However, in reality they are typically
either zero or one. A factor of zero excludes a generator from participation, e.g.,
F rri is zero if RES are not allowed to offer upward reserves. This translates
formally as follows:
rrri,p ≤ F rri ·Rrri · capi, (µrri,p ), ∀p ∈ P, (3.7e)
rrri,p ≤ capi − gi,p,t/Lh, (µrr gi,p,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.7f)
rrri,p ≤ F rri ·Rrri · capi, (µrri,p ), ∀p ∈ P, (3.7g)
rrri,p ≤ gi,p,t/Lh, (µrr gi,p,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.7h)
The offered green certificates, gresi , are constrained by the energy-output
multiplied with a factor, F resi . Similar to the offered flexibility, this factor
derates the energy output based on its emissions. RES would have a factor one,
assuming all energy output is emission-free. Conventionals have a factor zero
and thus do not receive any RES certificates. This is formally described by the
following equation:
gresi ≤ F resi
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
gi,p,t, (µresi ), (3.7i)
capi, gi,p,t, r
rr
i,p , r
rr
i,p , g
res
i ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.7j)
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The resulting KKT-conditions (3.8a)-(3.8e) for the primal decision variables of
the MCP reformulation allow analyzing the decision-making of each generator
in detail. It emphasizes the interaction of revenues from different markets.
The KKT-conditions can be read as following for the energy, gi,p,t. In order to
justify energy output (gi,p,t > 0), the complementary constraint states that the
variable cost of generation must be recovered by the revenues coming from the
energy price, λemp,t , and other markets through the duals, µresi , µ
rr g
i,p,t, µ
rr g
i,p,t. In
other words, the scarcity rents (µemi,p,t) and ramping rents, ρ
em,
i,p,t , ρ
em,
i,p,t , must be
reflected in the energy-based price. Similar analysis can be done for the other
market volumes. The link between the duals to the energy output and installed
capacity is established.
0 ≤Wp · (Cgi − λemp,t)
+ µemi,p,t + ρ
em,
i,p,t − ρem,i,p,t+1 − ρem,i,p,t − ρem,i,p,t+1
−Wp · F resi · µresi − µrr gi,p,t/Lh − µrr gi,p,t/Lh
⊥ gi,p,t ≥ 0,∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T (3.8a)
0 ≤ µrri,p +
∑
t∈T
µrr gi,p,t − λrrp ⊥ rrri,p ≥ 0,∀p ∈ P, (3.8b)
0 ≤ µrri,p +
∑
t∈T
µrr gi,p,t − λrrp ⊥ rrri,p ≥ 0,∀p ∈ P, (3.8c)
0 ≤ µresi − λres ⊥ gresi ≥ 0 (3.8d)
Most interesting for this dissertation is the interpretation of the KKT-condition
for the installed capacity, capi, (3.8e). This condition is affected by the
introduction of a CM later on. In order to justify investment (any installed
capacity larger than 0), the fixed cost must be recovered through the additional
revenues from all markets. Again, those revenues include scarcity rents (µemi,p,t)
and rents for ramping (ρem,i,p,t , ρ
em,
i,p,t ) on the energy market, emerging if the price
exceeds the variable costs.
0 ≤ C invi −
∑
p∈P
∑
t∈T
[
Rhi · (ρem,i,p,t + ρem,i,p,t ) · Lh
+Ai,p,t · µemi,p,t · Lh + µrr gi,p,t
]
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−Rrri ·
∑
p∈P
[
F rri · µrri,p + F rri · µrri,p
]
⊥ capi ≥ 0 (3.8e)
For RES the revenues from RES certificates are indirectly linked to the
investment. The revenues from the RES certificates allow for lower energy
prices. As the difference between the variable cost and energy price is reduced
by the RES price (µresi = λres) (3.8a). The revenues from the flexibility markets
(µrri,p , µrri,p , µ
rr g
i,p,t) add to them. The shares of the different rents differ for the
technologies studied later on to analyze the impact of changing market settings
on the technologies.
The complete MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.1.1.
Consumer c
The consumer aggregates the demand side. The consumer maximizes its total
surplus based on the energy-based market only. As this is the only market with
an elastic demand, the consumer only takes a decision for this market. The
decision of the consumer has no influence on the other markets for flexibility
or RES certificates. The utility of the consumer is defined as the difference
between the willingness to pay expressed by the price cap in the demand curve
and the resulting market price times the served demand (3.9a).
The strategy of the consumer, χc = (demp,t , lemp,t ) ∈ Xc, includes only the level of
served, demp,t , and not-served energy demand, lemp,t , in each period and time step.
The decision is taken given the prices by the market operator, λMO. Given the
price-elastic demand curve (Figure 3.7b), the consumer surplus (orange area)
can be formalized as:
max
χc∈Xc
Πc(χc, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
1/2 · (λem − λemp,t) · (demp,t +Demp,t). (3.9a)
Only one additional constraint defines the set of strategies. The constraint
ensures that the sum of served, demp,t , and not-served demand, lemp,t , are located
on the sloped demand curve. This yields the following:
demp,t + lemp,t = (λemp,t − λem,0p,t )/Eem, (βemp,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.9b)
demp,t , l
em
p,t ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.9c)
In order to describe the linear demand curve, two additional parameters must be
derived, the y-axis intercept, λem,0p,t , and the minimum demand after voluntary
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adaptation, Demp,t . Both parameters are calculated based on the reference demand,
Demp,t , the price-elasticity, Eem, and the reference price, λem#. Formally, it is
calculated as follows:
λem,0p,t = λem# −Demp,t · Eem, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.9d)
Demp,t = (λ
em − λem#)/Eem, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.9e)
The resulting MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.1.2.
Storage Operator SO
Similar to the generator, the storage operator combines investment and
operational decision-making. The strategy of the storage operator is described
as χSO = (chp,t, dchp,t, p, e) ∈ XSO. The operational decisions including
charging, chp,t, and discharging, dchp,t, are defined as energy exchange on the
energy-based market. Additionally, the state of charge of the storage is tracked,
ep,t. It is not a decision variable but a result of the charging and discharging.
The investment decision is taken for sizing the energy storage, e, and the
maximum capacity, p, used for charging and discharging. It is assumed that the
sizing of the two investment decisions is independent and there is no technical
constraint such as a power/energy ratio.
The profit of the storage operator is defined by the price arbitrage on the
energy market reduced by the investment cost. The revenues result from
discharging/selling during hours of high prices, while additional cost emerges
from charging/buying during hours with low prices. The prices are given by the
strategy of the market operator, λMO. Formally, the utility function is given by:
max
χSO∈XSO
ΠSO(χSO, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
λemp,t · (dchp,t − chp,t)
]
− C inv,e · e− C inv,p · p. (3.10a)
The operational constraints of the storage include the upper limits for charging
(3.10b), discharging (3.10c) and the energy storage (3.10d) based on the
investment decisions. An hourly energy balance (3.10e) keeps track of the
state of charge in the storage. The energy resulting from the charging or
discharging is multiplied by respective efficiencies to represent further technical
characteristics of the storage technology. Note that the weighting of the periods
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is absent but addressed in a second energy balance (3.10f).
chp,t ≤ p · Lh, (µchp,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(3.10b)
dchp,t ≤ p · Lh, (µdchp,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.10c)
ep,t ≤ e, (µep,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(3.10d)
ep,t = ep,t-1 + chp,t · ηch − dchp,t/ηdch, (βep,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.10e)
In order to account for the different weights of the representative periods, an
additional constraint needs to be added. Equation (3.10f) ensures that the
overall charged and discharged energy is zero over the complete model horizon.
This approach only approximates the state of charge in the energy storage, as
the link between the periods is lost. However, it offers sufficient accuracy if the
number of representative periods is limited [6].∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
chp,t · ηch − dchp,t/ηdch
]
= 0, (βe#), (3.10f)
chp,t, dchp,t, ep,t, p, e ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T .(3.10g)
The resulting MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.1.3.
Market Operator MO
Finally, a market operator sets the prices to minimize the excess demand
and excess supply. Its strategy, λMO = (λemp,t , λres, λrrp , λrrp ) ∈ XMO, contains
all market prices. Given the market volumes offered in the strategies of the
other agents, χi, χSO, χc, the market operator minimizes the sum of all market
clearings multiplied by the prices.
As a result, the market operator chooses the prices such that the market clearings
are fulfilled with equality. If there would be a remaining imbalance on one of
the markets, the market operator would have an incentive to adapt the prices
accordingly. If there would be too much supply, the market clearing becomes
negative, hence an incentive to decrease prices, and vice versa.
min
λMO∈XMO
ΠMO(λMO, χi, χSO, χc)
=
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
λemp,t ·
(
demp,t −
∑
i∈N
gi,p,t − dchp,t + chp,t
)
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+ λres · (Dres −∑
i∈N
gresi
)
+
∑
p∈P
Wp ·
[
λrrp · (Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p ) + λrrp · (Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p )
]
.(3.11a)
Each market price is bounded by a lower bound, i.e., a floor price, and an upper
bound, i.e., price cap.
λem ≤ λemp,t ≤ λ
em
, (νemp,t , νemp,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.11b)
λres ≤ λres ≤ λres, (νres, νres), (3.11c)
λrr ≤ λrrp ≤ λ
rr
, (νrrp , νrrp ), ∀p ∈ P, (3.11d)
λrr ≤ λrrp ≤ λ
rr
, (νrrp , νrrp ), ∀p ∈ P. (3.11e)
The resulting MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.1.4.
3.4.2 Centralized Capacity Market
The next market setting is that of a centralized Capacity Market (cCM) with
a linear downward-sloped demand curve (Figure 3.10). Only the necessary
adaptations compared to the formulation for the EOM are highlighted.
Generator (Gi)i∈N
The generator model requires two changes. First, an additional market volume
is introduced: offered capacity to the capacity market, capcmi . Consequently,
the set of strategies is extended to χi = (capi, capcmi , gi,p,t, rrri,p , rrri,p , gresi ) ∈ Xi.
The utility function is adapted accordingly and includes the revenues from the
capacity market. The offered volume is valued with the capacity price, λcm,
part of the market operator’s strategy, λMO. This yields the following objective:
max
χi∈Xi
Πi(χi, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
(λemp,t − Cgi ) · gi,p,t
]
+ λres · gresi
+
∑
p∈P
Wp · (λrrp · rrri,p + λrrp · rrri,p )
+ λcm · capcmi − C invi · capi, (3.12a)
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Second, an additional constraint is added that limits the offered capacity by the
installed capacity multiplied with a derating factor, F cmi . Again, the derating
reflects the participation rules for different technologies and varies between zero
and one. The derating also represents the expected availability of a technology
during scarcity events. Typically, derating factors for RES are equal or close to
0, while for conventionals they are equal or close to 1.
capcmi ≤ F cmi · capi, (µcmi ), (3.12b)
additional constraints (3.7b)-(3.7i),
capi, cap
cm
i , g
res
i , r
rr
i,p , r
rr
i,p , gi,p,t ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.12c)
In order to see the direct impact of the capacity market on the decision-making,
the resulting KKT-conditions for the offered capacity and the installed capacity
are presented:
0 ≤ µcmi − λcm ⊥ capcmi ≥ 0, (3.13a)
0 ≤ C invi − F cmi · µcmi −
∑
p∈P
∑
t∈T
[
Rhi · (ρem,i,p,t + ρem,i,p,t ) · Lh
+Ai,p,t · µemi,p,t · Lh + µrr gi,p,t
]−Rrri ·∑
p∈P
[
F rri · µrri,p + F rri · µrri,p
]
⊥ capi ≥ 0 (3.13b)
In case capacity is accepted to the CM (capcmi > 0), the revenue from the
market, µcmi , is equal to the price, λcm (3.13a).
The KKT-condition for the installed capacity (3.13b) shows that these revenues
contribute to the recovery of the fixed cost. They only form a part of the
revenues in case there are additional rents coming from other markets. This
emphasizes the link between revenues from different markets.
The complete MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.2.1.
Consumer c
An adaptation of the consumer is necessary to incorporate the downward-sloped
capacity demand curve, similarly to the energy demand curve and follows the
description of the cCM. The model formulation is presented for a uniformly
downward-sloped demand curve without break point (Figure 3.10a).
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The strategy of the consumer, χc = (demp,t , lemp,t , dcm, lcm) ∈ Xc, includes only the
level of served, demp,t , and not-served energy, lemp,t , respectively capacity, dcm, lcm.
The decision is taken given the energy and capacity prices by the market
operator, λMO. The utility function describes the combined consumer surplus
on the energy and capacity market:
max
χc∈Xc
Πc(χc, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
1/2 · (λem − λemp,t) · (demp,t +Demp,t)
+ 1/2 · (λcm − λcm) · (dcm +Dcm). (3.14a)
One additional constraint per market ensures that the sum of served, demp,t or
dcm, and not-served demand, lemp,t or lcm, are located on the sloped demand
curve. This yields the following:
demp,t + lemp,t = (λemp,t − λem,0p,t )/Eem, (βemp,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.14b)
dcm + lcm = (λcm − λcm,0)/Ecm, (βcm), (3.14c)
demp,t , l
em
p,t , d
cm, lcm ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.14d)
In contrast to the energy demand curve described using a reference price,
reference demand and price-elasticity (3.9d)-(3.9e), the capacity demand curve
is described using two reference price-demand pairs: the target demand, Dcm#,
at target price, λcm#, and the minimum demand level, Dcm, at the price cap,
λ
cm. The slope and the y-axis intercept are:
Ecm = λ
cm# − λcm
Dcm# −Dcm , (3.14e)
λcm,0 = λcm# − Ecm ·Dcm#. (3.14f)
The resulting MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.2.2.
Storage Operator SO
The model formulation in this dissertation does not foresee a participation of
storage in a CM. The model formulation used in the dissertation is already
described by the equations (3.10a)-(3.10g).
It would be possible to extend the formulation of the storage operator with
offered capacities as a derated function of the installed power and energy
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capacities. A more active role of storage, their availability during scarcity events
and consequently their participation in CMs is one of the recommendations for
future work.
Market Operator MO
The adaptation for the market operator is based on the introduction of a
new price for capacity, λcm. Consequently, its strategy is as follows: λMO =
(λemp,t , λcm, λres, λrrp , λrrp ) ∈ XMO. In the same way as in the energy-only market,
given the offered market volumes in the strategies of the other agents, χi, χSO, χc,
the market operator minimizes the sum of all market clearings multiplied by
the prices. An additional market clearing for the capacity market is now part
of the utility function:
min
λMO∈XMO
ΠMO(λMO, χi, χSO, χc)
=
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
λemp,t ·
(
demp,t −
∑
i∈N
gi,p,t − dchp,t + chp,t
)
+ λres · (Dres −∑
i∈N
gresi
)
+ λcm · (dcm −∑
i∈N
capcmi
)
+
∑
p∈P
Wp ·
[
λrrp · (Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p ) + λrrp · (Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p )
]
.(3.15a)
Each market price is limited by an upper bound, i.e., price cap and a lower
bound, i.e., floor price. This also includes the price for capacity.
additional constraints (3.11b)-(3.11e),
λcm ≤ λcm ≤ λcm, (νcm, νcm). (3.15b)
The resulting MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.2.4.
3.4.3 Strategic Reserves
Strategic Reserves (SR) are an additional market setting analyzed in the
following chapters. It uses an additional market clearing. A system operator
contracts capacity from the generators on behalf of the consumers. Therefore,
the role of the system operator is integrated in the consumer c.
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Again, only the necessary adaptations compared to the formulation for the
EOM are highlighted.
Generator (Gi)i∈N
The generator model requires major changes in the description of the
constraints as the contracted capacity in the SR is no longer available for
other markets. An additional market volume is introduced: the capacity
offered to the SR, capsri . Consequently, the set of strategies is extended to
χi = (capi, capsri , gi,p,t, rrri,p , rrri,p , gresi ) ∈ Xi. The utility function is adapted
accordingly and includes the revenues for contracted capacity in the SR based
on the capacity price, λsr. This yields the following objective:
max
χi∈Xi
Πi(χi, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
(λemp,t − Cgi ) · gi,p,t
]
+ λres · gresi
+
∑
p∈P
Wp · (λrrp · rrri,p + λrrp · rrri,p )
+ λsr · capsri − C invi · capi. (3.16a)
An additional constraint is added limiting the offered capacity to the SR by the
installed capacity with a derating factor, F sri . Again, the derating reflects the
participation rules for different technologies and varies between zero and one.
The derating also represents the expected availability of a technology during
scarcity events. Typically, derating factors for RES are equal or close to 0, while
for conventionals they are close or equal to 1.
capsri ≤ F sri · capi, (µsri ). (3.16b)
All constraints that affect the other market volumes need to be corrected to
reflect that capacity in the SR is not available. In fact, compared to the EOM
and CM, all occurrences of the installed capacity, capi, are reduced by contracted
capacity, capsri . Consequently, the reduced capacity limits the energy-output and
offered flexibility, but also the ramping capability of the technology. Formally,
it is described by:
gi,p,t ≤ Ai,p,t · (capi − capsri ) · Lh, (µemi,p,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.16c)
gi,p,t ≤ gi,p,t-1 +Rhi · (capi − capsri ) · Lh, (ρem,i,p,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.16d)
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gi,p,t ≥ gi,p,t-1 −Rhi · (capi − capsri ) · Lh, (ρem,i,p,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.16e)
rrri,p ≤ F rri ·Rrri · (capi − capsri ), (µrri,p ), ∀p ∈ P, (3.16f)
rrri,p ≤ (capi − capsri )− gi,p,t/Lh, (µrr gi,p,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.16g)
rrri,p ≤ F rri ·Rrri · (capi − capsri ), (µrri,p ), ∀p ∈ P, (3.16h)
rrri,p ≤ gi,p,t/Lh, (µrr gi,p,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.16i)
gresi ≤ F resi
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
gi,p,t, (µresi ), (3.16j)
capi, cap
sr
i , g
res
i , r
rr
i,p , r
rr
i,p , gi,p,t ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.16k)
In order to see the direct impact of the SR on the decision-making, the KKT-
conditions for the offered capacity, capsri , and the installed capacity, capi, are
presented:
0 ≤ µsri +
∑
p∈P
∑
t∈T
[
Rhi · (ρem,i,p,t + ρem,i,p,t ) · Lh
+Ai,p,t · µemi,p,t · Lh + µrr gi,p,t
]
+Rrri ·
∑
p∈P
[
F rri · µrri,p + F rri · µrri,p
]
− λsr ⊥ capsri ≥ 0, (3.17a)
In case capacity is contracted in the SR (capsri > 0), the revenue from the SR,
µsri , is no longer only equal to the price (3.17a). In fact, due to the impact on the
limits for other offered market volumes, a trade-off has to be made that is also
reflected in the KKT-conditions. The KKT-condition for the offered capacity
(3.17a), additionally contains the duals of the constraints above. Hence, the
revenue for capacity is valued against the revenue that would emerge from the
other markets.
The KKT-condition for the installed capacity (3.17b) looks the same, except
that it includes the fixed cost, C invi . Combined revenues from all markets recover
the fixed costs.
0 ≤ C invi − F sri · µsri −
∑
p∈P
∑
t∈T
[
Rhi · (ρem,i,p,t + ρem,i,p,t ) · Lh
+Ai,p,t · µemi,p,t · Lh + µrr gi,p,t
]
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−Rrri ·
∑
p∈P
[
F rri · µrri,p + F rri · µrri,p
]
⊥ capi ≥ 0 (3.17b)
In combination, the two KKT-conditions emphasize that if there is capacity
contracted (capsri > 0 and capi ≥ capsri ), the capacity price, λsr, must recover
the complete fixed cost, as there are no additional rents from other markets
possible. This is fundamentally different to the system of a capacity market
in which capacity-based revenues might contribute to the cost recovery only
partly.
The complete MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.3.1.
Consumer c
In order to represent the SR in the market model, the consumer incorporates
the role of the system operator responsible for contracting and activation. The
consumer is changed such that it includes the demand curve for contracting the
SR. The demand of the SR is assumed inelastic. The implementation follows
the example of the RES certificates or flexibility requirements. An example
demand curve is presented in Figure 3.11.
Hence, the strategy of the consumer, χc = (demp,t , lemp,t , lsr, gsrp,t) ∈ Xc includes the
level of served, demp,t , and not-served energy, lemp,t , not-served capacity demand,
lsr, and the energy delivered by the SR during activation, gsrp,t. The decision is
taken, given the prices set by the market operator, λMO. The utility function
describes the sum of consumer surplus on the energy-based market and the
contracting of the SR.
The two additional decision variables can be understood as follows. The not-
served capacity, lsr, takes a positive value if there is not sufficient capacity
offered to fulfill the demand. In that case, the price is equal to the price cap for
SR, λsr.
Next to that, the activation is modeled such that it provides an additional
surplus defined as the difference between the energy-based market price, λemp,t ,
and a proxy for the cost of activation. Here, the price of activation is marginally
below the market price cap, (λem − ). Therefore, the activation2 , gsrp,t, is the
last means before not-served energy demand, lemp,t . Formally, the utility function
2The formulation does not model a direct cost related to the activation. In reality, the
activation price is higher than the variable cost. The system operator would pay the variable
cost of activation to the capacity owner after the activation. However, the model does not
explicitly capture this transfer in the agents’ models, as it does not affect its outcome.
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF AGENTS’ PROBLEMS 95
is:
max
χc∈Xc
Πc(χc, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
1/2 · (λem − λemp,t) · (demp,t +Demp,t )
]
+ (λsr − λsr) · (Dsr − lsr),
+
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
(λemp,t − (λ
em − )) · gsrp,t
]
(3.18a)
In the same way as for the EOM, one constraint ensures that the sum of served,
demp,t , and not-served demand, lemp,t , are located on the downward-sloped demand
curve (3.18b). Next to that, the energy from the activation of the SR is limited
by the contracted capacity, i.e., the demand reduced by the not-served capacity
(3.18c). This yields the following constraints:
demp,t + lemp,t = (λemp,t − λem,0p,t )/Eem, (βemp,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.18b)
gsrp,t ≤ (Dsr − lsr) · Lh, (µgsrp,t ) ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (3.18c)
demp,t , l
em
p,t , l
sr, gsrp,t ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (3.18d)
The resulting MCP reformulation is provided in Appendix C.3.2.
Storage Operator SO
As stated for the centralized capacity market, the model formulation in this
dissertation does not foresee a participation of storage in a CM. Consequently,
(3.10a)-(3.10g) describe the storage operator’s model formulation.
Market Operator MO
In order to account for the contracting of the SR, the market operator introduced
a new price for capacity, λsr. Consequently, its strategy is as follows: λMO =
(λemp,t , λsr, λres, λrrp , λrrp ) ∈ XMO. In the same way as in the model for the
EOM, given the offered market volumes in the strategies of the other agents,
χi, χSO, χc, the market operator minimizes the sum of all market clearings
multiplied by the associated prices.
The utility function is changed at two points. The market clearing for the
hourly energy market includes the activated generation from the SR, gsrp,t. An
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additional market clearing for the SR (forth row) is added:
min
λMO∈XMO
ΠMO(λMO, χi, χSO, χc)
=
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
λemp,t ·
(
demp,t − gsrp,t −
∑
i∈N
gi,p,t − dchp,t + chp,t
)
+ λres · (Dres −∑
i∈N
gresi
)
+ λsr · (Dsr − lsr −∑
i∈N
capsri
)
+
∑
p∈P
Wp ·
[
λrrp · (Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p ) + λrrp · (Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p )
]
.(3.19a)
All market prices are bounded each by an upper bound, i.e., price cap, and
a lower bound, i.e., floor price. In the same way as for the other prices, a
constraint for the SR price, λsr, is added:
additional constraints (3.11b)-(3.11e),
λsr ≤ λsr ≤ λsr, (νsr, νsr). (3.19b)
3.4.4 Other Capacity Mechanisms
In order to complete the modeling framework for CMs (Figure 3.2), model
formulations for three additional mechanisms have been developed. The
mechanisms include capacity payments, reliability options and decentralized
capacity market (Section 2.3.2). As they are not discussed in the following
case studies in detail, only a short discussion is provided here. The full model
formulations are provided in Appendix A.
Capacity payments
The model for capacity payments is a straightforward extension of the energy-
only market model. Only small changes for the generator’s formulations are
required. An additional income from the payments is linked to the installed
capacities. Formally, as the level of payment is an exogenous model parameter,
lowering the fixed cost of the different technologies achieves the same effect.
Differentiation among the technologies can be done by varying this reduction.
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The model formulation is provided in Appendix A.1.
Reliability options
The model for reliability options is an extension of the centralized capacity
market model. Similarly, an additional market clearing for capacity needs to be
introduced in which a single buyer contracts the options. The market clearing
yields a premium price transferred to the generators. The difference is the
change in the generator’s model formulation to account for the penalty if the
energy price exceeds a strike price. This can be achieved by formal description
of the penalty as max(λemp,t − λro,s, 0) times the offered capacity, where λro,s is
the strike price of the option. This term occurs as an additional cost in the
utility function of the generator.
The appealing idea of this mechanism is that derating of capacity remains
with the decision-making of the generator and is not required to be explicitly
modeled in the generator’s constraints. The generator makes a trade-off between
compensation payments in the energy market and revenues from the reliability
options. Depending on the strike price, the generator offers capacity reliable
enough such that the benefits from the revenues exceed the compensation
payments.
The model formulation is provided in Appendix A.2.
Decentralized capacity market
A model for a decentralized capacity market, i.e., in which the consumers express
their value of availability, strongly relies on the modeling of the consumer. As
the model in the current form works with one agent that aggregates all individual
consumers, the chosen approach links the demand curves for energy and capacity.
For the model formulation, it is assumed that the consumer is obliged to back
its peak energy demand with obligations on a capacity market. As such, the
demand curve for capacity is inelastic, cf. the SR demand curve. However, the
volume is linked to the price-elastic energy demand. Consequently, during peak
hours, the consumer makes a trade-off between energy demand and additional
need for capacity obligations.
The interesting fact of such a CM is that it reveals the value of scarcity
directly to the consumer. A logical development of such a model is the increase
of resolution of the consumers into for example consumer groups with each
individual preferences.
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The model formulation is provided in Appendix A.3.
3.4.5 Limitations and Possible Extensions
The presented model framework covers the most relevant concepts and market
actors. It is suitable for researching the main effects that can be expected from
the introduction of a market for availability. However, some limitations are
worth mentioning and can be seen as starting points for further research. The
suggestions are ranked based on feedback received for the model at various
events with academics and industry.
First, the model simulates a single year assuming that the emerging equilibrium
is the result of a transition pathway. This is different to dynamic modeling
techniques described in Section 3.2. However, the model in its present form
could be extended to a multi-year approach by introducing an additional
temporal index, e.g., representative years. Such a model extension would allow
incorporating additional technical limitations like limited available technologies
or delays in construction. Moreover, one could better represent market
specifications such as lead times of CMs. The main hurdle is related to
computational challenges but this could be addressed in a similar way as
the representative periods.
Second, the role of storage applications and RES in other markets than the
energy market is limited. Similar to new ways of participation in reserve
requirements [6], an extension to this model could be an active participation of
storage operators and RES in CMs, in a first approach, achieved by altering the
deratings for technologies. Eventually, one could think of endogenous decision-
making of agents to participate in a CM if there is a penalty for non-delivery. As
such, the storage operators and RES would have to make a trade-off between the
additional revenues and being unavailable, i.e., facing a penalty. This requires
an extension on the stochastic framework as presented in Chapter 6.
Third, the model assumes that the generators group the technologies, i.e., one
generator represents a unique technology available in the market. In a next
step, one could assume agents incorporating different technologies and operate
on multiple markets. An extension to Chapter 5 could include a case study
on different utility functions of agents to spread a portfolio on interconnected
market zones with different market settings. Together with the models for risk-
averse behavior (Chapter 6), the model would represent the decision-making of
large players in for example the European Internal Energy Market (IEM) more
realistically.
Fourth, one could imagine adding an additional layer of agents. Formally,
SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 99
Computation
method
Data
processing
Model
formulation Solver
MCP
Chapters 4,5
Python GAMS (MCP)
Julia JuMP/Complementarity.jl (MCP)
PATH
Julia JuMP (QP)
ADMM
Chapter 6
CPLEX
Figure 3.12: Software implementation for equilibrium models
this would extend the model framework to a multi-level problem, i.e., with
leaders and followers. Consequently, this would also require the introduction of
new solution concepts. For the context of the model framework, two options
seem appealing. On the one hand, one could assume an agent representing
the regulator that has the decision variables to define the demand for capacity,
e.g., chosen mechanism or the target demand respectively SR volume. Given
its utility function, e.g. combined level of adequacy and social welfare, it
would decide on the CM design endogenously. A regulator that anticipates
on the market reaction of all other agents as described above, i.e., a leading
regulator would parameterize the CM in an optimal way. On the other hand,
leading generators (or firms) could anticipate on the reaction of the regulator
to parameterize the CMs given their announced plans to invest. They could
adapt their strategy to tune the CMs via the regulator’s reaction in a more
favorable way. The latter one certainly deserves a discussion with respect to
slippery slopes of SR or self-fulfilling prophesies of CMs once addressed.
3.5 Software Implementation
The software implementation of the models can be divided into two approaches
based on the method of computation of the NE. Figure 3.12 shows the model
components, software choices and their interactions.
Chapter 4 and 5 use the MCP-reformulation to compute the NE. The MCP
formulation is implemented using two different software languages of which
advantages and disadvantages are briefly discussed.
In a first implementation, the model in its MCP form is formulated using
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) [151]. GAMS is a high-level
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modeling system for mathematical programming and optimization. It consists
of a language compiler and a set of integrated high-performance solvers including
the PATH solver [152]. GAMS uses the dedicated PATH solver [153] to
solve the square set of complementarity constraints. PATH uses Newton
methods for solving complementarity problems [154]. It is based on the normal
map formulation of complementarity problems. At each iteration, a linear
complementarity problem is solved to calculate a direction. The data processing
prior to and after model formulation is done in Python. This includes the
storing of model parameters, processing, plotting of results and so on.
GAMS offers some built-in features used to reduce the computation time. One
feature is the possibility to scale constraints and variables without altering
the model formulation. The performance of the PATH solver improves if the
constraints are on the same scale. An example usage is the RES target. Due
to the summation over all hours, the magnitude is about 1000 to 10000 times
larger than for example hourly energy constraints. Alternatively, scaling can
also be directly integrated in the model formulation. However, this approach
would require a consequent rescaling of the model solution afterwards.
Moreover, GAMS directly allows rerunning models using previous solutions as
starting point. A starting point close to the solution improves the performance
of the PATH solver to find the new solution. Such a “warm start” can be
exploited if for example sensitivity analysis on RES targets are executed.
Note that GAMS is a commercial software that requires a license that needs to
be purchased. Purchasing such a license can be omitted with the alternative
described below.
In a second implementation, the whole chain from data processing to model
formulation, including the interface to the PATH solver, is implemented in
Julia [155]. Julia is a rather new, high-level, high-performance dynamic
programming language for numerical computing. It provides a sophisticated
compiler, distributed parallel execution, numerical accuracy, and an extensive
mathematical function library [156]. The JuMP (Julia for Mathematical
Optimization) library is used for the model formulation [157]. In particular, the
MCP formulation is realized using the Complementarity library [158] providing
a modeling interface for MCP and Math Programs with Equilibrium Problems
(MPEC) via JuMP. The interface to the PATH solver is done using the underlying
PATHsolver library [159]3.
The approach with Julia does not require the purchase of a commercial license
3At this point, I would like to thank prof. Changhyun Kwon (http://www.chkwon.net/)
from the University of South Florida for the development of the libraries and the support and
cooperation during implementation.
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and performs as well as the approach using GAMS. Data processing and model
formulation prior to the solving is even sped up. The only downside experienced
during implementation is the lack of a possibility to efficiently rerun models
using starting points from previous solutions. This is a specific problem for the
implementation of the interface with the PATH solver and might be changed in
future versions.
Similarly, the ADMM-based methodology (Chapter 6) is also entirely
implemented in Julia. The requirement for the solver changes however. Instead
of solving a MCP, the update steps require solving a Quadratically Constrained
Program (QCP). It is chosen to use the CPLEX solver because a commercial
license is available in the research group. However, other available QCP
solvers, e.g., MOSEK, can replace CPLEX. For this approach, the Julia
implementation has shown significant advantages as the interface can be
implemented independent of the solver chosen. Moreover, the iterative process
of the ADMM-based method extensively benefits from interfacing the model
formulation and result processing because of the direct interface with the solver
implementation.
In summary, two approaches for software implementation have been intensively
used throughout the doctoral research and selected for the specific application
based on their individual advantages. Moreover, both implementations have
been used for validation of the two different computation methods, i.e., relying
on an MCP reformulation or the iterative process using the primal model
formulation. In case both methods compute an equilibrium, the resulting
equilibria coincide, i.e, the values of all primal variables are equal. This has
been tested for all market mechanisms.
Efforts have been made in describing an academic-viable software framework
that does not necessarily rely on commercial solvers, but also makes use of
academic or open-source licenses. Here, the Julia implementation offers the best
flexibility to select solvers based on their availability.
3.6 Conclusions
The model framework is introduced. It forms the baseline for the case studies
in the following chapters. The modular modeling framework builds upon
equilibrium modeling and presents capacity expansion planning as a non-
cooperative game of agents. Each type of agent represents a major market
participant including generators, storage operators, consumers and market
operators. For generators and storage operators, the decision-making entails
investment decisions and decisions on volumes offered to the markets for energy,
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flexibility (reserve requirements), Renewable Energy Sources (RES) certificates,
and availability, i.e., capacity mechanisms (CMs).
The decision-making of each agent is transferred into a mathematical
optimization problem. Each problem consists of a utility function and technical
constraints describing the set of strategies. Each agent’s problem is discussed
for three different market settings: energy-only market, centralized capacity
market, and strategic reserves. In addition, the chapter briefly discusses capacity
payments, reliability options and decentralized capacity markets for which the
formulations are included in appendix. Finally, limitations of the model and
possible extensions of the modeling framework are outlined.
Keeping the limitations in mind, the modeling framework offers an added
value for studying the impact of changing market designs for relevant market
participants. It allows comparing the effect of changing revenues resulting from
the introduction of all major concepts for CMs. The impact can be examined
for individual generation and storage technologies. Moreover, implications for
consumers and from a systems perspective can be studied. The individual
decision-making of each agent reveals how the changing revenues from markets
for energy, RES certificates, flexibility and availability are translated into, e.g.,
changing installed capacities, price-elastic demand response, or involuntary
energy not served.
As such, the model framework forms a first contribution of the thesis. It is
a comprehensive framework for the studying of CMs. All major concepts of
CMs are incorporated. The framework builds upon well-established equilibrium
modeling and allows tracing links between market participants’ decision-making
and market outcome. It bridges the gap between commonly used optimization
models and agent-based models applying detailed expert rules.
In addition, many extensions can be easily built upon the presented framework.
A multi-zonal context and the introduction of risk-averse agents are two
examples, both part of this thesis.
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4.1 Introduction
Future electricity markets will develop from a predominant energy-only market
to a mix of market segments for different values or services, offered by differing
market participants. Already today, market segments next to the markets
valuing energy output exist. Flexibility, i.e., the capability to adjust the output
or consumption in real-time, is valorized in short-term markets, e.g., reserve
products. The value of energy generated from sources without direct emission
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of greenhouse gases are valorized either directly via certificates for Renewable
Energy Sources (RES) or indirectly via a lower CO2-emissions cost.
Energy,Flexibility
and
Availability
In the discussion of capacity mechanisms (CMs), markets for energy, flexibility
and RES are extended with a market for availability. It shifts revenues between
the different markets, and eventually leads to changing decision-making of
market participants influencing the generation mix. The quantitative study in
this chapter addresses the following hypotheses:
1. With increasing RES shares, the role of energy-based markets is reduced
and shifted to more specific market segments.
2. The distribution of revenue changes with different market settings, which
eventually has influence on the choice of technologies.
The presented case study combines the findings of the case studies presented in
two own publications [69] and [104] :
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, H. Le Cadre, and R. Belmans. “Electricity markets
for energy, flexibility and availability - Impact of capacity mechanisms on the
remuneration of generation technologies”. In: Energy Econ. 66 (July 2017), pp.
372–383. issn: 01409883. doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.06.024.
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, D. Six, and R. Belmans. “Capacity remuneration
mechanisms and the transition to low-carbon power systems”. In: Int. Conf.
Eur. Energy Mark. EEM. IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–5. isbn: 9781467366915. doi:
10.1109/EEM.2015.7216647.
A deterministic capacity expansion planning in a single market is modeled.
Next to an energy-only market (EOM), the focus is on the differences between
centralized Capacity Market (cCM) and strategic reserves (SR). Both CMs
narrow down the discussion to two different approaches. On the one hand, a
centralized Capacity Market is a market-wide mechanism contributing to the
revenues of all participating technologies. Consequently, prices for other services
are affected having also an impact on non-participating technologies. On the
other hand, strategic reserves are a targeted mechanism that locks in a part
of the capacity as backup capacity for scarcity situations. Hence, the impact
on other markets is limited, but the decisions for participating technologies are
more emphasized.
The results show the impact of both CMs, compared to the EOM. The relative
changes are used to discuss CMs along different perspectives. First, the impact
on the average cost of supply and Energy Not Served (ENS) is analyzed from a
systems perspective. Second, the impact for different technologies is quantified
in terms of installed capacities, the resulting revenue shares and their spread
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amongst the considered time horizon. Finally, interactions of the markets are
discussed based on a sensitivity analysis for increasing RES targets.
Section 4.2 describes the model setup in detail. It includes the test system,
its relevant model parameters and associated implications for the results. The
model outcomes are presented and validated for the different market mechanisms
in Section 4.3. The consecutive sections address the hypotheses listed above.
Section 4.4 shows the different revenue shares and examines the resulting impact
for the technologies. The impact on generation mixes and non-participating
technologies is discussed in Section 4.5. The implications of the theoretical
case study for future electricity markets are shown in Section 4.6. Section 4.7
concludes the findings of this case study and links to the case of an interconnected
market setting in Chapter 5.
4.2 Model and Test System
The assumptions for the test system are outlined and the scenarios are analyzed.
Among others, this includes the assumptions for the parameterization of the
capacity demand. Additionally, the input parameters for demand and involved
technologies are presented. Finally, relevant implications to keep in mind for
the results, analyzed in the consecutive sections, are discussed.
4.2.1 Modeling Framework and Scenarios
The capacity expansion planning is implemented as a non-cooperative game
(Section 3.3.3). The model framework is reduced (Figure 4.1).
The game takes place in a deterministic setting, i.e., the market participants
are assumed to have a perfect foresight on future demand levels and the
possible contribution from RES. The investment decisions are taken assuming
all information is entirely available, including the decision-making of the other
market participants.
All market participants operate in an isolated market zone: there is no
interconnection with other market zones. In order to avoid ENS, the market
participants need to invest adequately in the isolated market zone. Within this
market zone, up to four different markets are implemented next to each other:
an hourly market for energy, a yearly market for RES certificates, and periodic
markets for up- and downward flexibility. Depending on the scenario, a yearly
CM is added. The CM is either a cCM or SR (Figure 3.5).
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Figure 4.1: Set up of the modeling framework
Conventional and RES generators are part of the market participants.
Additionally, demand flexibility is introduced into the system by two means. A
single storage operator representing the potential investment in Pumped Hydro
Energy Storage (PHES). A detailed study of different storage technologies is
out of the scope. The demand for energy is assumed to be partly price-elastic.
In other words, up to the price cap, a share of the demand can be reduced or
increased voluntarily reacting to the market price. This could also be interpreted
as simplified representation of decentralized demand response including other
storage technologies.
In total, four different scenarios are compared (Table 4.1). For all scenarios,
the demand for flexibility is assumed to be the same and symmetrical for up-
and downward reserve requirements. The demand for RES certificates is given
as share of the total energy demand. A sensitivity analysis for increasing RES
targets from 10% to 60% is executed.
Table 4.1: Scenario design for the different market settings
Scenario Demand Price cap Demand Demand RES
energy energy flexibility availability target
REF Inelastic -
Symmetrical
(up- &
downward)
750 MW
- Sensitivity
analysis
10% - 60%
EOM Elastic
Demand
300 MW
Price cap
3000e/MWhSR 5.5% of Peak
CCM 100% of Peak
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In the reference scenario, REF , only markets for energy, flexibility and RES
certificates are introduced. The demand for energy is assumed to be price-
inelastic. The energy-based market has no price cap. As prices theoretically
can reach any value, this scenario comes close to a cost minimization by a
central planner. The obtained energy prices, λemp,t , are used to calculate the
weighted reference price of energy, λem#, used for the price-elastic demand in
the consecutive scenarios:
λem# =
∑
p∈PWp
∑
t∈T λ
em
p,t ·Demp,t∑
p∈PWp
∑
t∈T D
em
p,t
. [e/MWh] (4.1)
The second scenario, EOM , represents an energy-only market. Compared to
the reference scenario, only the assumptions for the energy market differ. A
price cap of 3000e/MWh is assumed. Additionally, the demand is assumed to
be price-elastic with an inverse demand elasticity, Eem = −10e/MWh2 [149]:
out of the total demand, there is 300 MW price-elastic demand between 0 and
3000e/MWh. As the reference price is closer to zero than to the price cap,
the voluntary demand response mostly materializes through demand reduction
during high prices. However, because of the price cap, it is also possible that
insufficient capacity is installed. The consequence is involuntary Energy Not
Served (ENS).
The third scenario, SR, introduces a CM: strategic reserves (SR). The
assumptions for the energy market are taken from the scenario EOM . The
volume of the SR, Dsr, is sized as share of the capacity to serve the energy peak
demand within a time step of length Lh:
Dsr = Share ·max
t
(Demp,t/Lh). [MW] (4.2)
The activation price of the SR is assumed marginally smaller than the price cap.
Hence, the SR are activated as last means before involuntary ENS, as in the
case of the Belgian SR [78].
The fourth scenario, CCM , incorporates a different CM: a centralized Capacity
Market (cCM). Again, the assumptions for the energy market are those of
EOM . The downward-sloped capacity demand curve is based on two points
(Figure 3.10a). The target demand, Dcm#, is assumed to be equal to the
capacity needed to cover the energy peak demand, prior to reduction by the
price-based demand response. At the same time, the target demand is sufficient
to cover the additional capacity for the upward reserve requirements:
Dcm# = max
p,t
(Demp,t/Lh +Drrp ). [MW] (4.3)
108 MARKETS FOR ENERGY, FLEXIBILITY AND AVAILABILITY
0 2 4
6
8
10
12
14
Duration [%]
D
em
an
d
[G
W
]
Approximated Full data (Belgium, 2015)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Duration [%]
Figure 4.2: Load duration curve and approximation based on 30 representative
days using [148]. Data taken from Elia [160].
4.2.2 Test System
Demand and market parameters
The test system is parameterized using data obtained from the grid of the
Belgian system operator, Elia [160]. This includes networks of at least 30 kV in
Belgium plus the Sotel/Twinerg grid in the south of Luxembourg. The energy
demand uses the hourly total load profiles for the year 2015. According to
Elia, the total load incorporates all electrical loads on the Elia grid and in
underlying distribution networks. Exports are deducted, leading to an estimate
of the actual total load. This load profile is assumed to be the hourly reference
demand, Demp,t .
The energy demand varies between a peak load of 13750MW and minimum
load of 5744MW. The total energy consumption sums up to 87.35TWh. In
the model, the demand curve is approximated by 30 representative days and
associated weights. They are selected using the methodology presented in [148].
The resulting days provide a good approximation, while keeping the model
computationally manageable (Figure 4.2). The weighted consumption of the
reduced demand profile is 87.25TWh. The peak and minimum load remain
part of the reduced profile. Hours with peak demand are associated with a
weight higher than one. This results in an overestimate of scarcity situations
and lower scarcity prices than one would observe in reality.
The demand for flexibility, Drrp , Drrp , is an approximation of the classical
reserve products available in European markets, i.e, Frequency Containment
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Reserves (FCR), Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR), Replacement Reserves
(RR). The demand abstracts from the type of reserves and the associated
technical requirements. The demand is assumed to be 750 MW symmetrically
in both directions. It is independent from the RES target and there are no
price caps applied in the flexibility markets. In the model, the only requirement
for participation is the technical capability to regulate upward, respectively
downward, based on the short-term ramping capability, Rrri . In reality, the
three reserves types require different capability of the technologies to participate.
However, the representation of reserves is chosen to be simplified as the focus
is on CMs. Complementary studies on the impact of product specifications,
reserve sizing and allocation can be found for example in the related dissertation
of Arne van Stiphout [6].
The capacity demand, Dsr, for the SR is chosen to be 750MW as well. This
represents about 5.5% of the peak demand and roughly corresponds to the
volumes found in the Belgian SR. The price cap, λsr, is set to the Cost Of New
Entry (CONE), i.e., the annualized investment cost of the Peak technology:
C invPeak=59000e/MW.
Note that the outcome for SR is very sensitive to the choice of the price cap. If
the price cap is chosen too low, no capacity is contracted. The resulting price
would never fully recover the investment cost of the contracted capacity that has
no access to other markets. If the price cap is too high, investment would take
place to fill the complete SR demand as all additional installed capacity would
have a benefit from being contracted in the SR. If the price cap is set equal to
the CONE, the model choses the contracted capacity arbitrarily. This means
that it is somewhere between minimum demand to cover ENS and SR demand.
In order to achieve a reliable model outcome, the price is set marginally higher
than the CONE. This means the costs reported for SR are an upper bound.
The target capacity demand for the cCM is set to the sum of peak demand and
upward reserve requirements: Dcm = 14500 MW. The associated target price is
chosen to be 50% of the CONE: 29500 e/MW. This implies that the market
operator assumes that if capacity is installed equal to the target demand, the
Peak technology recovers 50% of the annualized investment cost via revenues
from other markets.
The associated minimum capacity demand is set to 97% of the target demand:
14065 MW. Symmetrically, the maximum demand at which the capacity price
reaches zero is set to 103% or 14935 MW. These shares are similar to the
Great Britain (GB) capacity auction [82]. The GB auction has a target price
slightly lower than 50% resulting in a demand curve that has a break point
(Figure 3.10b). As the results are comparable, it is chosen to use the uniformly
sloped demand curve. A general discussion on the optimal design of the capacity
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Table 4.2: Economic and technical input parameters taken from [162, 163, 6]
Generators C invi C
g
i R
h
i R
rr
i F
res
i F
rr
i |F rri F sri |F cmi
[e/MW] [e/MWh] [%] [%] [-] [-] [-]
Base 138000 36 50 8.33 - 1 1
Mid 82000 53 80 13.33 - 1 1
Peak 59000 76 100 16.67 - 1 1
PV 76500 0 100 - 1 - -
Wind (on) 110000 0 100 - 1 - -
Wind (off) 249000 0 100 - 1 - -
Storage C inv,p C inv,e ηch F resi F rri |F rri F sri |F cmi
[e/MW] [e/MWh] [%] [-] [-] [-]
PHES 42000 410 86.6 - - -
demand curve can be found in [80].
Available technologies
The available technologies are grouped and organized along their economic
and technical parameters. The set of generators consist of three conventional
and three RES technologies. Additionally, one large-scale storage technology
is introduced under the storage operator (Table 4.2). For each technology,
the economic parameters are based on the JRC EU-TIMES model data, and
annualized using a discount rate of 5% [161]. The technical parameters are taken
from the model data report of the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
(DIW) [162]. Moreover, the table shows the derating factors for the different
technologies and the associated markets for RES, flexibility and availability. A
“-” indicates that the technology is not allowed to participate in the respective
market and is consequently derated with zero.
The three conventional technologies include Base, Mid and Peak. They follow
the classical grouping of generation technologies from inflexible base technology
with high fixed and low variable cost to flexible peak technology with low fixed
and high variable cost. All technologies are assumed to have an availability of
100%. They can offer flexibility to the reserves, and available capacity to the
CM. Hence, the respective derating is equal to one. They do not receive RES
certificates and are consequently derated with zero.
The three RES technologies include PV , Wind (onshore) and Wind (offshore).
All RES are assumed to have zero marginal cost of operation. Their available
generation is determined by an underlying profile. The underlying profile is a
capacity factor between zero and one. It represents the share of peak generation
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Table 4.3: Comparison of RES profiles taken from [164, 165] for 2015
PV Wind (onshore) Wind (offshore)
Data 30 days Data 30 days Data 30 days
Full load hours [h] 1032.24 1027.84 1128.93 1128.93 3617.08 3611.91
Average cost [e/MWh] 74.11 74.43 97.44 97.44 68.84 68.94
Correlation with Demp,t 0.230 0.198 0.097 0.046 0.093 0.017
the RES unit can inject in each hour. The profiles are taken from the EMHIRES
dataset published by the European Union [164, 165]1. The case study uses data
from the year 2015 for Belgium. Figure 4.3 shows the duration curves of the
profiles and the resulting approximation using the 30 representative days.
Table 4.3 shows the resulting full load hours, both for the full data set and the
representative days. The ratio of annualized investment cost and aggregated
full load hours results in the average cost per energy for each technology. The
average cost of Wind (offshore) and PV is comparable to the Peak technology.
Wind (onshore) is still relatively more expensive. In addition, the table shows the
correlation between the demand profile and and the RES profile. In comparison,
the PV profile is correlated stronger to the demand than the Wind (offshore)
profile. Hence, it is assumed that PV is injected more often during hours of
high prices than Wind. This will come back in the analysis of the response of
RES to changing energy prices due to the introduction of a CM.
Finally, it is chosen to include a single storage technology, as this is currently
the predominant large-scale storage technology. The technical parameters for
PHES are provided in Table 4.2. Other emerging storage technologies can
be incorporated in the model in a similar way. Dedicated studies have been
performed in the dissertations of Arne van Stiphout [6] and Tom Brijs [15]. The
investment in PHES is characterized by very low cost of energy storage. This
assumes that the most favorable locations for PHES are exploited, e.g., suitable
height difference, natural water reservoirs, etc. As such sites are limited, a
maximum energy storage size of 5800 MWh is assumed, the estimated potential
in the Belgian system. Yet, the decision on the associated pumping respectively
turbine size is unbounded. In addition, the storage technology is assumed to be
only active on the energy market. Hence, all derating factors for RES, reserves
and availability are set to zero.
Obviously, the results of the case study strongly depend on the input parameters.
Consequently, the findings must be interpreted with these assumptions kept in
1The reported full load hours for onshore wind differ from the data reported by the Belgian
system operator Elia [160]. For the same year 2015, the total full load hours for onshore wind
connected to the Elia grid are reported 2184.03 h and for offshore wind 3566.96 h.
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Figure 4.3: RES capacity factor duration curve and approximation based on 30
representative days using [148]. Data taken from Elia [160].
mind. The presented parameters are chosen from commonly used data sources in
long-term planning models. As the focus of this thesis is not the uncertainty of
cost parameters and expected developments for emerging technologies, sensitivity
analyses for the different cost parameters are not performed. In the presented
case studies, highest priority is given to sensitivity analyses linked to model
parameters affecting the design of the CMs.
4.2.3 Implications for Results
The presented case study is a theoretical analysis to compare the impact of the
different CMs in an isolated market zone. As such, it presents a very optimistic
and idealistic representation of a market outcome. The analysis neglects certain
elements existing in real markets.
The model uses a greenfield approach, in other words, there is no pre-existing
capacity or capacity legacy. Consequently, the results can only be interpreted
as an idealistic equilibrium that could develop from the current situation after
a sufficiently long transition phase. Moreover, the deterministic nature of the
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model assumes that all market participants have perfect information about, e.g.,
injection profiles from RES. Consequently, this also results in an idealization of
the decision-making of the agents. The latter assumption is relaxed in Chapter 6
in which the decision-making is based on expectations for future scenarios.
For the case study in this chapter, a sensitivity analysis on the RES target is
performed. This implies that installed capacities of RES are increased to fulfill
increasing shares of energy originating from RES, which is a process to take
place in the upcoming years. Yet, the cost for RES remain unchanged for all
shares, although further cost reduction for RES is expected for the future. As a
consequence, the reported cost for RES can be seen as an upper bound for the
cost related to the RES target.
Large shares of the investment cost are recovered during peak price hours.
Peak prices are observed during the hours of peak demand that belong to a
representative period. As a consequence, the energy prices in peak hours and
prices for upward flexibility in the period including the peak demand hours
are linked. In most scenarios, price caps for energy are implemented. The
resulting capping of revenues from the energy market are partly transferred to
the revenues from flexibility. The resulting prices for upward flexibility tend to
be higher if a lower price cap for energy is in place. On the one hand, this is
important for the interpretation of the model results. On the other hand, it
sketches developments in markets where shifts of prices from energy to flexibility
can be observed.
Two additional remarks are necessary on the modeling of the CMs. In case of
SR, the results of the greenfield approach differ from the observations of SR
implementations in reality. As the case study does not incorporate existing
capacities, generators invest in additional capacities with the single purpose of
contracting them in the SR. As a result, the full annualized investment cost
needs to be compensated in contrast to older units that have been already
partially or fully written off in reality. Consequently, the cost for contracting
capacity reported in the model results for the SR are considered an upper
bound.
The estimation of the capacity demand for both the SR and the cCM are very
conservative: during the estimation of the capacity demand the contribution
from voluntary, price-based demand reduction and RES are not considered. The
target demand for the centralized capacity is set assuming the peak demand
of the reference demand profile. Especially with increasing shares from RES
and flexible demand, this might lead to oversizing the capacity demand and
overestimating the cost related to the CM. In reality, expected contributions
from demand flexibility or aggregated RES should be considered as they could
lead to lower capacity demand levels. This also relates to the case study of
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Figure 4.4: Price duration curves for the different markets (RES target 30%)
implicit or explicit contribution of imports and exports (Chapter 5).
4.3 Model Results and Validation
This section describes the results from the test system and scenarios. The
purpose is to trace back the obtained results to their origin in the underlying
model formulation. The actual interpretation of the results is done in Sections 4.4
and 4.5.
4.3.1 Market Operator and Prices
Given the utility function of the market operator, if an equilibrium is computed,
all market-clearing conditions are fulfilled with equality. Hence, the resulting
prices can be interpreted as the market clearing prices. Figure 4.4 shows the
price duration curves for the markets for energy, flexibility and RES certificates.
The duration curves are shown for a RES target of 30%, scaled using the weights
of the periods. They do not contain chronological information.
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The energy-based price duration curve (Figure 4.4a) clearly shows the three
steps that coincide with the variable cost of the conventional generators. In
between the steps, prices can be set to intermediate levels driven by binding
ramping constraints. Important for the interpretation are the rare price spikes
on the left of the graph.
For REF , the price spikes exceed the value of 3000e/MWh, later set as price
cap. Enforcing the price cap leads to shifts in revenues as intended by the
scenario design. However, the energy price does not reach the price cap, because
additional revenues are achieved via changing prices for flexibility. It is not
directly visible from the graphs as the chronological information is lost. The
price duration curve of EOM and SR are the same. Hence, the introduction
of SR does not affect energy-based prices. This might be different if a lower
activation price for the SR would be chosen.
The price spikes are completely absent in case of CCM : the price never exceeds
the variable cost of the Peak generator. At the right end of the graph, some
hours with negative prices can be observed. These number of hours increase
with the RES target. If there are negative prices, their absolute value equals
the price of the RES certificates (Figure 4.4b). At these energy price levels,
RES are self-curtailed. It highlights the link between the revenues for energy
and RES certificates for RES generators.
Both lower graphs show the prices for flexibility (Figure 4.4c and 4.4d). As
in the market for energy, prices in the scenarios EOM and SR are the same.
For upward flexibility, one period with a very high price can be observed. This
period also contains the peak demand level with a high price having a major
contribution to cost recovery, comparable to the peak prices for energy. Hence,
the prices for upward flexibility are mainly driven by the investment cost of
the contributing technologies and the applied price cap. Applying a lower price
cap would increase prices for upward flexibility during this period to allow
technologies to compensate for the reduced revenues from the energy market.
In case of large shares of RES, prices for downward flexibility are mainly driven
by must-run cost of Base and Mid throughout a period in order to be able to
further reduce output. These prices are strongly linked to the assumptions of the
flexibility markets. If, for example, downward flexibility would be contracted
on an hourly resolution, contribution of Wind and PV , i.e., market-based
curtailment could be exploited. The downward prices would then be driven by
the opportunity cost of RES, i.e., the missing revenues from certificates.
Similar as in the energy-based market, prices for upward flexibility are reduced
in the CCM . This is because cost for flexibility providers are already partly
or fully covered. In contrast, increased prices for downward reserves can be
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observed. They contribute to the cost recovery for mainly Base and Mid,
providing them.
4.3.2 Generators and Storage Operator
Given the model assumptions, the utility, i.e., the profit, of all generators and
the storage operator are zero in an equilibrium. In the chosen non-cooperative
game setting, each generator invests in the optimal amount of capacity given the
prices observed on the markets. A positive result for the utility would indicate
an incentive to invest in more capacity and vice versa. Consequently, it is not
possible to state that a generator makes more profit given a certain market
setting compared to another one. The benefits of a certain market setting for a
generator only appears in a larger volume of installed capacity.
In order to incorporate possible minimum profit margins for a generator in the
model, one could add a mark up to its costs, either fixed or variable. Yet, in
the equilibrium, the result for the utility would remain zero and the profit must
be calculated ex-post. This is not foreseen in this dissertation and the costs are
assumed equal to the reported ones.
4.4 Remuneration from Different Markets
This section analyzes the results from two perspectives. First, the systems
perspective is taken. The results include the indicators of average costs,
ENS and reserve margins. Second, the results are discussed from the agents’
perspective including the shifting shares of remuneration, i.e., the markets, and
the consequences for the generators. The results are presented for a modest RES
target of 30%. Where necessary, the results are shown for a stepwise increase of
the RES target, i.e, the energy originated from RES generators, from 10%, 30%
and 50% in order to highlight expected developments with increasing shares of
RES in the system.
4.4.1 Systems Perspective
The most obvious indicator from a system and eventually from a consumer’s
perspective is the average cost of electricity, AC, defined as the sum of costs
faced by the consumer on the different markets, the cost of ENS valued with
the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) divided by the served energy. It is assumed
that the price cap is set to the VOLL = 3000e/MWh. The average cost is
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different from an average price of energy, as the cost of flexibility, availability
and RES certificates is included:
AC =
∑
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rr
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rr
i,p · λrrp )∑
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em
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. [e/MWh] (4.4)
Figure 4.5 shows the average cost grouped per scenario. The y-axis does not
start at 0 in order to emphasize the difference between the markets. For all
scenarios, the energy-based market ( ) provides the major share of the average
cost. In addition, the bars do not contain information about whether costs are
related to operations or investments.
Comparing the different results reveals interesting insights in the value of
the different markets and the impact of the different CMs. Only the market
setting with a cCM yields higher costs. The increased cost is linked to the
very conservative sizing of the capacity demand and ignoring of contributions
from RES and demand response during peak demand. The cost difference
increases with the RES target, it confirms that neglecting sources during the
estimation of the capacity demand leads to inefficiencies. In a highly uncertain
environment, this is not an easy task and there is a trade-off between estimating
too conservative and risking ENS.
Another important observation is linked to the shares of revenues for availability
( ). In case of SR, the share is very limited and hardly visible in the graph. It
remains below 1% of the total average cost. This cost is linked to contracting
SR. As the capacity is solemnly contracted for the SR and, e.g., cannot be used
for flexibility, this also yields a marginal increase of the overall average cost.
Here, the model result is a bit too optimistic as capacity exactly matches the
volume of SR. In reality, entire power plant units are contracted which might
lead to higher costs, yet, the share remains small.
In case of a cCM, the share of cost from the capacity market is more significant.
For the given scenarios, the share ( ) is between 10% and 15%. At the same
time, the shares of costs originating from the energy market ( ) and market for
upward flexibility ( ) are reduced or vanish completely (Figure 4.4). The price
spikes on these two markets disappear as the value for availability during high
demand is captured by the cCM. It is the average share of remuneration from
the cCM and is not the same for all generators (Table 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: Average cost of served demand shown for different market settings.
For an increasing RES target, two observations can be highlighted. Obviously,
the share of cost that originates from the RES certificates ( ) increases with the
RES target. An additional effect not directly visible from the graphs is linked
to decreasing energy prices in CCM . Because of decreased energy-based price,
the remuneration on other markets need to replace the reduced revenues. For
RES generators, this means a higher price for RES certificates.
Additionally, an increase of the value for downward flexibility ( ) can be observed.
While for low shares of RES (Figure 4.5a), there are hardly any cost associated
to this market, this value increases for higher targets. The origin of this cost is
the provision of downward flexibility during periods with high injection from
RES. Conventional generators must be kept running to provide downward
reserves. As energy prices are low during those periods, the value of providing
downward flexibility must be replaced by higher prices for downward reserves.
This is strongly linked to the assumption of RES not being able to provide
downward reserves. The discussion of the agents’ remuneration for flexibility is
continued in Section 4.4.2.
Another measure for the system performance is the relative Energy Not Served,
ENS, defined as the share of ENS with respect to the demand served. This
is different to the maximum ENS in a given hour, which would highlight the
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Figure 4.6: Results from a systems perspective
capacity gap instead:
ENS =
∑
p∈PWp
∑
t∈T l
em
p,t∑
p∈PWp
∑
t∈T d
em
p,t
· 1000‰. [‰] (4.5)
Additionally, the reserve margin is used as indicator for the level of adequate
investment as result of the different market settings. The reserve margin, RM , is
defined as a ratio. The numerator is the sum of derated capacity and the storage
capacity, assuming it is discharging during peak demand. The denominator
holds the peak residual demand, i.e., minus the RES contribution, plus the
demand for upward flexibility. In other words, the maximum demand that
needs to be covered by conventionals and storage capacities:
RM =
∑
i∈N F
cm
i · capi + p
max(demp,t −
∑
i∈N F
res
i · gi,p,t +Drrp )
· 100%. [%] (4.6)
Figure 4.6 shows the result for both indicators. For the reference scenario REF ,
the reserve margin is 100%, the expected outcome given the model setup and
similar for the scenario with EOM, EOM . There is no additional incentive to
build a reserve margin exceeding 100%. Together with the assumed price-elastic
demand (maximum 300 MW), it is sufficient to avoid ENS for all scenarios
except for EOM with a RES target of 50%. In this case, the reserve margin
drops marginally below 100%. One could argue that in such a future scenario,
more price-elastic demand is available to completely avoid ENS.
For the remaining two market settings with CM, ENS is also avoided. An
increased reserve margin is observed. In case of the SR, the increase of the
reserve margin is related to the exclusive use of capacity in the SR as discussed
above. Additional capacity must be built to provide upward flexibility and
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capacity for the SR next to each other. In case of cCM, the reserve margin
is unnecessarily large as both storage operator and RES generators cannot
contribute to the cCM. Moreover, the capacity demand is not adapted to the
decreasing residual peak demand. Hence, the reserve margin increases with a
higher RES target as the difference between served demand and residual peak
demand also increases. The reserve margin can also be read from Figure 4.10
in Section 4.5 showing the resulting installed capacities being the difference
between the upper end of the PHES ( ) and the peak residual demand ( ).
4.4.2 Agents’ perspective
In order to analyze the impact of different market settings with and without
CM, the remuneration for the different services is examined for a RES target of
30% (Figure 4.7) and 50% (Figure 4.8).
Each graph in Figure 4.7 shows the remuneration for a generator under a given
market setting. Each column contains the results for one market setting. The
graphs in one row belong to the same generator. Each graph depicts the sorted
hourly contribution to cost recovery over the model horizon. The hours are
sorted by ascending total contribution to the generator’s cost recovery. In other
words, hours in which large shares of the fixed costs are recovered, e.g., due to
scarcity prices, are found at the right end of each graph. Negative values occur
if energy-based prices are below the variable costs.
The values are given in percent of the fixed costs per MW, i.e, the total surface
of the colored area sums up to 100%. This is also visualized using the dotted
lines showing the cumulative cost recovery over the model horizon (secondary
y-axis). They start at 0% and reach 100%. The shape of the dotted line is later
on used to describe the dependency of generators on scarcity prices.
The remuneration for available capacity ( ) based on an annual price is
discretized over the model horizon resulting in a stable contribution to cost
recovery. The reserve requirements are cleared per period and discretized in
the same way for all time steps of the associated period ( ). The energy-based
revenues are split into infra-marginal and scarcity. Infra-marginal revenues ( )
indicate that the price in the given hour is higher than the own variable cost, but
lower than or equal to the variable cost of the Peak. Negative values indicate
that injection happened during hours with prices lower than the generator’s
variable cost. In case of scarcity ( ), the energy-based market price exceeds
the variable cost of the Peak generator. The difference between energy-based
price and Peak variable costs are visualized as scarcity remuneration in order
to make the distinction with infra-marginal rents. The remuneration from
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RES certificates ( ) is the injection multiplied by the single annual price for
certificates.
By means of Figure 4.7, five elements for the generators and storage operator
are discussed:
1. Impact of CM on scarcity pricing,
2. Impact of CM on the value of flexibility,
3. Interaction of CM and RES certificates,
4. Long-term price signals from CM,
5. Distribution of revenues under different market settings.
Finally, the shares of revenues for each generator from different market settings
are compared.
Energy scarcity pricing and capacity mechanisms
The top three rows in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 belong to conventional generators. In
line with economic theory, e.g., [38], a substantial dependency on scarcity prices
( ) can be observed in the scenario EOM . It is especially true for conventional
generators (left column of Figure 4.7). Substantial parts of the cost recovery
happens in the very last hours.
It does not change after the introduction of a SR (middle column). In both
scenarios, the contribution of scarcity to cost recovery remains the same for
Base and Mid. The dependency on scarcity for Peak is marginally reduced.
However, distinction has to be made between Peak capacity contracted in the
SR and Peak capacity still operating in the energy-based market. The graph
for Peak shows the combined results. The Peak not contracted for the SR still
recovers its costs via flexibility and scarcity ( , ). The contracted Peak recovers
its cost solemnly capacity-based ( ). The height of this band varies with the
ratio of Peak capacity contracted compared to the rest. The isolated graph for
contracted Peak would look similar to the Peak in the CCM (right column).
For the CCM , the results reveal that dependency on scarcity prices completely
dissolves. For the assumed capacity demand, the conventional generators
completely replace their cost recovery from scarcity prices with the capacity-
based remuneration ( ). It is the intended behavior of a market-wide CM. In
case of tighter capacity demand, or lower remuneration for availability, scarcity
prices might be still necessary, yet, to a lower extent.
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The impact of scarcity pricing on RES is limited (less than 5% of the cost
recovery for the given case study) for both Wind and PV . In general, the
dependency on scarcity prices is lower because of the partial cost recovery via
the RES certificates ( ). The change of remuneration due to CMs is rather
small. The limited share of scarcity is recovered by a necessary increase of the
RES certificate price (Figure 4.4b). This reveals a first hint that there is an
indirect effect of CMs for RES. Prices for RES certificates must increase to
compensate for reduced energy-based prices. The required change depends on
the contribution of RES to the peak demand. The necessary price increase is
smaller if the contribution of RES to the peak is lower because the initial share
of remuneration from scarcity prices was lower.
In the given case study, the most substantial dependency on scarcity prices
can be observed for the PHES . Due to its price arbitrage model, it relies on
large price differences. Consequently, there is no storage capacity installed for
the cCM (empty graph). The reduction of energy-prices to reflect the variable
cost of generation leads to insufficient price differences for the storage operator.
Only in case of more RES, i.e., RES targets exceeding 50%, PHES is built for
a scenario CCM to benefit from lower prices during high injection from RES
(Figure 4.8 or 4.10). In conclusion, storage applications that only rely on price
arbitrage on the energy market have a disadvantage in a market framework
including a cCM.
The value of flexibility
Compared to other services, the remuneration of flexibility (upward , downward
) is smallest for all conventionals. Two groups of periods with high remuneration
for flexibility can be observed.
First, flexibility has a large value in periods with very high shares of RES and
hardly any generation from conventionals. Due to sorting, these hours are
located on the left end of each subgraph in Figure 4.7. For these periods, the
value of flexibility is driven by the downward reserve requirements provided
by Base and Mid ( ). To provide the downward reserve, i.e., to be able
to reduce injection in real time, the conventionals generate energy at prices
below or at their marginal costs (see negative values for infra-marginal for
Mid). To compensate, the prices for downward reserves must be high in these
periods. This interaction of energy-based and flexibility markets increases with
increasing shares of RES as more hours with zero or negative residual load
would occur(Figure 4.8, RES target of 50%). The introduction of a CM does
not interfere with this interaction. It is important to highlight that the value of
downward flexibility is not affected by SR or a cCM. This interaction would
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only be reduced if RES could participate in a more dynamic downward reserve
scheme.
Second, flexibility has a large value in periods containing hours of scarcity. The
value is linked to the upward requirements ( ). The hours occur at the right
end of each subgraph in Figure 4.7. For these hours, the value of flexibility is
driven by the capability to provide upward reserves, i.e., to further increase
injection. It is mainly relevant for Mid and Peak generators. Scarcity prices for
energy-output and high values for upward flexibility appear simultaneous. In
the EOM, the value of an asset to be available during scarcity is remunerated
through both services. Consequently, with the introduction of a cCM, this
value is transferred to the availability service. The conclusion is analogous
to the discussion of absent energy-based scarcity prices. As opposed to the
prices of downward flexibility, cCM partly reduces the remuneration for upward
flexibility.
In this case study, the target volume of the cCM includes the volume for upward
requirements. The value of flexibility is therefore already partially covered in the
availability. If the target volume would not include upward reserve requirements,
high prices for flexibility (and energy-based scarcity) could be observed, but not
to the same extent as in the EOM. In reality, the remaining needs for flexibility
due to real-time power adjustments would still be present. However, this effect
cannot be captured by a deterministic model with an hourly resolution.
Negative prices: Impact of RES certificates
The role of remuneration for RES injection amplifies with an increasing share of
RES. The results in Figure 4.8 show a case with a policy target of 50% in which
hours with negative prices are more prominent. They are visible on the left
part of RES graphs. Higher targets lead to more hours with zero or negative
residual load, i.e., hours in which RES injection exceeds demand. Therefore,
the RES certificates ( ) affect the remuneration of other generators in two ways.
First, RES certificates ensure the cost recovery of the RES generators, while
at the same time achieving the policy target for RES, the intended working
principal of RES certificates. All RES generators receive an equal price for
RES certificates. The chosen installed capacities are driven by two factors. The
investment is chosen on the one hand by the correlation of injection and high
demand and, on the other hand, by the average cost per energy or full load hours
per year. Table 4.3 shows the values for the RES technologies. While often-
occurring high prices for energy rather favor correlated RES, higher shares of
remuneration from RES certificates would favor RES with lower investment cost
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per injected energy. The results of the installed capacities show this behavior
(Section 4.5).
Second, the constant remuneration through RES certificates allows the RES
generators to offer energy, even at negative prices. Prices actually become
negative when RES supply exceeds the demand, or when the lower boundary of
conventional generation defined by ramping limits or reserve commitments are
binding. However, in absolute numbers, prices are never lower than the RES
certificates as otherwise RES are self-curtailed.
In that way, RES are protected against negative prices, while due to the
required minimum generation or limited ramping, conventionals are exposed to
this risk. It can also be seen in the cumulated cost recovery curves (dotted line
in Figure 4.8). While the cumulated cost recovery for RES is monotonically
non-decreasing, the curves for conventionals (especially Base and Mid) initially
decrease in the most left part. This results in a higher need for scarcity prices
for conventionals for recovering fixed costs and hours with losses. Assuming
the RES certificates system stays in place, it is expected to worsen with higher
RES shares because the number of hours with negative prices further increases.
Long-term price signals through availability
The introduction of a CM separates clearly the value of availability from energy
output and flexibility. Two similar effects for energy output and flexibility can
be observed.
The first effect is on the prices for energy output. The subgraphs for the
conventionals in Figure 4.7 show that the dependency on energy scarcity pricing
( ) is reduced or dissolved in market designs with a CM. A clear separation of
values for availability and energy output happens: prices on the energy-based
market only reflect the short-term marginal costs of energy and rare rents for
ramping, even in situations, where demand is close to the limit of installed
capacity. Distinction needs to be made between SR and the cCM. With SR,
scarcity prices still occur. It is necessary because the conventionals that are not
part of the SR still need to recover part of their fixed costs via scarcity pricing.
In case of a cCM, no scarcity pricing is necessary as all conventionals can
sufficiently recover fixed costs in the market for availability. Only infra-marginal
rents for energy output ( ) contribute to cost recovery of Base and Mid. Peak
capacities fully recover their fixed costs via the remuneration of availability ( )
and flexibility, in line with the expected working principals of a cCM and SR
emphasizing the proper modeling of CMs in the distinctive models.
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Table 4.4: Gini-indicator for the revenue distribution for generators.
Scenario RES mean Base Mid Peak
target
REF
10 0.837 0.758 0.877 0.874
30 0.850 0.744 0.899 0.907
50 0.900 0.790 0.957 0.952
EOM
10 0.834 0.757 0.874 0.870
30 0.849 0.744 0.898 0.905
50 0.883 0.778 0.943 0.929
SR
10 0.760 0.757 0.874 0.649
30 0.773 0.744 0.898 0.677
50 0.816 0.778 0.944 0.727
CCM
10 0.285 0.438 0.317 0.099
30 0.225 0.382 0.275 0.018
50 0.233 0.392 0.309 -0.002
The second effect is that the prices for upward flexibility ( ) only reflect the
value of ramping capabilities. In case of the EOM, prices for flexibility in
hours of scarcity are high as well, as the periods contain the value of the scarce
capacity ( for Mid & Peak in the left column of Figure 4.7). In contrast, the
value of upward flexibility is strongly reduced in case of a cCM (right column)
and nearly disappears. The remaining value of flexibility refers to the downward
flexibility ( ), which can be observed in the hours of negative cost recovery for
Mid as discussed above.
Revenue distribution under different market designs
The different mechanisms are compared based on their performance to spread
revenues and reduce dependency on scarcity prices. An indicator for the
distribution of remuneration is used as performance indicator to assess the
impact of the market design from a generator’s perspective. It is a first approach
to address the discussion of reducing risk for generators (Chapter 6).
From the generators’ perspective, this indicator describes to what extent the
generators depend on scarcity prices. Figure 4.9 presents the underlying idea
of using an indicator for statistical dispersion of a distribution, similar to the
Gini-coefficient. Surface B is described by the cumulative remuneration for one
generator (Figure 4.7 and 4.8). Surface A describes the difference between an
equally distributed remuneration (full line) and the cumulative remuneration
(dotted line). The indicator is defined as the ratio R = A/(A+B), 0 ≤ R ≤ 1.
The higher the value of R, the higher the dependency of generators on scarcity
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Figure 4.9: Definition of indicator for revenue distribution.
prices. R→ 0 indicates that the revenues are equally spread, R→ 1 indicates
a complete dependency on scarcity prices.
The results for the generators are presented in Table 4.4 showing the indicator,
depending on the scenario and the assumed RES target. At first sight, the
results reveal that the indicator for the two CMs show very different outcomes.
For the first three scenarios (REF ,EOM ,SR), the indicators are very similar or
even equal. This is a consequence of the minimal differences in the prices between
the three scenarios. In case of SR, the dependency on scarcity prices remains
the same as in the scenario with an EOM. Hence, the revenue distributions are
the same except for the Peak generator. The reason is the combined evaluation
of Peak active in the market, and contracted in SR. The capacity contracted
in the SR has a R=0. The capacity active in the market would have the same
value as in the scenario with an EOM. The indicator consistently increases for
all three scenarios with a high RES target. Hence, an even stronger dependency
on scarcity prices can be expected in the future under the given market settings.
In contrast, in a cCM, the indicator is lower because revenues are more
distributed, in particular the revenues originating from the cCM. It has a
positive effect on all conventional generators. In addition, there is no clear
tendency observable that the indicator increases with a higher RES target: as
there is an additional shift from energy-based revenues to revenues for flexibility,
already more distributed due to its periodic contracting.
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Table 4.5: Origin of Remuneration per technology
RES Scenario Base Mid Peak Wind PV
(offshore)
10%
REF
EOM
SR
CCM
30%
REF
EOM
SR
CCM
50%
REF
EOM
SR
CCM
Energy (Infra-marginal) Energy (Scarcity) Capacity Upward Flex. Downward Flex. RES
Origin of remuneration
Finally, splitting up the remuneration per generator reveals the importance
of the different markets for the generators. Table 4.5 visualizes the shares of
revenues for all generators in form of pie charts. The size of each individual
pie does not reflect the overall revenues. In contrast to the Figure 4.7, the
revenues are shown without deducting the variable cost. While the discussion
of Figure 4.7 emphasized the contribution of individual markets to the cost
recovery, now, the focus is on the shares of markets revenues as a means to
show the importance of a market for the generators.
PHES is not depicted. It is 100% remunerated via the energy-based prices, as
it only does price arbitrage on the energy market.
Both scenarios without a market for availability (REF and EOM ) show the
same results. The conventional generators (Base, Mid and Peak) are for a
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large share remunerated via the energy-based market ( ). Additionally, the
generators are remunerated for their flexibility. Peak predominantly receives
revenues from the upward flexibility ( ). Base and Mid have shares from the
downward flexibility ( ). With increasing RES targets, the shares also increase
and a clearer distinction between the generators is seen. Base and Mid focus
on the downward, while Peak exclusively generates revenues for upward.
In case of SR, the situation changes only for the Peak generator providing the
full capacity for the SR. For clarity, the two different pie charts are plotted.
While for Peak generator active in the market, the shares hardly change, the
contracted Peak generator fully recovers the cost-based remuneration from the
CM ( ). That way, the changes compared to both previous scenarios are rather
small.
In case of a cCM, the share of capacity-based remuneration increases. However,
it is different for conventional generators. For the given case study, the shares
for Base are between 11% and 18%, increasing with the RES target. The shares
of Mid increase from 26% to 28%. The highest share can be observed for Peak,
reaching from 64% up to 85%. Two reasons can be given. First, even at peak
demand, prices on the energy-based market are not as high as in the previous
three cases. Hence, the importance of the energy-based market is decreased.
Second, with a higher share of RES, the capacity factor of conventionals further
decreases. Consequently, the major part of revenues comes from being available
in hours of peak demand reflected in the capacity price.
For RES generators, the shares also show similar patterns for the first three
scenarios. Only in case of a cCM the distribution of remuneration is shifted
towards the RES certificates. Again, the reason is reduced prices paid on
the energy-based market. Moreover, the need to get remunerated via RES
certificates increases with higher RES targets.
In conclusion, the impact of a CM is very much dependent on the type of
mechanism. The most substantial impact of capacity-based remuneration is on
the Peak technologies and decreases for Mid and Base, as the number of hours
for which these generators receive infra-marginal rents is also higher. They are
less affected by the impact of a CM on the energy-based prices. However, in
comparison to Figure 4.5, where the overall market volume of a CM is reported
rather small, looking at the individual revenue shares and their contribution to
cost recovery reveals that the impact of a CM for the individual generators is
substantial.
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Table 4.6: Absolute changes in capacity (MW) relative to scenario EOM
RES Scenario Base Mid Peak ENS PV Wind PHES
target (max) (offshore)
10 SR 0.00 0.00 750.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00CCM -160.11 75.68 1305.02 0.00 954.26 -271.55 -699.36
30 SR 0.00 0.00 750.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00CCM 189.36 -404.60 2264.36 0.00 885.73 -251.67 -675.24
50 SR 0.00 0.00 750.00 -115.75 0.00 0.00 0.00CCM 341.11 -66.85 2283.03 -115.75 -237.35 116.12 -330.79
4.5 Generation Mix in
Different Market Frameworks
The changes in remuneration shares due to the introduction of CM also have
an influence on the installed capacities for conventionals and RES. Keeping
the impact of capacity-based remuneration in mind, the consequences for the
generation mix are discussed. Two effects are distinguished. Section 4.5.1
describes the observed changes for the generators participating in a CM.
Section 4.5.2 sheds a light on the non-participating market players indirectly
affected by changing market prices.
In order to highlight the differences between the market settings, Table 4.6
provides an overview of the absolute changes in installed capacities compared to
the scenario EOM . It also shows the maximum observed ENS in an individual
hour, hence, the additional necessary capacity that would be required to fulfill
the demand.
In order to visualize the changes due to the increasing RES target, Figure 4.10
shows the installed capacities as stacked bars. The numerical values listed in
Table 4.6 are the differences in height of the bars as compared to EOM . Both
elements are used in the discussion.
4.5.1 Direct Changes for Participating Generators
The change of installed capacities relative to the scenario EOM is listed in
Table 4.6 showing the changes for the scenario with SR and cCM. In both cases,
the sum of Base, Mid and Peak increases as there is additional demand created
through the CM, a logical consequence of the introduction of a CM.
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Figure 4.10: Development of generation mix under different scenarios
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In case of SR, the Peak generator exclusively provides the contracted capacity,
as it offers the lowest fixed cost. It is newly built capacity and does not provide
any flexibility to the other markets. It is assumed that the SR volume is
not altered with increasing RES target and does not account for price-elastic
demand. Consequently, the total installed capacity is bigger with SR than in
EOM . Note that none of the other generators change their installed capacity.
The full volume of SR is contracted independently of the need to activate the
SR. For a RES target 10% and 30%, no additional ENS is prevented. Even if
activated, the volume might exceed the necessary capacity to avoid ENS as for
a RES target of 50%, a sign that the volume of the SR was set too high, leading
to an inefficiency of SR. As there is no ENS in the scenario EOM for low RES
targets, ideally, no additional SR should be contracted. In the given case study,
the ideal SR volume for a 30% RES target would be 116 MW. However, this
would require perfect information about RES as well as price-elastic demand
during peak demand by the system operator up front.
In case of the cCM, the absolute change of conventional capacity compared
to the scenario EOM is larger. Interestingly, as opposed to the SR, not only
the capacity of the Peak generator is affected, but also changes for Base and
Mid can be observed. Moreover, also changes for non-participating market
participants materialize. The reason for these changes has a different origin
and is discussed in the next section. With increasing RES target, the absolute
change is even bigger compared to the EOM. The reason is that the capacity
demand does not account for increasing RES. The sum of installed capacity
is defined by the peak demand, rather than the residual peak demand as for
the other market settings (see last row of Figure 4.10). Hence, the level of
installed conventional capacity remains approximately the same with cCM,
while it reduces for an EOM.
4.5.2 Indirect Changes for Non-participating Generators
The indirect effect of a CM describes changes in installed capacities, not directly
linked to the capacity demand. Due to the reduced energy-based remuneration,
i.e., the reduction of scarcity prices, the capacities for both RES and PHES
change. In turn, this affects conventional generators. In addition, because of a
reduced price spread, the PHES capacity is reduced leading to a higher need
for flexible capacity to follow demand variability on the energy-based market:
flexible generators benefit.
PV and Wind develop contrary. The importance of correlation of injection
and high demand decreases with the reduction of high energy-based prices. At
the same time, the importance of average cost of energy supply increases: the
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Figure 4.11: Resulting residual load for different market settings (RES target:
30%)
importance of RES certificates is increased. As the price for RES certificates
is uniform, it gives advantage to RES generators with lower average cost.
Consequently, the installed capacity of PV decreases and the installed capacity
of Wind (offshore) increases. Average cost per injected energy is lower for
offshore Wind, but the correlation of injection and demand level is higher for
PV (Table 4.2). This result on RES can be attributed to a CM via energy-based
prices, although they do not participate in a CM.
Because of shifts in the installed capacities of RES and PHES , the residual
demand also alters, resulting in changes for conventionals. Figure 4.11 shows
the residual demand curve for the different scenarios. For CCM , the residual
demand curve is slightly flatter, hence, the adaptations of Base and Mid beyond
the change discussed above. However, the increased capacity of Wind requires
more ramping capability, explaining the increase of Peak.
A CM also has an effect on participating generators that can only be attributed
indirectly to the CM. The magnitude and direction of this effect strongly
depends on the underlying profiles for RES and the remuneration. It cannot be
generalized from the case study. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight these
changes in the shares of the generation mix caused by a CM.
Finally, it is worth to look at the differences of voluntary demand response
based on the price-elastic demand curve for the energy-based market. The peak
demand levels under different market settings are also linked to the voluntary
price response. Two forms of price response are distinguished: a price response
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leading to demand increase, e.g., valley filling during hours with low prices, and
price response leading to demand decrease, e.g., peak shaving during scarcity
prices.
A distinction can be made between EOM and SR on the one hand, and CCM
on the other, linked to the impact on energy-based prices originating from the
shift of remuneration to the capacity-based market. Prices in EOM and SR
reach higher values and have a wider spread (Figure 4.4a). Even the highest
prices in CCM are not required for recovering fixed costs and therefore stay in
the range of the variable costs.
The demand increase during hours with low energy prices is higher for the
scenario with a cCM. Yet, the difference is not as big as for demand decrease.
The difference originates from the lower energy prices mostly during hours
where RES supply exceeds demand, causing prices to become more negative.
Consequently, the difference also increases with higher RES targets. The
difference between EOM and SR on the one hand, and the scenario with
capacity market, CCM , on the other, can be explained by the change in the
generation mix. Base and Mid generation more often set prices. Given the
simplified representation of the demand response using uniform price elasticities,
a general conclusion is not possible. More sensitivity analyses on the interaction
of price elasticity and generation mix would be required.
In the opposite direction, the voluntary price response to decrease demand is
larger for the EOM and SR than for the scenario with a CCM (Table 4.7) .
For market participants that benefit from decreasing load during high prices
through demand response, the EOM and SR offers more incentives. If demand
response relies on high prices, the price-impact of the cCM is unfavorable. The
result is in line with the findings for storage technologies. Downward demand
response could be allowed to participate in a CM as well, as for example in the
Belgian SR [78].
4.6 Discussion
The model results remain very sensitive with respect to demand levels. The
effect of shifting remuneration levels from energy- to capacity-based markets is
expected to be stronger if for example peak demand levels occur less often, but
are more extreme compared to average demand levels. CMs have a stronger
impact on the market outcome if residual demand duration curves are steeper
or more extreme in the peak and base demand levels. This development is
expected to further increase with larger shares of RES.
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Table 4.7: Price response as share of total demand [‰]
RES Scenario Demand Demand
target decrease increase
10
EOM 0.081 0.113
SR 0.081 0.113
CCM 0.030 0.119
30
EOM 0.085 0.111
SR 0.085 0.111
CCM 0.028 0.122
50
EOM 0.113 0.134
SR 0.106 0.134
CCM 0.042 0.157
From a market perspective, according to the model outcome, the impact on
the average cost is limited. A significant cost increase from a CM is not to be
expected under certain conditions including two crucial elements. First, the
reduction of the energy-based market prices is a consequence of the working
principle of a market-wide mechanism. It remains to be seen whether this effect
materializes in real markets. Second, the difference in cost is strongly linked to
the rules of participation. The more precise the rules of participation and the
target capacity demand reflect the contribution of different generators, storage
and demand response, the smaller the difference between the reference scenario
and a market setting with a CM. However, both elements are among the most
challenging elements in the implementation process of CM in reality.
From a systems perspective, all CMs achieve their initial purpose. The ENS is
avoided and the reserve margin is brought to an adequate level, exceeding the
minimum requirements. At the same time, it can lead to unwanted inefficiencies
caused by an over-dimensioned capacity demand. In the end, one must keep
in mind that the determination of the capacity demand is a trade-off between
the risk of having ENS and the risk of over-paying. Given the deterministic
nature of the model, this cannot be addressed fully in this chapter. However,
reality shows that there is a tendency that ENS is perceived a bigger risk, i.e.,
a higher value is allocated to avoiding ENS, with the consequence to be more
conservative in estimating the capacity demand.
The need to develop a dedicated model to represent the different CMs is
confirmed by the contrasting findings for a market-wide cCM and targeted SR.
The influence of SR is very limited, originating from the restricted purpose and
targeted contracting of back-up capacity. SR with a sufficiently high activation
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price does not interfere with the energy market and has no influence on the
generation mix, except for the additional capacity. A downside of SR is the
limited use of the capacity in SR. Although mostly flexible capacity is contracted,
SR are not used to serve for example other reserve requirements.
The situation with a market-wide mechanism is very different. The transfer of
remuneration for availability or firm capacity to a separate market provides a
clear signal for the investors. This may provide sufficient incentives to supply
capacity for scarce moments, as intended by the CM. Key to the efficiency of
the mechanisms is that during this transformation the feature “market-wide” is
retained. Current implementations, similar to the model formulation, struggle
to represent the value of all technologies in a cCM, as not all contributions are
fully reflected in the participation rules. If a mechanism curtails the supply
side for reliable capacity based on regulation, even a market-based mechanism
cannot provide the same efficiency as an EOM. Ideally, the combination of the
revenues must be allocated to all technologies according to their contribution in
the different markets.
An important observation of the model is the influence of a changing energy-
based price. The assumption that, with a market-wide cCM, energy prices
are reduced to reflect the short-run marginal costs, has consequences for all
generators, both participating and non-participating. If the participation rules
remain as strict as in the model, the results show clear disadvantages for storage
technologies and demand response because of the reduced price differences in
scarcity situation compared to average demand situations.
The value of storage based on price-arbitrage only emerges with higher shares
of RES and an increase of the price spread in the negative direction due to
excess supply from RES. Obviously, storage applications should not only rely on
price-arbitrage on hourly energy markets and they have more value in real-time
power adjustments. However, with a clear set of rules on delivery in real-time,
it would be possible to integrate (large-scale) storage applications in CMs.
The incentive for voluntary demand response, based on energy price signals,
is also strongly reduced. Given the assumptions on the reduced energy-based
prices, incentives for demand to reduce consumption during peak hours is lost.
In current markets, this only affects consumers exposed directly to energy-
based market prices. Nevertheless, if an implementation of a CM is done,
attention should also be given to transferring a market signal for scarcity to
end-consumers. There are interesting possibilities available to ensure such a
signal. For example, by using smart meters, one could think of a distribution of
the cost for contracting capacity among the consumers based on their measured
consumption during peak hours. Alternatively, other mechanisms with a direct
participation of end-consumers should be considered, e.g., in form of obligations
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imposed on consumers or direct capacity subscription.
Finally, it is important to highlight the impact of a CM on RES. The damping
effect on the energy prices and the exclusion of RES from the CM have the
consequence that also RES needs additional revenues to recover fixed cost. In
order to achieve a complete market integration of RES, these results provide
additional interesting insights for regulators and policy makers. In the developed
model formulation, the consequence is a higher price for RES certificates not
directly linked to a higher RES target. However, also other support mechanisms
for RES could be discussed. For example in case of a RES premium, the effect
of reduced energy prices should be less pronounced. Alternatively, a significant
price for CO2-emission from an Emissions Trading System (ETS) would again
increase energy-based prices making revenues from RES certificates less vital.
4.7 Conclusions
The presented case study demonstrates the shifts of remuneration between
the markets for energy output, flexibility, Renewable Energy Sources (RES)
certificates and capacity-based mechanisms. It uses a dedicated model framework
to capture the differences in the working principles of capacity mechanisms
(CMs). The case study applies a non-cooperative game with multiple agents in a
deterministic setting. Multiple generators, a consumer, a storage operator and a
market operator are incorporated. The generators take endogenous investment
decisions based on the remuneration from multiple markets.
Given a conceptual test system, the case study examines four scenarios for
which it compares the market outcome from a systems perspective. The results
reveal the altered price signals and their impact for the market participants.
An equilibrium model is used. An energy-only market setting with and without
a price cap serves as baseline for the comparison. Special focus is on analyzing
distinctive features of CMs: market-wide centralized Capacity Market (cCM)
and targeted strategic reserves (SR). It is compared with the described theory of
CMs in Chapter 2 and their expected consequences for the market participants.
CMs affect generators also if they are not directly participating in the mechanism.
Changing energy-based remuneration with a cCM shifts the focus of RES
investments from correlation with high demand to energy output per investment
cost. RES certificates must replace remuneration initially originating from
scarcity, and hence become more expensive. Incentives for storage operators
and price-elastic demand response are discouraged. Consequently, storage
operators enter markets only at a point when large shares of RES influence
prices significantly.
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Given the limited participation of technologies, SR are not a recommendable
long-term option for policy-makers as the mechanism shows some significant
drawbacks. Inefficiencies occur if capacity is contracted for a single purpose
only, as it is the case for SR. Additional investments are necessary to replace the
lost flexibility of the contracted capacity of SR. This conclusion is independent
of the chosen greenfield approach and also holds if existing capacities would be
considered. Also the contracting of preexisting capacities part in a SR would
exclude the otherwise available flexibility of these capacities.
A cCM provides a more beneficial outcome from the systems and generators’
perspectives. It achieves a suitable reserve margin that avoids Energy Not
Served (ENS). The benefits from providing clear, separated incentives for the
values of energy-output, flexibility, availability and emission-neutral injection are
strong arguments for a market design including a cCM. Revenues for generators
are spread more equal and the dependency on scarcity prices, both for energy
or upward flexibility, is reduced.
To evaluate the outcome of CMs in a context of interconnected market zones,
the case study is extended in Chapter 5 to a multi-zonal context.
To overcome the assumption of perfect information and perfect response to the
demand and price signals, Chapter 6 discusses a case study that introduces
stochastic elements, such as uncertainty on the demand levels and RES injection.
It extends the decision-making of generators to risk-averse behavior. This further
emphasizes the benefits of spreading revenues and reducing the dependency on
scarcity prices.
Further research into the participation rules or derating of technologies in the
markets for both flexibility and availability is required. This should address all
generators, including RES and storage. Their partial contribution, derated or
self-regulated, might help decreasing the cost difference between the market
settings with a CM and others and at the same time maintain all benefits for
the market participants. This is especially important with respect to future
targets for RES and decreasing relevance of the energy-based price signals.
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5.1 Introduction
The European Internal Energy Market (IEM) consists of many interconnected
market zones. Unless transmission capacities are constrained, these market
zones share capacity assets and injected energy to the benefit of the system.
The overarching target set by the European Commission for the IEM is to
create an adequately interconnected, market-based energy system [9]. Market
signals should create incentives for necessary investments for generation, storage,
demand response and transmission. Such a harmonized market would yield the
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economically most efficient outcome and minimize the need for state-planned
investments.
However, there are doubts about the capability of the current market to attract
adequate investments to ensure the current level of security of supply. The
European Commission acknowledges that shortcomings of the current market
arrangements reduce the attractiveness for new investments [9]. Therefore,
capacity mechanisms (CMs) are considered in many EU Member States as
a means to address national concerns about generation adequacy. Market
frameworks are redesigned accordingly [135]. However, there is hardly any or no
coordination among the different market zones in their plans for implementing
a CM.
Interconnected
M
arkets
This chapter presents an extension to the model and case study of Chapters 3
and 4 and extends the model framework to represent interconnected markets.
A case study examines the impact of different or harmonized CMs from a
systems perspective. It includes an assessment of cross-border effects such as
capacity leakage, shared generation adequacy, and cost distribution. The second
part of the case study focuses on efficient use of capacity assets through cross-
border participation in CMs. It highlights benefits and pitfalls of both implicit
and explicit participation models. Summarized, the case study addresses the
following hypotheses:
1. Implementing CMs without consideration of interconnected markets leads
to non-beneficial shifts in the generation mix,
2. Avoiding cross-border participation in CMs in interconnected markets
reduces the efficient use of assets and increased costs for consumers.
The proposed model and the presented case study are based on two publications.
The model extension with an interconnection operator for studies of two
symmetrical markets was presented at the 19th Power Systems Computation
Conference (PSCC 2016) [166]. In [167], the model was extended to a multi-
market model allowing for different CMs. The discussion on the role of
cross-border participation and the implications for the IEM are based on the
publications [19] and [168]:
• H. Höschle, H. Le Cadre, and R. Belmans. “Inefficiencies caused by non-harmonized
capacity mechanisms in an interconnected electricity market”. In: Sustain. Energy,
Grids Networks 13 (Mar. 2018), pp. 29–41. issn: 23524677. doi: 10.1016/j.
segan.2017.11.002.
• H. Höschle, C. De Jonghe, D. Six, and R. Belmans. “Influence of non-harmonized
capacity mechanisms in an interconnected power system on generation adequacy”.
In: 2016 Power Syst. Comput. Conf. IEEE, June 2016, pp. 1–11. isbn: 978-88-
941051-2-4. doi: 10.1109/PSCC.2016.7540839.
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• B. Tennbakk, P. Capros, H. Höschle, Å. Jenssen, J. Wolst, and
M. Zampera. “Framework for cross-border participation in capacity
mechanisms”. Final project report for European Commission, Dec.
2016. url: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/
cross-border_crm_study_-_final_report_-_170106.pdf.
• H. Höschle. “Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms – Implementations in Europe
and Implications for the European Internal Energy Market”. In: CIGRE Int.
Symp. - HVDC Syst. Mark. Integr. Lund, Sweden: CIGRE, 2015. url: https:
//lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/500149.
The applied modeling framework extends the proposed model in Chapter 3.
Similarly, the model is deterministic and simulates a single year. The
contribution of this chapter is the extension of the model to allow studying
combinations of multiple CMs implemented in interconnected market zones.
The model is not limited by the number of market zones or combination of CMs.
In order to enable cross-border flows, the role of an interconnection operator is
added in the form of an additional agent. The interconnection operator invests
in interconnection capacities between two market zones. The operator takes the
decision based on price differences on the energy-based market and additional
rents for facilitating cross-border participation in CMs. The latter requires an
additional market clearing for permits to use the interconnection capacity.
Different schemes for the implementation of cross-border participation are tested
in the modeling framework. The distinction between them is achieved by using
different methodologies to estimate the derating of the interconnection capacity
and to determine the target demand for the different CMs. As for the case
study in chapter 4, the findings are discussed for a market-wide centralized
Capacity Market (cCM) and targeted strategic reserves (SR).
The case study simulates a market setting with three interconnected markets
and considers a series of four scenarios, starting from a reference case similar
to a central cost minimization. A second scenario shows the results for an
interconnected energy-only market (EOM), a third simulates a patchwork of
non-harmonized CMs, and a fourth shows the results for a harmonized cCM.
The results of the case study are examined from a systems perspective. While
in the previous chapter the agents’ perspectives were analyzed in detail, the
focus in this chapter is on changes affecting interconnected markets. This
includes shifting generation mixes and resulting changes in energy flows across
interconnectors. Moreover, the market outcomes are compared in terms of
average cost per market and for the combined system, as well as reserve margins
and Energy Not Served (ENS) accordingly.
Finally, different levels of cross-border participation are compared to uncover
threats of under- or overestimation of cross-border participation, which might
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lead to economic inefficiencies, linked to the estimates of the implicit or explicit
contributions from non-domestic capacities via interconnections.
Section 5.2 provides an overview of the ongoing discussion on cross-border
participation in the European IEM. It describes different systems for cross-border
participation. Section 5.3 outlines the necessary changes to the model including
the mathematical formulation. The setup of the case study, its scenarios and
the examined test system are described in Section 5.4, followed by an analysis
of the impact of combining different CMs in Section 5.5. Thereafter, Section 5.6
examines the impact of cross-border participation. Section 5.7 discusses the
findings of the case study. Conclusions are provided in Section 5.8.
5.2 Patchwork of Capacity Mechanisms
The implementation of CMs in European electricity markets has led to a
patchwork over the last years (Section 2.4). This development opposes in
many aspects the harmonized European IEM. The provided arguments for the
implementation of CMs in European electricity markets are often linked to
national generation adequacy targets. However, CMs with a national focus
may introduce distortions in neighboring markets. Moreover, it may lead to
implicit competition between market designs. The objective of a European-wide
economically efficient mix might not be reached due to distorted investment
signals as a consequence of different market designs [168].
In the context of the European IEM, non-harmonized CMs are an additional
threat for the efficiency of the market operation. According to [96], different
degrees of harmonization are possible. However, redesigns of national markets
seem to aim at national generation adequacy rather than seeking a wider regional
coordination [169]. The resulting patchwork of different CMs undermines the
harmonization process. The European Commission [9] clearly states that if
implemented, CMs should be designed to minimize distortions to the IEM.
Prioritizing national generation adequacy rather than aiming at regional
coordination can significantly hamper potential benefits of an integrated
long-term expansion of the European power system [96]. Therefore, the
possible effects on neighboring markets make the implementation of a CM
complicated [73]. First results after the introduction of the Great Britain (GB)
capacity market show that ignoring the contribution of interconnectors leads to
inefficiencies. It impedes the harmonization process by weakening the business
case for interconnectors [82]. A possible coordination of capacity policies, such
as implementing a CM in combination with policies to increase transmission
capacity is highlighted in [170].
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In a European IEM with multiple CMs, cross-border participation, i.e., the
participation of capacity providers from adjacent markets, is promoted to
increase efficiency. According to the European Commission [97], cross-border
participation ensures incentives for investments in interconnection and reduces
the long-term costs of security of supply. However, the efficiency depends on how
remunerations are affected and how the market participants react. Variations
in remuneration of assets in the individual markets could lead to welfare losses
[171].
The discussion on cross-border participation in CMs and the resulting role of
interconnection capacities as well as non-domestic capacity is still an undecided
field. The European Commission and other regulatory bodies have taken efforts
in several projects to come to a consensus on the appropriate implementation
of CMs in an interconnected power system. According to the European
Commission, assuming that the decision for or against a particular CM was
taken based on clearly identified needs, cross-border participation is a means to
make best use of assets in neighboring markets that contribute to generation
adequacy. Therefore, the European Commission [172] argues that generation
adequacy assessments need to take into account interconnection capacity as
well as non-domestic generation capacity. Consequently, these capacities need
to be reflected in a potential CM.
In the literature and in current implementations different levels of cross-border
participation can be identified. Figure 5.1 provides a schematic overview
showing the target capacity volume or demand of a CM given a predefined
adequacy target. The supply side, i.e., the offered capacity (here only shown
for conventional generators) originates from the domestic market and possibly
also from non-domestic markets via an interconnection (IC). The cross-border
participation can be grouped in three categories.
First, the most stringent form is to rule out cross-border participation
(Figure 5.1a), assuming that the estimated contribution (red area) is zero.
The non-domestic capacity cannot participate because flows during scarcity are
assumed unreliable. Consequently, only domestic capacity is remunerated in the
CM. Examples are the capacity payments implemented in Spain and Portugal
[97].
The second category is the implicit contribution of non-domestic capacity
(Figure 5.1a), assuming that the red area is an expression of the contribution
from interconnected markets during scarcity situations. As a result, non-
domestic capacity is deducted from the capacity demand. It is for example the
case of the Belgian SR [78]. The volume of the SR is estimated accounting
for imports during scarcity. It can be done based on various methodologies.
Commonly used methods are based on historical data or limited Loss of Load
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Figure 5.1: Cross-border participation based on derating and participation
Expectation (LOLE) computations [173]. In market-wide mechanisms, implicit
non-domestic contributions are sometimes also integrated as zero bids at the
supply side, similar to priority dispatch for Renewable Energy Sources (RES)
in energy markets. An example of this approach are the Reliability Options
(RO) implemented in Italy [97].
The third category is based on a different approach. The explicit participation
of non-domestic capacity (Figure 5.1b) has two implications. The target volume
of the CM is not reduced and follows the adequacy target. Additionally, capacity
not directly located in the domestic market is allowed to participate in the
market mechanism. Here, a distinction can be made between a generator
and an interconnector model [95]. In case of an interconnector model, the
interconnection capacity participates in the CM on behalf of the adjacent
market. An example is the GB capacity market [82]. It is in contrast to a
generator model, where the non-domestic capacity directly participates in the
neighboring markets. It also requires a registration of the transmission capacity,
which can be done in form of transmission rights similar to regulation for energy-
based trading. In both cases of explicit participation, additional deratings for
both the interconnection and non-domestic capacity must be estimated.
While implicit participation is considered easier to implement, explicit
participation and the associated derating of capacity might be challenging [174].
The derating of capacity is linked to the objective of ensuring delivery during
scarcity events and the possibility to participate in multiple CMs in neighboring
markets. In order to limit the necessary assessments for multiple potential
capacity providers, the interconnector model is preferred by multiple studies.
The delivery is easier to track and the approach offers a direct investment signal
for interconnection capacity [175, 95]. The capacity-based price signals for
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interconnection improve their economic efficiency [171].
Alternatively, the generator model would require an additional auction of
transmission capacity in either an implicit or an explicit way, comparable to
the practice for energy markets. This could indirectly also provide a signal for
investment in interconnection. However, the two-step auction also introduces
an additional risk for capacity providers. Contracted capacity and transmission
capacity must be matched in two markets in order to avoid undesired market
outcomes. For the relative small market volume (limited by the interconnection
capacity), this might represent a serious hurdle for capacity providers leading
to a reduction of willing suppliers. Different approaches, including the derating,
rules for qualification and participation, etc., could introduce a similar market
barrier for smaller non-domestic market participants given the expected low
market volume [19].
Several recent studies [19, 167, 113, 176, 177] show that the harmonization
of the CMs itself, combined with cross-border participation across multiple
markets, is beneficial. Non-harmonized implementations of CMs could reduce
economic efficiency and even negatively affect security of supply. Moreover,
the implementation of a CM in one market may cause pressure on neighboring
countries to implement a CM as well [113]. In addition to harmonization, [19]
highlight that a regional capacity assessment and sound derating are crucial for
the efficiency.
In the end, the target of an IEM could also be transferred on CMs. The
objective could be a fully harmonized and coupled market-based CM with cross-
border participation of derated generation, load, or storage. The cross-border
participation would be determined based on capacity price differentials similar to
the energy market. The resulting congestion rents provide a market-based signal
for interconnection investment, similar to the interconnector model. Currently,
the European Commission aims in the same direction preferring a generator
model to allow for cross-border participation [19].
5.3 Model for Multi-Market Context
In order to account for the discussed topics of Section 5.2, the model framework
presented in Chapter 3 is extended. This section discusses the changes
to the mathematical formulation and introduces a new agent to the non-
cooperative game. As compared to the previous formulation, the presented
model formulation omits markets for flexibility. This is mainly a computational
trade-off as the focus of the presented case study is to enable multiple market
zones. Consequently, the intermediate temporal resolution of periods are not
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necessary. At the same time, the hourly resolution and the total number of time
steps are maintained. As the periods disappear from the model formulation,
the weights are directly applied for each time step, Wt.
In this section, the model extension is presented for three agents. The agents
are generators, market operator and a new agent, the interconnection operator.
The model uses market zones. A new index z ∈ Z is introduced to address any
finite number of market zones. In case two different market zones are addressed,
the difference is indicated with a prime ′, i.e., z 6= z′. If a CM is implemented in
a given market zone, the index is also adapted accordingly. The market zones
with a SR are indicated with zsr ∈ Zsr ⊆ Z. Market zones with a cCM are
indicated zcm ∈ Zcm ⊆ Z. Note that in the given model formulation, a market
zone can even implement SR and a cCM at the same time. Moreover, all other
implementation concepts presented in Appendix A can be introduced in the
same way.
A schematic representation of the model setup for two zones and a cCM is
depicted in Figure 5.2. Similar to the previous model, competing generators
and consumers are introduced per market zone. Generators are associated to a
specific market zone and decide on the installed capacity and the market volumes
in this market zone. Additionally, the generators can offer capacity to a CM in
their own zone or in other interconnected zones. The offered capacity, capcmi,z,z
per agent i ∈ N is always indexed by the location of the installed capacity (first
z) and the market zone in which the capacity is contracted (second z).
Both market zones have a market for energy resulting in a price, λemz,t . The
markets are connected via an exchange of energy. The exchange of energy from
market z to market z′, f emz,z′,t, is controlled by the interconnection operator based
on the market price difference. It is limited by the interconnection capacity,
icapz,z′ . Moreover, each market zone has a market for RES certificates. Each
market for RES certificates results in a market price, λresz . Only RES generators
of the same zone can offer to that market.
In case of a CM, the market operator of the market zone adds a market clearing
according to the chosen CM, similar to the presented model in Chapter 3. The
CM results in a price for the given market zone, λcmz . In order to facilitate
cross-border participation, an additional market clearing is introduced. The
market operator matches the demand of non-domestic capacity and the available
interconnection capacity, resulting in the permit price for transmission, λcm,pz,zcm
(bottom center Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2: Schematic representation of the multi-market model for two zones.
5.3.1 Generator (Gi)i∈N
The model formulation for each generator (Gi)i∈N is adapted to represent
the different market zones z ∈ Z. Consequently, the utility function Πi is
the summation of profits across all market zones. Note that the formulation
technically allows that a generator (Gi)i∈N invests and operates in multiple
market zones.
Each generator’s strategy, χi = (capi,z, gi,z,t, gresi,z , capcmi,z,zcm , capsri,z,zsr) ∈ Xi, is
defined by installed capacity and market volumes. The installed capacity is
defined per market zone. Each agent is strictly associated with one zone, i.e.,
for each generator the associated size of the set is |Z| = 1. The market volumes
remain the offered energy, gi,z,t and the RES certificates, gresi,z .
Additionally, it includes the offered capacity to CMs in the market zones capsri,z,zsr
and capcmi,z,zcm . The revenues from the CM, originating from SR and a cCM, are
based on the received capacity price in the market zone with a CM, λsrzsr , λcmzcm .
The revenues are reduced by price for permission, λsr,pz,zsr , λ
cm,p
z,zcm , that is paid to
the interconnection operator to facilitate the cross-border participation. In case
the CM is in the same zone as the installed capacity, the permission price is
zero. The resulting objective of the generator’s objective function is:
max
χi∈Xi
Πi(χi, λMO) =
∑
z∈Z
[∑
t∈T
Wt · (λemz,t − Cgi,z) · gi,z,t + λresz · gresi,z
− C invi,z · capi,z +
∑
zsr∈Zsr
(λsrzsr − λsr,pz,zsr) · capsri,z,zsr
+
∑
zcm∈Zcm
(λcmzcm − λcm,pz,zcm) · capcmi,z,zcm
]
. (5.1a)
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The constraints for the offered energy, gi,z,t, and RES certificates, gresi,z , remain
the same. They are only adapted to facilitate the modeling of multiple market
zones. In case of SR in one or more zones, the total of contracted capacity is
subtracted from the capacity available for energy output. Consequently, the
constraints for the technical limits are:
gi,z,t ≤ Ai,z,t · (capi,z −
∑
zsr∈Zsr
capsri,z,zsr) · Lh, (µemi,z,t),∀z ∈ Z, t ∈ T ,(5.1b)
gi,z,t ≤ gi,z,t-1 +Rhi,z · (capi −
∑
zsr∈Zsr
capsri,z,zsr) · Lh, (ρem,i,z,t ),∀z ∈ Z, t ∈ T ,(5.1c)
gi,z,t ≥ gi,z,t-1 −Rhi,z · (capi −
∑
zsr∈Zsr
capsri,z,zsr) · Lh, (ρem,i,z,t ),∀z ∈ Z, t ∈ T ,(5.1d)
gresi,z ≤
∑
t∈T
Wt · F resi,z · gi,z,t, (µresi,z ), ∀z ∈ Z.(5.1e)
The constraints that limit the capacity offered are also adapted compared
to Chapter 3 containing the derating of the installed capacity similar to the
model in an isolated market. It is important to highlight that there is no
explicit limitation stating that capacity can only be offered to a single CM. The
constraints can be read as follows:
capsri,z,zsr ≤ F sri,z,zsr · capi,z, (µsri,z,zsr), ∀z ∈ Z, zsr ∈ Zsr,(5.1f)
capcmi,z,zcm ≤ F cmi,z,zcm · (capi,z −
∑
zsr∈Zsr
capsri,z,zsr), (µcmi,z,zcm),∀z ∈ Z, zcm ∈ Zcm.(5.1g)
For example, if capacity is derated in two market zones with 0.6, the total
capacity offered to CMs might exceed the installed capacity. It makes economic
sense if scarcity situations do not coincide and capacity can contribute equally
effective to generation adequacy in multiple market zones. It shows that for an
efficient derating of capacities in a multi-market context, a common approach
is beneficial.
Alternatively, a stricter formulation that limits the contribution to a single
CM could be easily achieved by a constraint on the sum of offered capacities.
However, it is chosen to keep the model formulation flexible.
Finally, all decision variables are defined in the non-negative range:
gi,z,t, g
res
i,z , capi,z ∈ R+, ∀z ∈ Z, t ∈ T , (5.1h)
capsri,z,zsr , cap
cm
i,z,zcm ∈ R+, ∀z ∈ Z, zcm ∈ Zcm, zsr ∈ Zsr. (5.1i)
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5.3.2 Interconnection Operator IO
The interconnection operator, IO, decides on the transmission capacity and
facilitates energy flows. Similar to the consumer, a single agent aggregates the
roles of interconnection operators for all introduced interconnection capacities.
Hence, one agent operates all interconnections. Alternatively, one agent per
interconnection could be introduced. Yet, with the given assumptions and the
deterministic model formulation, it is valid to state that a single interconnection
operator yields the same result as individual ones: the presented problem is
separable into one agent per interconnection, resulting in the same equilibrium.
The operator’s strategy, χIO = (icapz,z′ , f emz,z′,t) ∈ XIO, consists of the installed
capacity, icapz,z′ , and the energy flows, f emz,z′,t, connecting two energy-based
markets. The model formulation assumes that the installed capacity and the
energy flows have a fixed direction, e.g., from z to z′. Therefore, the investment
in one direction is independent from an investment in the opposite direction.
While in reality, the investment might result in a single cable, this approach
yields the most flexible way to model available transfer capacities for import
and export. The investment cost must be adapted accordingly.
The operator’s utility function, ΠIO, represents the sum of revenues reduced
by the cost of investment (5.2a). The revenues include the energy price
arbitrage and revenues from selling transmission permits to facilitate cross-
border participation in neighboring CMs. The energy price arbitrage is the price
difference multiplied by the transferred energy (first line of (5.2a)). Typically,
the price difference is referred to as the congestion rent, which takes a value
greater than zero, if there is a remaining price difference between the two zones
and the energy flows are constrained by the installed capacity.
The revenues for facilitating cross-border participation are given in the two
last lines of (5.2a). They are the product of derated interconnection capacity
and permit price. Similarly to the energy-based market, CMs could also be
organized in a capacity market per zone for which the interconnection operator
would facilitate a “flow” of capacity based on a capacity price difference. The
chosen market operation based on the transmission permits is discussed in
Section 5.3.3.
max
χIO∈XIO
ΠIO(χIO, λMO) =
∑
z∈Z
∑
z′∈Z
∑
t∈T
Wt · (λemz′,t − λemz,t) · f emz,z′,t
−
∑
z∈Z
∑
z′∈Z
C inv,IOz,z′ · icapz,z′
+
∑
z∈Z
∑
zsr∈Zsr
λsr,pz,zsr · F srz,z · icapz,zsr
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+
∑
z∈Z
∑
zcm∈Zcm
λcm,pz,zcm · F cmz,z · icapz,zcm . (5.2a)
One additional constraint limits the energy flows between two markets by the
interconnection capacity, icapz,z′ . As mentioned before, the flows and capacities
are defined as non-negative and therefore implicitly have a direction. Formally,
this results in the following constraint:
f emz,z′,t ≤ icapz,z′ · Lh, (µIOz,z′,t), ∀z ∈ Z, z′ ∈ Z, t ∈ T , (5.2b)
icapz,z′ , f
em
z,z′,t ∈ R+, ∀z ∈ Z, z′ ∈ Z, t ∈ T . (5.2c)
Alternatively, the investment could also be modeled in a bi-directional way and
only considering the installed capacity in one direction, using only icapz,z′ and
not icapz′,z. The facilitation of energy flows in both directions can be achieved
by assuming the flows to be negative or positive depending on the direction.
In that case, asymmetrical available transfer capacities could be adapted via
deratings of the installed capacity similar to the used factors for the cross-border
participation.
Similar modeling of investment in transmission capacity is presented in the
literature. A detailed model and discussion on the importance of congestion
rents from the energy-market and transmission rights to justify investments in
new transmission capacity can be found in [178].
The presented model formulation for the interconnection does not make any link
to common power flow models based on an approximation of the underlying grid
[132, 133, 179]. Instead, it uses a simplified flowgate representation between
market zones [178]. An extension of the model is possible by adapting the
constraints accordingly. However, the level of detail of the above presented
formulation is sufficient for the case study presented. Section 5.3.5 discusses
developments for an improved grid representation.
5.3.3 Market Operator MO
One market operator, MO, sets the prices for the different market zones,
λMO = (λemz,t , λresz , λsrz , λcmz , λ
sr,p
z,zsr , λ
cm,p
z,zcm) ∈ XMO given the market volumes of
the other agents from all zones, χi, χIO, χc. Similar to Chapter 3, its utility
function is the excess demand on the markets, being minimized. It sets the
prices such that the market clearing conditions are balanced. Formally, the
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utility function of the market operator is:
min
λMO∈XMO
ΠMO(λMO, χi, χIO, χc) =
∑
z∈Z\Zsr
[
λemz,t ·
(∑
i∈N
gi,z,t +
∑
z′∈Z
(f emz′,z,t − f emz,z′,t)− demz,t
)]
+
∑
z∈Zsr
[
λemz,t ·
(∑
i∈N
gi,z,t + gsrz,t +
∑
z′∈Z
(f emz′,z,t − f emz,z′,t)− demz,t
)]
+
∑
z∈Z
[
λresz ·
(∑
i∈N
gresi,z −Dresz
)]
+
∑
zcm∈Zcm
[
λcmzcm · (
∑
z′∈Z
∑
i∈N
capcmi,z′,zcm − dcmzcm)
+
∑
z′∈Z
(
λcm,pz′,zcm · (
∑
i∈N
capcmi,z′,zcm − F cmz′,zcm · icapz′,zcm)
]
+
∑
zsr∈Zsr
[
λsrzsr · (
∑
z′∈Z
∑
i∈N
capsri,z′,zsr + lsrzsr −Dsrzsr)
+
∑
z′∈Z
(
λsr,pz′,zsr · (
∑
i∈N
capsri,z′,zsr − F srz′,zsr · icapz′,zsr)
)]
, (5.3a)
Similar to Chapter 3, prices for energy, λemz,t , and the price for RES certificates,
λresz are defined per zone. The energy-market with energy imports and exports
results in an hourly price, λemz,t . A distinction is made if there are SR available
for backup generation (first and second line (5.3a)).
The price for RES certificates, λresz , is set such that the demand for RES
certificates is satisfied in each market zone (third line (5.3a)). Similarly, each
CM results in a price per zone that implements the respective mechanism.
The model formulation distinguishes between SR, λsrz , and a cCM, λcmz . The
associated market clearings follow the formulation of the market clearings in
the model for an isolated market. However, all contributions, domestic and
non-domestic, are taken into account (fourth and sixth line (5.3a)).
Additionally, an explicit auction of the transmission capacity for cross-border
participation is added per CM (fifth and seventh line (5.3a)). The demand
for transmission capacity is defined by the capacity willing to participate in
the neighboring market. The supply of transmission capacity is given by the
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derated interconnection capacity. A discussion of an alternative formulation to
incorporate cross-border participation is added in Section 5.3.5. In the given
formulation, each market clearing for the transmission capacity is linked to a
permit price, λsr,pz,zsr , λ
cm,p
z,zcm . This price results in a transfer payment from the
generators to the interconnection operator.
A floor price and cap, (5.3b)-(5.3g), bound the associated prices:
λemz ≤ λemz,t ≤ λ
em
z , (νemz,t , νemz,t), ∀z ∈ Z, t ∈ T , (5.3b)
λresz ≤ λres ≤ λ
res
z , (νresz , νresz ), ∀z ∈ Z, (5.3c)
λcmzcm ≤ λcmzcm ≤ λ
cm
zcm , (νcmzcm , νcmzcm), ∀zcm ∈ Zcm, (5.3d)
λcm,pz,zcm ≤ λcm,pz,zcm ≤ λ
cm,p
z,zcm , (ν
sr,p
z,zsr , ν
sr,p
z,zsr), ∀z ∈ Z, zcm ∈ Zcm, (5.3e)
λsrzsr ≤ λsrzsr ≤ λ
sr
zsr , (νsrzsr , νsrzsr), ∀zsr ∈ Zsr, (5.3f)
λsr,pz,zsr ≤ λsr,pz,zsr ≤ λ
sr,p
z,zsr , (ν
cm,p
z,zcm , ν
cm,p
z,zcm), ∀z ∈ Z, zsr ∈ Zsr. (5.3g)
For simplicity, a single agent operates all markets and sets the prices for all
market clearings. However, the presented problem is separable into one agent
per market and market zone, as the utility function and constraints of the
markets and market zones are not linked. A split of market operators might be
interesting to introduce diverging objectives for different markets.
5.3.4 Consumer c
The mathematical formulation of the consumer is adapted to account for multiple
zones. In fact, the adjusted utility function is the summation of all consumers
of the individual market zones. The necessary constraints for the implemented
markets and CMs are added. Combining the consumers of all market zones into
one agent does not influence the model outcome, given the model formulation.
5.3.5 Limitations and Possible Extensions
During the model formulation for multiple markets, choices for modeling the
interconnection capacity are necessary, leading to some limitations.
A rather obvious extension of the model formulation is a more detailed
representation of the grid and associated power flows. However, in order
to use the Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) reformulation, the use of
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binary variables must be avoided. As mentioned before, a simple abstraction like
a DC power flow based on voltage angles can be implemented in the constraints
of the interconnection operator. However, one should keep in mind that the
purpose of the interconnection operator is not the detailed modeling of physical
flows but rather the facilitation of trade-based exchange of energy and capacity.
The available transfer capacity for trading could be estimated similar as in flow-
based market coupling (FBMC) relying on a zonal Power Transfer Distribution
Factors (PTDF) matrix [180, 59]. Yet, the endogenous change of the PTDF
matrix with transmission investment is not straightforward.
Linked to the previous paragraph, it is important to highlight that the presented
model framework cannot be used for studying situations with simultaneous
system stress events. The discussion of cross-border participation in CM is often
focused on the control strategies to handle simultaneous scarcity events. It is
linked for example to the actual operational details of sharing unserved loads
to relieve shortages or congestions on the grid. Additional models are needed
to study those situations in which different types of regulation for contracted
capacities can be evaluated.
The modeling of the interconnection operator is specific to assumptions taken.
Alternative approaches to handle cross-border flows could be modeled. For
example, cross-border participation could be modeled in two different approaches
(Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.3a shows the approach used in Section 5.3.3. An alternative formulation
for a harmonized CMs could follow the approach of the energy market. The
interconnection operator could facilitate the cross-border participation based on
the capacity price difference (Figure 5.3b). The result for the agents would be
similar. The price difference and the price for the transmission permit should
yield the same value. The capacity price for non-domestic capacity would be
very small or even zero because in most market situations the supply of capacity
largely exceeds the demand, limited by the interconnection capacity.
The consequence that the permit price equals the capacity price and most of
the value would end up with the interconnection operator raises the question
for the willingness of non-domestic generators to participate in the market. The
revenues for generators are expected to be very small or even zero. In reality,
the transaction cost for participation in the CM would have an influence on
the willingness to supply capacity. Consequently, the number of participating
capacity providers would be reduced to the generators with lowest transaction
cost (administration, experts, pre-qualification, etc.). This behavior is not
incorporated in the model framework. The model can choose arbitrarily from
the excess non-domestic capacity supply. Hence, additional details on the
participation requirements for generators could enhance the model with respect
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Figure 5.3: Alternative formulation of cross-border participation
to the generators’ reaction to market rules.
5.4 Model and Test System
The extended model framework is again applied to a test system. This section
describes the additional parameters, scenarios and necessary changes made
to the test system outlined in Section 4.2. The parameters concerning the
generators’ technologies and the demand remain the same. The additional
inputs to parameterize the interconnections and the markets affecting the
cross-border participation are presented in detail. Thereafter, the structure
and sequence of the scenarios are introduced. The section ends with relevant
implications of the assumptions for the results.
5.4.1 Modeling Framework and Scenarios
The capacity expansion planning is implemented as a non-cooperative game. The
presented model framework is reduced to the elements presented in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: Set up of the modeling framework
The game takes place in a deterministic setting, i.e., the market participants are
assumed to have a perfect foresight on future demand levels and the possible
contribution from RES. The investment decisions are taken such that they align
with the perfect information.
In contrast to the case study in Chapter 4, the market participants are located
in multiple market zones. Throughout the scenarios, the choice of implementing
a CM is altered. Next to an EOM, the considered CMs are SR or a cCM. In
total, three market zones are chosen named A, B and C (Figure 5.6). The
specifications of the individual markets are described in Section 5.4.2. The
choice of three market zones is the result of a trade-off between examining a
scenario with a different market mechanism (EOM, SR, cCM) in each market
and the presentation of the results.
Next to possible CMs, an hourly market for energy and an annual market for
RES certificates are introduced for each market zone (Figure 5.2). A market for
flexibility is omitted in this case study as the focus is on multiple market zones.
The market participants consist of conventional generators, RES generators and
a consumer per market zone. Each generator is associated to a single market
zone and can only invest in capacity in the respective market zone. Storage
operators are not considered. The demand is assumed flexible in the sense that
there is voluntary demand increase or reduction based on the market price.
Four scenarios are compared in the case study and need to be seen as a sequence
of consecutive scenarios, the differences being summarized in Table 5.1.
160 INTERCONNECTED MARKETS AND CROSS-BORDER PARTICIPATION
Table 5.1: Scenario design for the different market settings
Scenario Markets Price cap RES Target capacity Cross-border
energy market target demand [GW] contribution
REF all EOM Not applicable
40%
Not applicable Not applicable
EOM
3000 e/MWhMIX A: EOM; B: SR; C: cCM B: 0.096; C: 45.52 Implicit
CCMim
all cCM
A: 9.59; B:14.94; C:45.52
CCMex A: 11.76; B:16.53; C:47.72 Explicit
Throughout the scenarios, the market settings in the three market zones are
altered. Again, the case study uses a reference scenario, REF , as benchmark for
the consecutive scenarios. The first scenario, EOM , represents a situation with
an EOMs in all market zones. It has the purpose to highlight the efficient use of
energy exchange across the interactions and serves as motivation for the markets
to implement a CM because of ENS and reduced reserve margins. The next
scenario, MIX , highlights the consequences of an uncoordinated introduction of
CMs by individual market zones. The third scenario, CCM, is a harmonized
approach wherein all market zones agree on the same type of mechanism, a cCM.
A distinction is made based on the methodology for cross-border participation.
The scenario compares implicit, CCMim, and explicit cross-border participation,
CCMex. In what follows, each scenario is outlined in detail.
Reference scenario: central planning – REF
The reference scenario, REF , forms the benchmark for the other scenarios. An
EOM without a price cap and a market for RES certificates define the market
setting. For the given model type, the outcome of this scenario coincides with a
cost minimization as done by a central planner. All assets installed are used
optimally in terms of exchanging energy across the available interconnections.
The result of this scenario yields minimum cost and no ENS. In an equilibrium,
the energy price can reach sufficiently high price spikes to justify investment to
cover all demand at lowest cost. In the reference scenario, the resulting prices
are sufficient to ensure cost recovery by all generators. If assuming a more
price-elastic demand or storage applications, ENS might already be avoided
without prices exceeding the price cap introduced in the next scenario.
The price spikes typically exceed the otherwise present price cap in the hour
being most constraining for the system. The price signals trigger the investment
choices for both technology and location necessary to cover both scarcities in
individual market zones due to limiting interconnection capacity and combined
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stress events. Stress events are the result of combining demand levels and RES
profiles from all market zones. They do not necessarily coincide with the peak
demands in the individual market zones.
Scenario 1: Energy-only markets with price caps – EOM
The first scenario, EOM , is set up as three coupled EOM in the same way as
the reference scenario, REF . The scenario differs from the reference scenario
only because of price caps on the energy markets, λemz . For each market zone,
the price cap is equal to 3000e/MWh.
Because of the price caps, investment by generators is reduced below the level
of the reference scenario. Moreover, the location of investment also changes.
In the worst case, this leads to ENS and a system reserve margin below 100%.
However, the effect is not necessarily the same for the different market zones.
It depends on two characteristics. On the one hand, the situation worsens with
an increased steepness of the load-duration curve in the peak demand levels,
i.e., how much scarcity demand levels differ from average demand levels and
how often do they occur. On the other hand, the impact is bigger if there is a
higher dependency on imports, also linked to the steepness of the demand.
As such, this scenario can be seen as the starting situation in European markets
before national initiatives to implement CMs have emerged. The results are
assumed a sufficient motivation for the market zones to introduce a CM in the
consecutive scenario. In case of ENS, the market outcomes are used to estimate
the capacity demand for the SR and the cCM.
Scenario 2: Patchwork of capacity mechanisms – MIX
The second scenario, MIX , reenacts the current developments in the non-
harmonized European electricity market landscape. Individual market zones
implement CMs.
It is assumed that market B decides to implement SR because of observed ENS
in EOM . The implementation follows the inelastic demand (Figure 3.11). The
participation to the SR is limited to the installed capacities of generators in
market B.
The volume, Dsr,imB , is defined as the gap between the residual peak demand
and the installed conventional capacity in market B in scenario EOM :
Dsr,imz = max
t
(
demz,t + lemz,t −
∑
i∈{PV,Wind}
gi,z,t
)
/Lh −
∑
i∈N
capi,z. [MW] (5.4)
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The residual peak demand is defined as the maximum demand reduced by the
generation from RES.
The volume, Dsr,imB , implicitly takes into account possible contributions from
imports during peak hours. As such, the sizing of the SR requires perfect
foresight on RES and import contribution. It is assumed that the imports
observed in the scenario EOM are persistent in this scenario. The results in the
following sections show that this assumption is not confirmed if other markets
also change their market setting.
The price cap for the SR, λsrz , is set equal to the Cost Of New Entry (CONE),
assumed the investment cost of the Peak technology in market B, C invPeak,B .
Moreover, market C observes ENS in EOM . Therefore, market C introduces a
cCM following the description of a downward-sloped capacity demand curve
(Figure 3.10).
Two points define the demand curve of the capacity market in market C. The
target demand, Dcm,imC , is set equal to the residual peak demand:
Dcm,imz = max
t
(
demz,t + lemz,t −
∑
i∈{PV,Wind}
gi,z,t
)
/Lh. [MW] (5.5)
In this scenario, explicit cross-border participation is not allowed. However,
the demand takes into account the contribution from imports during the peak
hours. The target price, λcm#z is set to the Net Cost Of New Entry (Net CONE),
assumed 40% of the CONE in market C, C invPeak,C . The minimum and maximum
demand are symmetrical to the target demand at 97%, respectively 103%. The
price cap, λcmz , is set to the CONE.
Market A remains an EOM. Other combinations of market designs are possible
but not part of this case study. It is not the purpose to define the most optimal
combination of CMs in this scenario, as it merely serves to highlight inefficiencies
of non-harmonized CMs, which could also occur for other combinations.
Scenario 3: Harmonized capacity market – CCM
The final scenario, CCM, represents a harmonized approach for CMs. In contrast
to MIX , each market zone implements the same CM, a cCM. Cross-border
participation is allowed in a limited way by the derated interconnection capacity,
determined based on derating factor, F cmz,z .
Two sub-scenarios are distinguished based on the determination of the target
capacity demand, Dcm#z . Again, the values are determined based on the results
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of the second scenario, EOM , as this scenario is assumed the motivation for
the implementation of CMs.
For the first sub-scenario, CCMex, the residual demand is covered by a
combination of domestic generators and explicit cross-border participation
of non-domestic generators. The target capacity demand, Dcm#z , is set to the
expected peak demand of the zone. As non-domestic capacity can participate,
the estimation of the target demand excludes the imports in the first place
(Figure 5.1b). The resulting peak demand, Dcm,exz , used as target capacity
demand, is:
Dcm,exz = max
t
(
demz,t + lemz,t −
∑
i∈{PV,Wind}
gi,z,t +
∑
z′
f emz′,z,t
)
/Lh. [MW] (5.6)
The residual demand implicitly takes into account contributions from non-
domestic capacity reflected in the energy flows during peak demand (Figure 5.1a).
The approach yields a lower capacity demand, Dcm,imz , to be covered by domestic
capacity. This is the same approach as in the scenario MIX . Therefore, the
target demand, Dcm#z = Dcm,imz . This sub-scenario is denoted with CCMim.
For both sub-scenarios, the target prices and price caps depend on the CONE in
the respective market zone, i.e., the fixed cost of the Peak technology, C invPeak,z.
The Net CONE is assumed 40% of the CONE in all markets.
5.4.2 Test System
Demand and market parameters
The three markets in the test system use data from Belgium, The Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. As initial energy demand, Demz,t , the hourly
load profiles for the three markets are applied. They are taken from the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-
E) transparency platform [181]. The Belgian data is mapped on market A.
Market B is parameterized using the data from The Netherlands. Market C
uses the data from the United Kingdom respectively. All data originates from
the year 2015.
The three market zones differ in peak and total energy demand. Market A and
B are relatively small compared to C, which is about three times the size of A
or B. For market A, the load varies moderately between 13.75 GW and 5.74
GW with a total energy demand of 86.79 TWh at an average load of 9.91 GW.
Market B is comparable in size. Its load varies between 19.32 GW and 6.47
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Figure 5.5: Load Duration Curves
GW, summing up to a total energy demand of 96.67 TWh, although the average
demand is comparable (11.04 GW), Market B has a relative scarce and extreme
peak demand, i.e., an increase of 3.5 GW in the last 1% of the model horizon.
Market C has a significant larger peak demand and energy consumption, i.e.,
57.68 GW peak and 324.38 TWh. Market C has an extreme drop towards the
minimum consumption levels by about 3.66 GW. The increase in load during
the peak hours is slightly milder than in market B, i.e., about 5.2 GW in 1%
of the model horizon. Especially for the extremes in peak and base loads, the
use of interconnections to share capacity assets among the market zones can be
very beneficial and should not be discouraged by the market setting.
The data is reduced to 30 representative days. Based on the method presented
in [148], the days and associated weights are selected taking into account all
load and RES profiles from all three markets (Figure 5.5). Special attention is
given to the representation of the extreme events in the different markets. For
example, it is ensured that all peak and base demand levels are selected and
associated with a weight that approximates the duration, i.e., the weight is not
too big.
The RES profiles for Wind and PV are taken from the EMHIRES datasets
[164, 165]. The characteristics of the RES profiles are provided in Table 5.2.
Differences in the full load hours as well as correlations with the demand can
be observed for the three market zones. The reported average costs for energy
are obtained by dividing the investment costs by the full load hours assuming
no curtailment takes place. For simplicity, only offshore wind is considered.
For the assumed RES target, the economic characteristics of onshore Wind as
reported in [161] would result in no installed capacities anyhow.
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Table 5.2: Comparison of RES profiles taken from [164, 165] for 2015
Market A Market B Market C
PV Wind PV Wind PV Wind
Data 30
days
Data 30
days
Data 30
days
Data 30
days
Data 30
days
Data 30
days
Full load hours [h] 1032.24 1018.64 3617.08 3643.56 1002.49 1011.22 3261.84 3309.37 830.49 840.66 2504.69 2557.62
Average cost
of energy
[e/MWh] 74.11 75.10 68.84 68.34 80.13 79.43 80.15 79.00 87.51 86.45 94.44 92.49
Correlation
with Demz,t
- 0.230 0.156 0.093 0.024 0.273 0.123 0.108 0.118 0.265 0.214 0.150 0.187
The RES target is the same in each market zone. 40% of the energy must be
generated from domestic RES. There is no trading of RES certificates across
borders. A shared market for RES certificates would reduce the need of RES
capacities as they can be installed in the most favorable markets. An even higher
target, pointing at future policy targets, would emphasize the role of capacity
markets because of decreasing energy prices and increased dependencies on
price spikes. The conclusions on the inefficiencies discussed in the Section 5.7
would remain valid or even amplified.
In each zone, a low demand flexibility in form of a low inverse price-elasticity of
Eemz =-40 e/MWh2 and a reference price λem#z =55 e/MWh are assumed. The
reference price is the weighted average price for energy given the conventional
technologies and their variable cost. Moreover, the demand flexibility is the
same for all time steps.
The CMs are parameterized according to the description provided for each
scenario using the cost data of the generators in the given market zone.
Interconnection capacity
Each possible connection in between the market zones is put in place (Figure 5.6).
For the presented case study, the interconnection capacities are assumed fixed
at 3000 MW in both directions. Hence, the interconnection operator does not
take an investment decision. It is done to limit the results in Section 5.5 and
Section 5.6 to the effects of changing market settings. Another case study
that includes a detailed sensitivity analysis on interconnection capacity was
published in [166].
Due to the fixed interconnection capacity, the prices of the equilibrium do not
ensure that the interconnection operator recovers its fixed cost. Alternatively,
the prices might also result in a profit larger than zero. The sign indicates
whether the interconnection agent should invest in more or in less capacity.
166 INTERCONNECTED MARKETS AND CROSS-BORDER PARTICIPATION
A
B
C
RES Target: 40%
Peak: 57.6GW
Demand: 325.8TWh
5% higher Cg
5% lower C inv RES Target: 40%
Peak: 19.3GW
Demand: 97.7TWh
5% lower Cg
5% higher C inv
RES Target: 40%
Peak: 13.7GW
Demand: 86.5TWh
ic
ap
A
,B
=3
00
0
ic
ap
B
,A
=3
00
0
icapC,B
=3000
icapB,C
=3000
icap
C,A=3000
icap
A
,C=3000
Figure 5.6: Model set-up with three markets and interconnection capacities
Available technologies
Three conventional generators (Base, Mid, Peak) and two RES generators
(PV , Wind) are available in each market zone. The input parameters for the
generators in Market A are the same as in Chapter 4 (Table 4.2). For RES, the
underlying profiles for the availability are chosen according to the market zone.
Each generator of the same technology is assumed to have the same technical
characteristics in all zones. However, it is assumed that there is a small difference
in variable cost, and annualized investment costs between markets. These cost
differences can be related to differences in taxation policy, primary fuel markets,
level of competition, etc. The difference is assumed symmetrical and 5% relative
to Market A (Figure 5.6). The change is applied equally to all generators of the
same market: market B has higher fixed costs for all generators, while variable
costs are lower. On the opposite, market C has lower fixed costs and higher
variable costs.
As a side note, the difference in the economic parameters also ensures that the
results are stable throughout the sensitivity analysis. In case of same cost, the
solver might find multiple equilibria depending on the underlying algorithm of
the PATH solver. Such unpredictable changes to the model outcome distort the
discussion of the sensitivity analysis and should therefore be suppressed.
MODEL AND TEST SYSTEM 167
5.4.3 Implications for Results
When talking about the value of cross-border participation, it becomes obvious
that the bottleneck for sharing capacity is often the interconnection. The size
of the interconnection never exceeds a level for which the capacity in the non-
domestic market would become the limiting factor. The interconnection operator
receives a price signal to consider investing in more capacity. Nevertheless,
the value of the interconnector also depends on the available capacity “behind”
the interconnection capacity. Therefore, in reality, there should be at least a
sufficient incentive for generators to participate in the market and engage into
a reliable commitment with their capacity.
Given the model formulation, the market clearing of the cross-border
participation is always binding in an equilibrium. As such, there is a transfer
from the generators to the interconnection operator. As there is no minimum
required level of remuneration for generators to participate in CMs in neighboring
countries, they are willing to accept a permit price equal to the capacity price.
Hence, generators do not make an additional profit from offering capacities in
neighboring CMs.
During the sensitivity analysis, the derating of the capacity is kept the same
for all interconnections. It is an approximation hardly able to perfectly reflect
the individual contribution of capacities to an adjacent CM. If contributions
between markets are very diverse or, for example, limited in one direction, this
should be reflected in the derating. Consequently, although the results will be
close to the benchmark of the reference scenario, they cannot equal the outcome
of REF .
In the European IEM, a common approach for the deratings in a harmonized CM
would be required. For example, [19] presents an approach based on marginal
contribution to Member States’ peak demand from capacities in all other Member
States. It leads to the following question: To what extent does cross-border
participation scale spatially, i.e., are only capacities in adjacent markets allowed
to contribute or are solutions with a wider extent more beneficial? Moreover,
there are several other proposed methodologies to estimate the contribution
into neighboring markets, such as probabilistic methodologies that account
for technical availability and the impact of coinciding scarcity [173]. If it is
a target to further harmonize CMs, more attention should be given to these
methodologies in research in order to avoid unused potential of capacities in
neighboring markets due to false deratings.
Both limitations hint at challenges for large-scale systems with multiple
interconnected markets. In future work, the model could be extended
with limited effort to account for more realistic representation of details in
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implementation and decision-making. This comes with an increased effort in
agent modeling and information on mechanisms’ specifications.
5.5 Impact of Harmonizing Capacity Mechanisms
This section analyzes the results for the different market settings as defined by
the four scenarios. The section has two parts. The differences directly linked
to the different market settings are examined. The results are compared in
terms of average cost, reserve margin and ENS for each market zone and for
the combined system. The changes in energy flows and installed capacities are
shown to highlight the shift of generation mix in the two market zones. The
generalizable findings are derived from the results of the case study.
5.5.1 Comparison of Market Settings
In order to assess the scenarios, three indicators are introduced. They include
the average cost for served electricity, the reserve margin and ENS.
The first indicator is the average cost of electricity per zone, ACz. It describes the
total cost faced by the consumer across all markets (energy, RES, availability).
Additionally, it includes the cost of ENS valued by a moderate Value of Lost
Load (VOLL) of 10000 e/MWh. The total cost is divided by the served demand
to get an average cost, reported per market zone or combined for the whole
system:1
ACz =
λresz ·Dresz + λsrz · (Dsrz − lsrz ) + λcmz · dcmz∑
t∈T Wt · demz,t
+
∑
t∈T Wt · λemz,t · demz,t +
∑
t∈T Wt ·VOLL · lemz,t∑
t∈T Wt · demz,t
[e/MWh]. (5.7)
The second indicator is the reserve margin per zone, RMz. It is calculated as
the installed conventional capacity divided by the residual peak demand:
RMz =
∑
i∈N capi,z −
∑
i∈{PV,Wind} capi,z
maxt
(
demz,t + lemz,t −
∑
i∈{PV,Wind} gi,z,t
) · 100% [%]. (5.8)
1Note that this calculation is done after the model runs. Hence, the level of VOLL does
not influence the model outcome, which is determined by the price cap, λem. Using a higher
VOLL only emphasizes the differences in average cost between the scenarios, but does not
change the overall message.
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The combined reserve margin of all market zones is based on the aggregated
residual peak demand of the system. Note that the system-wide peak demand
is not necessarily the same as the sum of all individual residual peak demand
levels.
The third indicator is the ENS per zone, ENSz:
ENSz =
∑
t∈T
Wt · lemz,t [MWh]. (5.9)
Figure 5.7a shows the average cost, ACz, for all market zones. The different
scenarios, grouped per market zone, are listed on the x-axis. Accordingly,
Figure 5.7b shows the reserve margin, RMz. In the same way, Figure 5.7c
displays the ENS, ENSz, for each market. The scenarios are evaluated assessing
the combination of these three indicators.
In order to analyze the impact on the operation of the system, the energy flows
over the interconnections are displayed in Figure 5.8a. The scenarios are given
on the x-axis, together with the connections between the market zones. A
positive value indicates for example an export from market A to market B, and
vice versa. The changes of the generation mix are shown in Figure 5.8b, relative
to the reference scenario REF .
From a systems perspective, the reference scenario, REF , shows the expected
outcome. It achieves a system-wide reserve margin of 100%, the ENS is zero,
and the combined average costs are the lowest. Note that a 100%-reserve margin
in the individual markets is not targeted. It indicates the benefits of market
coupling. Generation technologies are used and shared optimally in terms of
energy, and implicitly in terms of capacity among all market zones. Prices can
reach sufficiently high levels to provide the adequate price signals. The cost
differences between markets are caused by different demand profiles, variable
and fixed cost.
In the scenario including only EOM with a price cap, EOM , the generation
mix results in ENS in all markets (Figure 5.7c). Due to the price cap, revenues
from the EOM do not generate sufficient incentives for adequate investment.
The combined reserve margin decreases below 100%., linked to a reduction of
installed capacity, mostly Peak (Figure 5.8b). The biggest change is experienced
in market C as it has the steepest increase at the peak demand (Figure 5.5),
and requires higher energy prices due to the higher variable cost. The smaller
changes for the other generators are caused by shift in the residual load profiles
(Chapter 4).
Figure 5.8a shows a small decrease in energy flows towards market C. This
relates to the change of the generation mix. Uncapped prices in REF made it
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Figure 5.7: Results for different scenarios.
equally interesting to export to market C or to invest there. The price cap now
limits the flows as the price signal is weaker and most probably the same in
both markets. It would only change if there would be different price caps in
place.
As described in Section 5.4, the results motivate the implementation of CMs
in the consecutive scenarios. The choice of CMs follows the description of the
scenario MIX , again, an arbitrary choice. Other combinations of market designs
are possible. This scenario serves to highlight inefficiencies of non-harmonized
CMs, which could also occur for other combinations. Based on scenario EOM ,
market B implements only small SR (97 MW) in MIX . The volume is based on
the maximum experienced ENS. Market C puts a cCM in place with a target
demand of 45.52 GW. Although market A experiences ENS in the scenario
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Figure 5.8: Results for energy flows and installed capacities
EOM , no CM is put in place. As a rather small market, it is expected to benefit
from the neighboring markets.
The combination of CMs, i.e., scenario MIX , yields worse results. Although
market B implements SR, the ENS in market B is higher than in EOM . This
can be explained by the fact that both CMs in B and C lead to a shift of
capacity from market A to market C (Figure 5.8b). The capacity in Market A is
reduced due to increased imports. The generation mix of Market C changes due
to a partial shift from energy- to capacity-based remuneration. In combination,
this results in reduced flows from market A to the other markets in times of
scarcity in market B. As such, the sizing of the SR should anticipate on these
changes being one of the challenges when introducing SR.
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Market C is not negatively affected, but it reduces its level of ENS. Its cCM
leads to an increase of the domestic reserve margin close to 100%. A significant
increase in installed capacity can be achieved. Due to the capacity price, energy
prices tend to be lower resulting in increased exports from market C (purple
bars for MIX , Figure 5.8a). As in market B, the implementation of a CM, here
a cCM, does not succeed in preventing ENS completely. Similarly, the target
demand for the cCM is not satisfying in the sense that changes in the other
markets undermine the positive effect.
Market A would expect a positive effect from both CMs in the neighboring
markets. However, the opposite is true. Due to more beneficial capacity
prices in market C resulting in lower energy prices and consequently in
increased energy imports from the neighboring markets, the reserve margin
drops significantly. This emphasizes that markets need to anticipate on the
effects of CMs implemented in interconnected neighboring markets.
The two last sub-scenarios, CCMex and CCMim, show very different outcomes,
although both implement a harmonized approach of cCMs. The main difference
originates from the determination of the target capacity demand and the
allowance of cross-border participation.
In case of explicit cross-border participation, CCMex, the system-wide capacity
demand is higher than in CCMim. As there is no derating for the interconnection,
the potential cross-border participation actually exceeds the most beneficial
contribution as observed in the reference case REF . The supply of capacity is
higher because the additional non-domestic capacity can participate without
derating in multiple markets.
Consequently, prices for capacity remain very low and the share of remuneration
from capacity is marginal. Hence, the cCMs in all market hardly have positive
effects on the generators. The decision-making for investment is mainly based on
energy-based prices. Therefore, the result is comparable to the scenario EOM :
generation mix, energy flows and indicators show similar results. This reveals
that a too ambitious facilitation of cross-border participation undermines the
effect of a CM and can have an equally bad impact on the results as preventing
cross-border participation.
In the current situation, the contribution of availability from other markets is
overrated. The assumption that capacity can be offered in multiple capacity
markets in parallel leads to a situation of actual capacity shortage during scarcity.
The derating of 100% is a too optimistic assumption. It has the consequence
that the system reserve margin drops below 100%. Therefore, the link between
offering capacity in multiple markets and derating is discussed in more detail in
Section 5.6.
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The case of implicit cross-border participation, CCMim, not relying on
participation from non-domestic capacity, shows a different result. Capacity
demand is lower and its capacity supply is limited to the generators of the
respective market zone. Due to the limitation of capacity supply to the domestic
market, the scarcity signal is transferred from the energy to the capacity market
(Chapter 4). Therefore, the value of availability is shifted to the capacity price.
Energy prices are reduced and only reflect the variable costs, also during peak
demand.
Consequently, the shift of remuneration from energy to capacity affects the
choice of technologies (Figure 5.8b) in each individual market. Indirectly, this
shift also affects RES. The reduction of Wind capacity is due to lower energy
prices during scarcity. While it was beneficial in the previous scenarios to install
more capacity, curtail if necessary and benefit from high prices shared across
the zones, this incentive has disappeared and the capacity is reduced. These
effects are a follow-up of the results discussed in Chapter 4.
In terms of average cost, reserve margin and ENS, the scenario, CCMim, shows
almost equally good results as the optimal scenario, REF . Yet, the generation
mixes and consequently also the average costs in the individual markets differ.
Interesting is the shift of average cost in markets B and C. This effect of the
CM can be linked to the difference in the fixed costs. Because the capacity
demand needs to be covered by domestic generators exclusively, market C can
benefit from lower investment cost, while market B has the burden of higher
investment costs. In the reference case, market B could benefit from sharing
capacities, now suppressed by the market design.
Note that the scenario relies on assumptions on the imports during scarcity
hours to parametrize the capacity demand curve. A sensitivity analysis is done
in Section 5.6.
5.5.2 Generalizable Findings
The results of the case study show that the configuration of market settings in
the three markets only has limited impact on the combined average cost, given
the cost parameters used. Therefore, this result is not generalizable. However,
closer analysis of the results reveals that, in terms of changing generation mixes
and levels of reserve margins, differences emerge from the market settings. These
effects do not directly depend on the chosen parameters but on the analyzed
market settings and, therefore, are of higher interest.
Given the assumed approach to determine the capacity demands from EOM
to MIX , a resulting patchwork of CMs yields larger shares of ENS and this at
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a higher average costs. It shows that the determination of the target capacity
demand, for both SR or cCM, cannot be done independently from neighboring
markets. Equally important is to consider their choice of CM and the resulting
cross-border contribution.
Sizing the capacity demand used in scenario MIX is based on the outcome
of scenario EOM . Consequently, when considering implicit cross-border
contribution to estimate the capacity demand, the assumption is made that
under the new market settings the implicit contribution remains unchanged. It
leads to wrong estimates with negative effects, like increased cost or ENS. Both
markets, i.e., with and without a CM, can experience these effects. Nevertheless,
this does not exclude the possibility that there might be a situation for which
it is beneficial to use different CMs. However, this requires a coherent and
coordinated approach to make best use of cross-border participation [166].
Both scenarios with harmonized cCMs, CCMex and CCMim, show very different
results. The decision for an implicit or explicit participation of non-domestic
capacity should be taken with the long-term consequences on the remuneration
and generation mix in mind.
Being inconsistent on the derating, an explicit participation model yields similar
results as an EOM. Although the capacity demand is higher, the excessive cross-
border capacity supply tends to lead to overall lower prices for capacity, leaving
energy prices to represent scarcity during peak demands. It voids the effect of
the CMs. Crucial for a good result in terms of cost and ENS is derating the
cross-border participation. The target of derating is to limit the participation
based on the estimated energy contribution during peak demand.
An implicit cross-border participation, assuming that the contribution is
estimated correctly, leads to high prices on the cCM determined by domestic
capacity supply. Consequently, lower energy prices, only echoing the variable
cost of the price-setting generators, are possible. Because of indirect impacts on
RES generators through higher RES certificate prices, conventional generators,
that are more flexible, might be necessary. In the case study, these shifts yield
a different generation mix. Crucial for a good result is the estimation of the
capacity demand that implicitly assumes the contribution of RES and more
importantly the imports during peak demand. For both participation models,
these crucial estimates are worth a closer assessment.
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5.6 Impact of Cross-Border Participation
After assessing the different market settings, this section aims at quantifying
the cost of lack of coordination or wrong estimation of potential contributions.
To this extent, the sensitivity analysis starts from the assumptions that three
different market zones have agreed on a common CM, a cCM. As discussed
for the scenario CCM, there are two options to determine the target capacity
demand in the market zones: implicit or explicit participation. This refers to
the sub-scenarios CCMim and CCMex.
In both cases, it is important to correctly derate the interconnection capacity
to reflect the contribution of non-domestic capacity to generation adequacy.
Compared to the scenarios in the previous section, derating of interconnections
is simultaneously increased from 0% (no cross-border participation) to 100%
(no limitation of cross-border participation) for CCMim, respectively decreased
from 100% to 0% for CCMex.
Altering the derating of the interconnections can also be interpreted as wrongly
estimating the contribution of non-domestic capacity in the first place. By
highlighting the impact of wrongly estimating the cross-border participation, the
sensitivity analysis reveals potential pitfalls of different approaches to estimate
the target capacity demand and deratings.
5.6.1 Implicit and Explicit Cross-Border Contribution
The sensitivity analysis on the derating of the cross-border contribution is done
for harmonized capacity markets. The results are compared using average cost
ACz, reserve margin RMz, and the Energy Not Served ENSz (Figure 5.9).
In the case of implicit participation, the derating factor, F cmz,z , is increased, i.e.,
more and more non-domestic capacity can participate. It is done even though the
contribution is already taken into account in the target capacity demand. The
scenario with implicit participation in the previous section, CCMim, assumed a
derating of 0% and is located at the left in the graphs. Obviously, an implicit
participation initially does not foresee cross-border participation. Relaxing
the derating of the interconnection is the same as assuming that the implicit
contribution is increasingly overestimated.
The results of the case study show that already for a small deviation from the
derating of 0%, the reserve margin drops (Figure 5.9b) resulting in increasing
ENS (Figure 5.9c). It comes at increased average costs (Figure 5.9a), mainly
linked to the value of ENS and depends on the assumed VOLL.
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Figure 5.9: Results for the combined system with changing derating
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The decrease in reserve margin and all consequences are caused by a too high
and increasing capacity supply, compared to the low target capacity demand.
The consequence is a low or zero price for capacity and increasing energy prices.
The energy price eventually reaches the price cap in scarcity situations. The
total installed capacity aligns to the level of the scenario EOM . With a derating
between 30%-40%, the results for CCMim are equal to those of EOM . The
implemented CMs have become redundant, as all capacity prices are equal to
zero. The results remain at that level even for further increasing deratings of
the interconnection capacity.
In case of the explicit participation, two deviations, due to wrongly estimating
the cross-border participation, can be observed. Starting from 100%, the
derating factor, F cmz,z , is decreased, i.e., the contribution of non-domestic capacity
is reduced. The scenario with explicit participation in the previous section,
CCMex, assumed a derating of 100% and is located at the right-hand side.
Between 100% and 60%, the contribution remains overestimated. At that point,
capacity prices are zero because of excessive supply of capacity. Consequently,
energy prices align with those of the scenario EOM . The results show the same
outcome as in the case of implicit cross-border participation. Although the
target capacity demand is estimated differently, the same reasoning for the
results can be applied.
Below a derating of 20%, there is an opposite behavior as the cross-border
contribution is underestimated due to a too conservative derating. Therefore,
the capacity from neighboring markets is not used at its full value to cover the
capacity and energy demand. Inefficient investments take place, which lead
to a reserve margin above 100% (Figure 5.9b). Each market invests in more
than sufficient capacity. As a result, the ENS is reduced to zero (Figure 5.9c).
However, this comes at an increased investment cost (Figure 5.9a).
In between 20% and 60%, derating yields intermediate results. A unified
derating is applied in the case study: interconnection A→B is equally derated
as B→C and so on. Therefore capacity can be exchanged in all directions to
fulfill capacity demands. However, if derating should account for the energy
flows during scarcity situation, a more detailed approach would be necessary.
For example, if the optimal flows of the scenario REF would be baseline, the
derated cross-border participation should be limited for the three interconnec-
tions to the following values: F cmA,C=7.44%, F cmB,A=3.81%, F cmB,C=61.30%. The
result would be that all indicators align with the reference scenario. However,
this would assume that the energy-based flows would not change, which is not
necessarily the case (Section 5.5).
The values show that an equal derating is a very special case and most probably
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not valid in reality. It underlines the need for a harmonized approach to
implement a cCM, and more importantly, a common approach of generation
adequacy assessment and efficient cross-border participation. Again, assuming
that these deratings could be estimated perfectly, all indicators would take the
values of the reference scenario REF .
5.6.2 Generalizable Findings
The results from the sensitivity analysis highlight the need for a coordinated
approach. It is independent of the chosen method to facilitate cross-border
participation. There is a possibility to over- or underestimate the contribution
of non-domestic capacity. It comes with negative consequences for the average
cost, reserve margin and ENS.
Underestimating the contribution from non-domestic capacity leads to an
inefficient over-investment in capacities. The consequence is an increase of
average cost above necessary, result of either derating interconnection capacities
too strictly or setting the implicit capacity demand too high.
Overestimating the contribution of non-domestic capacity increases ENS. The
reason is too little investment in capacity to reach a system-wide reserve margin
of 100%. Such an overestimation of cross-border participation is the result of a
too optimistic assessment, leading to a double counting of available capacity.
The chance of wrongly estimating the cross-border participation is higher if
markets do the assessment individually. A common and harmonized approach
is recommended. By means of a common derating of the interconnections and
a common estimation of the implicit demand, the direction of cross-border
participation can be identified that reflects the energy flows during scarcity
situations.
A major challenge, for both implicit and explicit participation, is the estimation
of changing energy flows during the determination of the target capacity demand
and derating, as the choice of target capacity demand has in turn an influence
on the energy flows. As authorities and system operators are typically assumed
risk-averse, they would prefer a more conservative approach.
5.7 Discussion
The presented case study shows a very specific market setting for three
interconnected market zones. Therefore, it only provides a narrow view on
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how different CMs might interact in a broader market context. However,
acknowledging the assumptions of the case study, generalizable findings for
interconnected markets implementing CMs and cross-border participation can
be established. This section summarizes the most important ones.
Non-harmonized CMs, as observed in the scenario MIX , based on individual
national implementations, oppose efficient use of generation technologies. A
distortion of the market harmonization because of differing incentives leads to
disturbed investment signals and in the end to a less efficient market outcome.
The case study reveals that markets that remain an EOM are challenged with
changing price signals for energy and capacity around them. As a consequence,
price signals from similar markets might represent different underlying values.
The result might be a competitive disadvantage to attract new investment in
generation capacities. In turn, a competition for better price signals between
markets with CMs might also bias the market outcome. This may shift the
generation mix even further from optimal.
Therefore, acknowledging that the implementation of CMs in Europe is
happening, the market harmonization started for various energy markets should
be extended to possible CMs giving the possibility for capacity providers to
contribute to CMs across market borders.
However, the results for a harmonized approach of CMs also show that there is
a possibility of under- or overestimating the cross-border participation, which
leads to undesired outcomes. They can either be over-investments resulting in
increased costs because of too conservative assumptions about the non-domestic
contribution, or insufficient reserve margins because of double counting of
available capacity across multiple markets, resulting in a decrease of installed
capacity.
The case study points out that a common and harmonized approach to represent
non-domestic capacities is beneficial. In general, the results emphasize that
a common methodology for derating interconnections must take into account
resulting energy flows during scarcity situations and long-term changes in
generation mixes. The major challenge, for both implicit and explicit cross-
border participation, is a proper determination of the capacity demand and
deratings. Policy makers and regulators need to find a balance between under-
and overestimating the contribution of non-domestic capacity, with the above
described consequences in mind.
The impact of changing market settings in neighboring markets cannot be
neglected in the assessment of a market’s generation adequacy. For example,
cross-border flows triggered by cheaper energy-based prices in one market with
a CM might lead to increased imports from that market and in the long-term a
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reduction of domestic capacities. A constant adaptation of the market setting
is required to ensure generation adequacy in response to the changes in the
neighboring markets. Here, two options for the affected market exist, either the
acceptance to rely on import or adapt the own market setting to restore price
signals for domestic capacity.
In case a CM is implemented to raise the market’s reserve margin, two options
are presented. SR might be sufficient to avoid ENS by adding capacity needed.
Note that this would require a thorough assessment of demand that cannot be
covered through imports. In contrast, a harmonized CM could give incentives
to install domestic capacities.
All discussions on possible introduction of CMs must keep in mind that in reality
different physical needs might remain for the interconnected markets. This
can be due to for example historically developed generation mixes or different
seasonal load patterns (Section 2.2.3). Specific requirements of the individual
market zones due to the characteristics of the power system might also include
locational limitations.
To avoid inefficiencies with respect to physical needs, market harmonization
should account for them. The interconnected CMs should not prevent the
efficient utilizing of capacities’ contribution to generation adequacy in any form.
Neither a double counting of capacity nor restricted contributions should be
the result of derating and cross-border participation. Although not addressed
by the case study but discussed in Chapter 4, in the end, this must be also
extended to other potential contributors to generation adequacy, e.g., demand
response or storage. A successful integration requires further harmonization of
market rules and regulations.
5.8 Conclusions
Next to the general discussion on the need for capacity mechanisms (CMs),
the harmonization of CMs and the facilitation of cross-border participation is
currently on the agenda of European policy makers. The current development of
a patchwork of different national CMs in the European Internal Energy Market
(IEM) is a counter-example of a coordinated and harmonized process to create
market signals that trigger adequate investment in an integrated power system.
The implementation of CMs without consideration of interconnected markets
leads to non-beneficial shifts in the generation mix. The hypothesis is studied
by comparing four different scenarios. They vary in the choice of CMs and
the possibility for cross-border participation in three interconnected markets.
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Starting from a uniform energy-only market, the hypothesis is examined for a
non-harmonized patchwork and a harmonized centralized Capacity Market.
Even if CMs can be harmonized, a wrong set up of cross-border participation
in interconnected CMs might reduce the efficient use of assets and might
increase costs for consumers. In order to analyze the validity of this hypothesis,
two methodologies for cross-border participation are studied. An implicit
participation already takes into account contributions from neighboring markets
during the determination of the capacity demand. Alternatively, an explicit
participation allows non-domestic capacity to participate directly in the CM
reflecting the total demand for available capacity.
In the presented case study, a patchwork of CMs shows the highest average cost,
the highest volume of Energy Not Served (ENS) and the lowest reserve margin.
This is, however, the result of an initial approach to account for cross-border
contributions under changing market settings. Because of investors’ reactions
to the introduction of CMs, these changes need to be taken into account a
priori during the determination of the capacity demand. In reality, this requires
an ongoing adaptation of the market parameters as a response to surrounding
markets.
The results for a harmonized approach of CMs show that there is a chance of
under- or overestimating the cross-border participation, leading to economic
inefficiencies. They are over-investments resulting in increased costs, due to too
strict assumptions about the non-domestic contribution. In turn, insufficient
reserve margins, due to double counting of capacity across multiple markets,
result in too low capacity-based remuneration and a decrease of installed
capacity.
The findings of the case study suggest that during the assessment of a market
zone’s generation adequacy and associated decision on a CM, the resulting
changes in both own and neighboring market zones need to be considered
thoroughly. The changing market setting and remuneration has a direct impact
on the long-term development of the generation mix exceeding the domestic
market participants. Through changing prices, imports respectively exports
might be substantially altered, resulting in undesired investment signals. If this
happens in an interconnected market region, the consequences are even harder
to predict. Therefore, the case study suggests that, rather than developing into
a patchwork of CM, a common and harmonized approach is preferable.
When deciding for a CM, policy makers and regulators need to weigh national
generation adequacy against the chance of having to rely on imports. These
imports are related to the chance of under- or overestimating the value of
non-domestic capacity with the described consequences.
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On the one hand, national generation adequacy through CMs requires
the adaptation of the own market setting to restore price signals for
domestic capacity. However, the consequence of all markets prioritizing
national generation adequacy is the undermining of benefits linked to market
harmonization.
On the other hand, CMs can play a supportive role in best using shared assets in
an interconnected market context. The case study shows that if capacity demand
and cross-border participation is set in a way that it reflects the contributions
of sharing capacities and energy flows across market borders, interconnected
CMs can contribute to a beneficial market outcome.
The proposed model presents a first step in the assessment of CMs in an
interconnected context. To highlight the role of other market participants, the
model could be extended in several ways. In the case study, the role of the
interconnection operator is limited to enable flows between the energy markets,
given a fixed interconnection. An investment decision could be taken based on
energy and capacity market. This provides insights on how CMs influence the
long-term development of interconnection capacities. In combination with a
more detailed representation of the grid, more realistic long-term studies could
be executed.
Having a detailed grid representation, the model could also address the discussion
on the validation of capacity, based on delivery and availability. This would
further emphasize the impact of CMs on the system operation in real-time. An
extension of the model to a stochastic equilibrium model with higher temporal
resolution could elaborate on potential mismatch between contracted capacity
and availability in operation. First steps to the formulation and computation of
stochastic equilibrium models are presented in Chapter 6.
Moreover, studying the role of authorities and system operators to select market
mechanisms and set capacity demands is very important. A game-theoretical
model that incorporates a hierarchical decision-making could explore a system
operator anticipating the reactions of market participants during setting capacity
demands and derating factors. This might even reveal that, under certain
conditions, a mix of CMs is beneficial. Another model extension could elaborate
on the impact of being conservative or risk-averse in selecting deratings. It
could be an extension to the study of risk-averse generators in CMs as initiated
in Chapter 6.
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n6.1 Introduction
Investment in generation technologies in the power sector are taken based on
expectations about future revenues to recover initial capital expenditures. This
is valid for conventional technologies with varying ratios of fixed and variable
costs, as well as emerging Renewable Energy Sources (RES) with high fixed and
low variable costs [182]. It implies that each investment is assessed thoroughly
for uncertainties and risks. A part of the uncertainty for investors in electricity
markets emerges from infrequent and uncertain price spikes. Because of the
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high capital expenditures leading to sunk cost, investors are often assumed
risk-averse, i.e., having a negative evaluation of risk. From a systems perspective,
risk-averse behavior of investors might lead to sub-optimal decision-making and
undermine generation adequacy.
Risk
Aversion
With the objective of restoring the confidence of investors and provide stable
long-term market signals, capacity mechanisms (CMs) have been implemented
complementary to existing energy-based markets. By remunerating firm capacity,
they should provide an adequate long-term price signal [40]. In turn, it is argued
that removing the missing money problem by taking away market distortions
like regulated price caps for energy would make CMs obsolete. In order to assess
the impact of CMs on risk-averse market participants, this chapter introduces
a stochastic equilibrium model into the modeling framework. A case study
examines the impact of risk aversion on the market outcome. A distinction is
made between an energy-only market (EOM) and a centralized Capacity Market
(cCM). The assessment of both market settings is done based on risk-adjusted
cost and installed capacities. Two sensitivity analyses examine the impact of
price caps on the energy-based market and the level of risk aversion among the
market participants. The addressed hypotheses are:
1. CMs have a positive effect on risk-averse market participants and provide
a more stable investment signal,
2. In a risk-averse market environment, CMs result in lower costs and avoided
Energy Not Served (ENS).
The content of this chapter has been developed during a research visit at the
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université
catholique de Louvain (UCLouvain). The presented results have been published
in [183]:
• H. Höschle, H. Le Cadre, Y. Smeers, A. Papavasiliou, and R. Belmans. “An
ADMM-based Method for Computing Risk-Averse Equilibrium in Capacity
Markets”. In: IEEE Trans. Power Syst. (Feb. 2018). issn: 0885-8950. doi:
10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2807738.
In addition, the work was presented and challenged at two academic events
[184] and [185].
In order to capture the investors’ risks in the changing power markets, long-
term models, including investment decisions, require three main adaptations.
The models should capture uncertainties, for example by means of multiple
scenarios with varying parameters related to the sources of uncertainty. High
temporal resolution is necessary to capture uncertainties related to variability
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and occasional scarcity. The risk aversion of investors should be incorporated
and modeled by risk measures altering the objective of the investors.
The incorporation of risk measures in market equilibrium models introduces
non-convexity [186] and consequently new challenges to the solution techniques.
State-of-the art solvers based on Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP)
reformulation [146] are not necessarily able to find an equilibrium for large-scale
capacity expansion problems including endogenous risk measures [139, 187, 188].
Because of the solver problems, the numerical examples are very limited. In
addition to the case study and research of the hypotheses above, this chapter
proposes an algorithm inspired by Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
(ADMM) in form of the optimal exchange [147]. The developed approach for
equilibrium models offers advantages in computing a Nash Equilibrium (NE) for
settings with risk-averse agents. The methodology allows computing larger case
studies in terms of scenarios, temporal resolution, and number of risk-averse
market participants thanks to the proposed iterative updates of the agents’
decisions and the market prices.
Section 6.2 outlines the modeling of risk-averse behavior in capacity expansion
planning models. In particular, the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CV@R) is
introduced, used as the risk measure. Section 6.3 provides the mathematical
formulation of the adapted agents. Section 6.4 summarizes the working principles
of the proposed algorithm. Section 6.5 outlines the test system comparable to
the previous chapters, followed by an assessment of the proposed algorithm’s
performance in Section 6.6. Finally, the proposed algorithm is applied on a test
system. Section 6.7 presents the results, discussed in Section 6.8. Conclusions
are provided in Section 6.9.
6.2 Risk Aversion in Capacity Expansion Planning
If risk-averse behavior is taken into account, investment decisions must be based
on multiple potential future outlooks. Typically, investors create scenarios and
assign probabilities to capture the most probable future outcomes. At the
same time, they can account for less probable outcomes with extreme results.
Using scenarios and associated probabilities, it is possible to take decisions in a
nuanced way. However, the preferences during decision-making can result in
different outcomes. These preferences can be expressed in a risk measure. This
section briefly introduces the intuition of risk measures and outlines how they
are used in market equilibrium models. Moreover, the last sub-section provides
a short discussion on computational challenges arising from the introduction of
risk measures.
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of decision-making in different model types
6.2.1 Risk Aversion and Risk Measures
Before discussing different preferences and evaluation of risk, the two model
types need to be distinguished. Figure 6.1 illustrates the different methods for
decision-making of individual agents.
On the left-hand side, the decision-making in a deterministic model is depicted.
As such, a single outlook is considered. The approach can be understood as one
single scenario (arrow) with a probability of 1 (or 100%). Consequently, the
decision-making is risk-free because there is the only one possible realization.
For each agent, the associated utility function is the profit or the surplus of
that realization.
The right-hand side shows two approaches for a stochastic model. Stochastic
models account for uncertainty. One way to introduce uncertainty in a stochastic
model formulation is the use of scenarios. The uncertainty is discretized into a
set of scenarios, s ∈ S, with associated probabilities Ps. The probabilities sum
up to 1 (or 100%). The scenarios are visualized by the set of arrows.
For the decision-making of the agents, two approaches can be identified. First, an
agent considers the outcome of each scenario given the predefined probabilities.
The result of this decision-making is called risk-neutral. The utility function
of each agent is the expected outcome or the sum over the multiplication of
probability and outcome of each scenario [189].
Second, an alternative to risk-neutral decision-making is risk-averse decision-
making: each agent adjusts the probabilities for each scenario according to its
preferences. The preferences are defined by a risk measure. The risk measure
implies an assumption for the agent’s utility function and can have various
forms. A few examples are discussed below. Depending on the risk measure,
the agent determines its risk-adjusted probabilities, which are not necessarily
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the same as the given probabilities. However, in the same way as the given
probabilities, Ps (dashed arrows), the risk-adjusted probabilities, qs, add up
to 1 (or 100%). For example, an agent might only consider the scenario with
the worst outcome for its decision-making. Consequently, the risk-adjusted
probability for this scenario would be 1, while to all other scenarios a probability
equal to 0 would be assigned.
6.2.2 Conditional Value-at-Risk
In the literature, a wide range of risk measures are available, mostly originating
from financial applications [190]. In this dissertation, the focus is on the CV@R.
Figure 6.2 shows the result for three example cases. All cases assume a set of
ten scenarios. Each scenario results in a profit for the agent depending on its
decision, χ. The scenarios are sorted so that the profit, pis(χ) increases for all
cases from 1 to 10. The higher the profit, the better it is for the agent. However,
the cases differ in the assumed probabilities for the scenarios. In the case shown
in Figure 6.2a, each scenario has the same probability. Figure 6.2b shows a case,
where the scenario with the third-worst outcome has a higher probability than
all others. The two scenarios with the worst outcome have a lower probability.
Finally, in the third case Figure 6.2c, the scenario with the worst outcome has
the highest probability.
An agent with risk-neutral decision-making takes into account the profit, pis(χ),
of all scenarios given their probabilities. Consequently, its utility function is
equal to the expected profit:
Expected Profit = E[pi(χ)] =
∑
s∈S
Ps · pis(χ) (6.1)
In contrast, a very risk-averse agent might only consider the scenario with the
worst profit. In other words, the agent assigns a risk-adjusted probability of 1
to the scenario with the worst outcome, also referred to as worst-case scenario:
Worst-Case = min
s∈S
{pis(χ)} (6.2)
The agent is blind to the probabilities and the utility is the same for all three
cases. In the same way, one can imagine a very risk-seeking agent that assigns
a risk-adjusted probability of 1 to the scenario with the highest outcome:
Best-Case = max
s∈S
{pis(χ)} (6.3)
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(c) “Bad” tail
Figure 6.2: Comparison of different risk measures
A modification of these extreme risk-measures is the Value-at-Risk (V@R). The
V@R of a risk-averse agent relaxes the constraint to only look at the worst-case.
Instead, it accounts for a number of scenario with worst outcome. The number
of scenarios depend on the parameter β, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The V@R describes the
most positive outcome of the scenarios with a cumulative probability lower or
equal to β. In other words, the scenarios are sorted based on their profit and
cut off where cumulative probabilities reach the value of β (dark scenarios in
the figures for β = 0.3) [190]:
V@Rβ(χ) = max
s∈S
{pis(χ)|
∑
s∈S
Ps ≤ β} (6.4)
For β close to 0, the V@R approximates the worst-case. In turn, a β = 1
results in the expected profit. Hence, the parameter β determines the amount
of scenarios considered in the decision-making. Therefore, the risk aversion of
an agent can be parametrized by β. The considered scenarios are also referred
to as tail. The motivation for using the V@R is the following. In case there is
an outlying scenario with very low profit but also with a very low probability,
the worst-case might be too biased towards this scenario. This assumption
can be relaxed with the V@R. Already the choice of the risk measure often
incorporates an assumption on the risk aversion of an agent.
A disadvantage of the V@R is that the risk measure is blind to the shape of the
tail. Figures 6.2b and 6.2c show two different tails. While the good tail would
be more beneficial from the agent’s point of view, using the V@R the decision
would be the same. In order to avoid this, the V@R is extended to the CV@R.
The CV@R is the conditional expectation of all scenarios that belong to the tail
defined by the parameter β. The advantage is that the CV@R is able to quantify
dangers beyond V@R [191], i.e., it accounts for the shape of the tail and a
decision taken based on the CV@R would be different for Figures 6.2b and 6.2c.
Moreover, it offers mathematical properties that can be exploited for larger
linear models with discrete scenario-based simulations [191] (Section 6.2.3).
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Formally, for a profit-maximizing agent, the CV@R is [192, 190]:
CV@Rβ(χ) =
1
β
·
∑
s∈S∗
Ps · pis(χ), with: S∗ = {s ∈ S|pis(χ) ≤ V@Rβ(χ)} (6.5)
Instead of using a risk measure, often a mean-risk analysis is used. In that case,
the utility function is a weighted combination of a measure for expected profits
and a measure for the risk:
Mean-risk = γ · E[pi(χ)] + (1− γ) · CV@Rβ(χ) (6.6)
According to [189], such an approach has many advantages, because it facilitates
the trade-off between mean and risk.
Summarized, using a mean-risk approach based on CV@R, two parameters can
be used to describe the risk aversion of an agent. First, a weighting factor,
γi, between the expected profit and the risk measure describes how much
the decision-making is determined by the consideration of risk. Second, the
parameter β for the CV@R describes the valuation of individual future outlooks.
Both parameters are interlinked and not trivial to estimate. Assuming that
investors are rather risk-averse in the power sector, the choice would be a γi
closer to 1 and a rather small β, i.e., assigning a large value to few scenarios
with worse outcome.
6.2.3 Reformulation of Conditional Value-at-Risk
The application of CV@R in the capacity expansion models follows the work
of Ehrenmann and Smeers [139]. In the original approach, the utility function
of the generators represent the CV@R. The profit for each scenario pi(χ) is
calculated similar to the utility function presented in Chapter 3.
Abstracting from the agents and their detailed profit function, pi, the utility
function is:
max
χ∈X
CV@Rβ(χ) =
∑
s∈S∗
Ps · pis, (6.7a)
with:S∗ = {s ∈ S|pis ≤ V@Rβ(χ)}. (6.7b)
Given a strategy, χ ∈ X , the CV@R for a parameter β is maximized. The
maximization of the CV@R is equal to the sum of profits weighted with the
scenarios’ probability. However, only the scenarios for which the profit is smaller
or equal than the V@R are considered. Note that the optimization needs to
determine both the V@R as well as the selection of scenarios endogenously.
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Especially the selection of scenarios causes problems for the formulation of
games using MCP-reformulations.
In order to overcome these problems, the CV@R can be reformulated using the
approach presented by Rockafellar and Uryasev [192]. They prove that their
reformulation of the CV@R replaces the necessary selection of scenarios S∗
to compute the CV@R. At the same time, the optimization problem remains
linear. Formally, for one agent, the optimization problem with respect to the
CV@R is:
max
χ∈X
CV@Rβ(χ) = α− 1
β
∑
s∈S
Ps · us, (6.8a)
us ≥ α− pis(χ), ∀s ∈ S, (qs) (6.8b)
us ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, (6.8c)
α ∈ R. (6.8d)
As described in Ehrenmann and Smeers [139], the α is the smallest profit that
is strictly exceeded with a probability of at most 1-β. It can be shown that
the α corresponds with the V@R. In addition, the formulation introduces a
new auxiliary variable interpreted as the valuation of a scenario, us. The non-
negative variable takes a value larger than zero for all scenarios of which the
profit is below a value α (6.8b). In addition, the associated dual variable, qs, can
be read as the risk-adjusted probability. In case the profit of a scenario is larger
than the V@R, (6.8b) is not binding, the associated risk-adjusted probability is
zero. In turn, it takes a value larger or equal than zero, if the profit is below
the V@R.
The two different formulations are illustrated in Figure 6.3. Figure 6.3a shows
the original definition following (6.7a)-(6.7b). The probabilities for each scenario
(y-axis) are shown with increasing profits (x-axis). The curly bracket shows the
selection of the scenarios.
Figure 6.3b shows the resulting definition based on the reformulation. It depicts
the valuation, us, with outcomes equal or worse than the V@R = α. The
valuation is based on the adjusted probabilities qs. In other words, the red bars
are a result of the blue bars under the curly bracket. Note that due to the
definition of us, the direction of the x-axis is reversed.
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Figure 6.3: Reformulation of Conditional Value-at-Risk (CV@R) according to
[192]
6.3 Model for Risk-Averse Agents
According to the discussion of risk aversion in Section 6.2, the model is extended.
This section outlines the adaptation made to the different agents. The model
formulation in this chapter does not model markets for flexibility. Consequently,
periods are omitted to reduce the computational efforts for the solver, as the
efforts are increased due to the stochastic nature of the equilibrium model.
Nevertheless, the hourly resolution and the total number of time steps are
maintained. As the periods disappear from the model formulation, the weights
are directly applied for each time step, Wt.
The stochastic element, or the uncertainty is introduced in form of discrete
scenarios. In order to distinguish between scenarios, a new index is introduced.
Each scenario is indicated with an s ∈ S. Additionally, each scenario is
associated with a probability Ps. The sum of all probability equals
∑
s∈S Ps = 1.
In each of the scenarios, three markets are modeled for energy, RES and
availability, i.e, a CM (Figure 6.4). The prices on the markets for all scenarios
are set by a market operator. One consumer groups the atomic consumers
and presents them in an aggregated demand for energy and capacity. Multiple
generators offer their volumes to the three markets in all scenarios. However,
each generator takes a decision on the installed capacity that is valid for all
scenarios. Hence, this decision is subject to its risk-averse behavior.
In what follows, each of the agents’ optimization problem is discussed. Only
the main adaptations related to the stochastic elements and risk aversion are
described in detail.
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Figure 6.4: Schematic representation of model with 3 markets (rectangles) for
energy output, availability and RES certificates. Market participants/agents
(rounded corners) are shown with their decision variables.
6.3.1 Risk-averse Generator (Gi)i∈N
Each generator (Gi)i∈N invests in capacity, capi independent of the scenarios.
All other market volumes are scenario-dependent. Therefore, each generator’s
strategy is defined as χi = (capi, gi,s,t, gresi,s , capcmi,s ) ∈ Xi. Next to the installed
capacity, it contains offered energy, gi,s,t, RES certificates, gresi,s , and capacity,
capcmi,s .
The risk-averse behavior of each agent is introduced in the utility function of
the generator.
max
χi∈Xi
Πi(χi, λMO) = γi ·
∑
s∈S
Ps · pii,s(χi, λMO)
+ (1− γi) · CV@Ri(χi, λMO). (6.9a)
It consists of the weighted sum of the expected profit and the CV@R. Both, the
profit in each scenario, pii,s, and the CV@R depend on the generator’s strategy
and take into account the price set by the market operator, λMO.
The profit per scenario, pii,s, is calculated based on the revenues from the
three markets reduced by the cost for generation and investment (6.9b). Each
scenario’s profit formulation is comparable to the utility function discussed in
Chapter 3 for the deterministic case (5.1g).
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The CV@R is formulated using the reformulation of Rockafellar and Uryasev
[192] discussed in Section 6.2.
pii,s(χi, λMO) =
∑
t∈T
[
Ws,t · (λems,t − Cgi ) · gi,s,t
]
+ λress · gresi,s
+ λcms · capcmi,s − C invi · capi, (6.9b)
CV@Ri(χi, λMO) =αi − 1
βi
∑
s∈S
ui,s, (6.9c)
ui,s ≥αi − pii,s(χi, λMO), (qi,s), ∀s ∈ S, (6.9d)
ui,s ∈ R+, ∀s ∈ S, (6.9e)
αi ∈ R. (6.9f)
αi is an auxiliary variable that matches the V@R. The valuation ui,s is an
additional auxiliary variable used for the reformulation and takes values larger
than 0 for scenarios with lower profits than the V@R. Note that for a weighting
factor γi equal to one, the model reduces to the risk-neutral case.
The remaining equations (6.9g)-(6.9l) represent the technical constraints and
the limitations due to participation rules.
gi,s,t ≤ Ai,s,t · capi · Lh, (µemi,s,t), ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T , (6.9g)
gi,s,t ≤ gi,s,t-1 +Rhi · capi · Lh, (ρem,i,s,t ), ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T , (6.9h)
gi,s,t ≥ gi,s,t-1 −Rhi · capi · Lh, (ρem,i,s,t ), ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T , (6.9i)
capcmi,s ≤ F cmi · capi, (µcmi,s ), ∀s ∈ S, (6.9j)
gresi,s ≤ F resi ·
∑
t∈T
gi,s,t ·Ws,t, (µresi,s ), ∀s ∈ S, (6.9k)
capi, gi,s,t, g
res
i,s , cap
cm
i,s ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T . (6.9l)
These constraints define the set of strategies and are similar to the ones
introduced in Section 3.4.2. They are only adapted to account for the different
scenarios s ∈ S.
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6.3.2 Consumer c
Consumer c maximizes the expected consumer surplus Πc(χc, λMO) given by the
consumer surplus on the three markets. The consumer’s strategy consists of the
ENS, the served and not served capacity in each scenario, χc = (lems,t , dcms , lcms ) ∈
Xc. Given the prices set by the market operator, λMO, the utility function is:
max
χc∈Xc
Πc(χc, λMO) =
∑
s∈S
Ps ·
[∑
t∈T
Ws,t · (λem − λems,t ) · (Dems,t − lems,t )
+ 1/2 · (λcm − λcms ) · (dcms +Dcms )
]
, (6.10a)
dcms + lcms = (λcms − λcm,0s )/Ecms , (βcms ), (6.10b)
lems,t , d
cm
s , l
cm
s ∈ R+, ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T . (6.10c)
As the consumer does not have a decision variable that spans the scenarios, the
concept of risk aversion is not applicable. However, extensions with decision
variables that span the scenarios are thinkable. In that case, the same approach
as for the generator is applicable.
The model formulation simplifies the initial formulation presented in Chapter 3
as it assumes the demand for energy and RES certificates being inelastic. The
demand for RES certificates Dress is set exogenously as a share of the total
inelastic energy demand Dems,t . The demand for RES is not influenced by the
consumer, as it is assumed that the price for RES certificates can reach any
sufficiently high value.
The price for energy is capped by a price cap λem. Hence, in case of insufficient
supply, the price reaches the price cap and involuntary ENS, lems,t , occurs to
close the gap between demand and supply. Consequently, on the market for
energy, the consumer surplus is given by the served demand multiplied by the
difference of price cap and market clearing price (first line of utility function).
The capacity demand is modeled as being elastic with the simplification that
the slope is constant. The sloped part of the demand curve is described by a
linear expression (6.10b) given the slope, Ecms , and y-intercept, λcm,0s . Hence,
the capacity demand can also vary with the scenario.
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6.3.3 Market Operator MO
The market operator MO sets the prices, λMO, on the three markets, given
the volumes of all generators, χi, and the consumer, χc. The prices consist
of the prices for energy, RES, and capacity. Its set of strategies is defined as
λMO = (λems,t , λress , λcms ) ∈ XMO. The market operator’s objective is to minimize
excess demand, formally given by the utility function:
min
λMO∈XMO
ΠMO(λMO, χi, χc) =
∑
s∈S
Ps ·
[
∑
t∈T
Wt · λems,t ·
(∑
i∈N
gi,s,t + lems,t −Dems,t
)
+ λress ·
(∑
i∈N
gresi,s −Dress
)
+ λcms ·
(∑
i∈N
capcmi,s − dcms
)]
. (6.11a)
Similar to the consumer, the market operator does not have a decision variable
that spans the scenarios. Consequently, the concept of risk aversion is not
applicable.
The brackets contain the market clearing conditions for each market. First,
the RES demand, Dress , is equal to the RES certificates of all generators, gresi .
Second, the energy demand, Dems,t , is equal to the offered energy of all generators
plus energy not-served, lems,t . Finally, the resulting capacity demand, as defined
by the consumer’s demand curve, must be equal to the offered capacity of all
generators. For all market clearings, either the excess demand or the price is
zero.
All market prices are bounded by an upper bound, i.e., price cap and a lower
bound, i.e., a floor price.
λem ≤ λems,t ≤ λ
em
, (νems,t , νems,t ), ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T , (6.11b)
λres ≤ λress ≤ λ
res
, (νress , νress ), ∀s ∈ S, (6.11c)
λcm ≤ λcms ≤ λ
cm
, (νcms , νcms ), ∀s ∈ S. (6.11d)
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6.4 ADMM-Based Methodology
for Risk-Averse Equilibrium
This section links the non-cooperative game formulation from Section 6.3
following the general formulation in Chapter 3, and an algorithmic approach
to compute a risk-averse equilibrium. The relationship between the standard
MCP reformulation and the ADMM-based algorithm is outlined. It describes
the necessary steps to ensure that the proposed algorithm converges to a NE.
6.4.1 ADMM to Compute an Equilibrium
In order to overcome computational difficulties that originate from the
introduction of the risk measures, this section proposes an algorithm inspired
by ADMM. It is modified to compute an equilibrium for the non-cooperative
game.
Typically, ADMM is used to solve optimization problems. It offers benefits if a
problem is separable in local optimization subproblems and is intended to blend
the decomposability of dual ascent with the superior convergence properties
of the method of multipliers [147]. ADMM is widely used in decentralized
optimization and is increasingly applied in machine learning, image processing,
and decentralized network operation, such as electricity distribution systems
or sensor networks [193, 194]. Briefly, the ADMM algorithm is designed for
problems of the following structure:
max
x,y
f(x) + g(y), (6.12)
s.t. Ax+By = c (λ) (6.13)
The optimization is assumed to be separable in the decision variables x and y,
except for the sharing constraint. λ denotes the dual variable of the constraint.
The iterative process updates the decision variables using the augmented
Lagrangian Lρ(x, y) that includes an additional second penalty term:
Lρ(x, y) = f(x) + g(y) + λ · (Ax+By − c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1st penalty term
+ ρ/2 · ||Ax+By − c||22︸ ︷︷ ︸
2nd penalty term
(6.14)
Decomposing the problem for the separable decision variables, one iteration
step for iteration k+1, k ∈ N∗ is:
xk+1 = argmin
x
Lρ(x, yk) (6.15)
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yk+1 = argmin
y
Lρ(xk, y) (6.16)
λk+1 = λk + ρ · (Axk+1 +Byk+1 − c) (6.17)
ρ describes a penalty factor used to tune the iterative process.
ADMM is known for its good convergence for both convex and also non-
convex optimization. Boyd et al. [147] provide a convergence proof for convex
problems, and more papers with extended convergence proofs for other classes
of optimization problems are available [195].
When the utility of each agent, except for the market operator, is summed up,
the non-cooperative game resembles a specific sharing problem: an optimal
exchange. The strategies of all agents are separable, except for the equality
constraints that resemble the market clearing conditions. The associated dual
variables λ match the decision variables of the market operator. Applying the
default ADMM notation, this has the following form:
max
xi
∑
i∈N
fi(xi), (6.18)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi = 0, (λ) (6.19)
The function fi can be interpreted as the utility function of agent i including its
constraints defining its set of strategy xi ∈ X . The following iterative process
can be derived [147] for iteration k+1, k ∈ N∗:
Update of all agents i ∈ N :
xk+1i = argmin
xi
Lρ(xi) (6.20)
with: Lρ(xi) = fi(xi) + λk · xi + ρ/2 · ||xi − (xki − xk)||22
and xk = 1|N |
∑
i∈N
xki
Price update:
λk+1 = λk + ρ · (
∑
i∈N
xk+1i ) (6.21)
Equally to an application of ADMM for distributed optimization, the mechanism
of iterative update steps for each agent and consequently of the price is used to
converge towards an equilibrium of the game. The exchange of information by
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Figure 6.5: Iterations of decentralized update process. This process of optimal
exchange ADMM is also described as a form of “tâtonnement”, “trial and error”
or price adjustment process [147].
the agents, i.e., operation decisions and market prices between the update steps
is shown in Figure 6.5.
There is no guarantee on the uniqueness of the found equilibrium. Whereas
in the simulations for the chapter’s case study the proposed algorithm always
converges to an equilibrium, the PATH solver based on MCP reformulation
can become instable. This is due to the non-convexity introduced by the
endogenous risk assessment of the agents [139, 196]. However, provided the
proposed algorithm converges, no agent has an incentive to deviate from its
decision and the market clearing conditions are satisfied. Hence, an equilibrium
is reached.
6.4.2 ADMM-Based Approach for the Equilibrium Problem
In order to use the proposed ADMM-based algorithm for computing an
equilibrium, the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT)-conditions of the market
equilibrium are basis for modifying the ADMM’s update steps. The resulting
optimality conditions of the update steps satisfy the KKT-conditions of the
market equilibrium. If the ADMM-based algorithm converges using the same
optimality conditions, the obtained result can be interpreted as the coinciding
equilibrium. This transfer from equilibrium problem to the ADMM-based
algorithm for distributed optimization is ensured by the specification of the
augmented Lagrangian of the generators Lρ,i, and consumer Lρ,c. It is adapted
such that the optimality conditions of minimizing the unaugmented Lagrangian
L0,i, L0,c match the equilibrium problem’s KKT-condition.
During the update step, the updated decision variables χk+1i , χk+1c are obtained
by minimizing the augmented Lagrangian. For the optimal exchange with a
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sharing constraint as described in Section 6.4.1, the augmented Lagrangian
function Lρ,i for each generator is at each iteration k+1, k ∈ N∗[147]:
χk+1i = argmin
χi∈Xi
Lρ,i(χi, λk) =
fi(χi, λk) + λk · χi + ρ/2 · ||χi − (χki − χk)||22, (6.22)
χk+1c = argmin
χc∈Xc
Lρ,c(χc, λk) =
fc(χc, λk) + λk · χc + ρ/2 · ||χc − (χkc − χk)||22, (6.23)
with: χk = 1|N + 1| ·
(∑
i∈N
χi + χc
)
(6.24)
The first penalty term is the multiplication of the sharing constraint’s dual
variable and the respective decision variable, the second is an expression of
the impact of the decision variable on the remaining imbalance of the sharing
constraint, weighted with a penalty factor ρ > 0. The augmented Lagrangian
Lρ,i in iteration k+1, given the prices λk, is minimized using a quadratic solver.
When the algorithm converges, the second penalty term becomes zero. To
make sure that the proposed algorithm converges to the same solution as one
would expect from the equilibrium problem, the optimality conditions of each
agent’s update step must be the same as the respective KKT conditions of an
MCP reformulation. Hence, the original agent’s objective function, Πi, (6.9a)
is modified such that the optimality conditions of the unaugmented Lagrangian
L0,i,∀i ∈ N (6.25) coincide with the respective KKT conditions. This is also
done for the objective of the consumer c (6.10) and L0,c. The augmented
Lagrangians for generators and consumer are provided in Appendix E.
Generators’ update
For the generators’ update step, the unaugmented Lagrangian for the risk-averse
generator looks is:
L0,i := γi ·
(
C invi · capi +
∑
s∈S
Ps
∑
t∈T
Ws,t · Cgi · gi,s,t
)
− (1− γi) · CV@Ri(χi, λMO)
− γi
∑
s∈S
Ps
(∑
t∈T
Ws,t · λems,t · gi,s,t
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+ λcms · capcmi,s + λress · gresi,s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
adapted 1st penalty term
(6.25)
s.t. constraints (6.9g)-(6.9l).
The unaugmented Lagrangian, L0,i, (6.25) can be read as the investment cost
and cost of generation (first row), the unchanged CV@Ri expression (second
row), and the first penalty term (third and fourth row). The modified objective
function represents the weighted (γi) sum of expected costs and the weighted
CV@Ri. The penalty term represents the revenues in the same way as they are
part of the agents’ profit, pii,s, in the utility function (6.9a). Compared to the
original ADMM algorithm, the first penalty term is adapted. It is now scaled
by the weighting γi, the exogenous probabilities Ps for each scenario and the
weight Wt of each time step.
As a result, the optimality conditions of the update step coincide with the KKT
conditions of the equilibrium problem. Consequently, an equilibrium found
by the proposed algorithm coincides with an equilibrium computed with the
MCP reformulation. For example, the optimality conditions resulting from
the unaugmented Lagrangian, L0,i, (6.25) and the utility function, Πi, (6.9a)
are compared for the offered energy, gi,s,t. For readability, the constraints
(6.9g)-(6.9l) are summarized by gi(χi) ≥ 0 and µi is assumed the associated
dual variable.
The optimality condition (6.26) can be interpreted as a condition for the prices
that justify energy output (gi,s > 0). In other words, a generator only offers
energy if, for a time step t in a scenario s, the energy price, λems,t , at least covers
the variable costs, Cgi . This is weighted with the exogenous probability, Ps, and
the endogenous valuation of each scenario, i.e., the risk-adjusted probabilities,
qi,s. They describe each generator’s weighted valuation of each scenario [192]:
0 ≤ ∂L0,i(χi, λMO)
∂gi,s,t
+µi · ∂gi(χi)
∂gi,s,t
⇔ 0 ≤ −∂Πi(χi, λMO)
∂gi,s,t
+µi · ∂gi(χi)
∂gi,s,t
⇔ 0 ≤Ws,t · (γi · Ps + qi,s) · (Cgi − λems,t ) +µi ·
∂gi(χi)
∂gi,s,t
⊥ gi,s,t ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , s ∈ S, t ∈ T . (6.26)
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Consumer’s update
Similarly, for the consumer’s update step, the unaugmented Lagrangian is:
L0,c := −
∑
s∈S
Ps ·
(∑
t∈T
Ws,t · λem · (Dems,t − lems,t )
+ 1/2 · λcm · (dcms +Dcms )
)
+
∑
s∈S
Ps
(∑
t∈T
Ws,t · λems,t · (Dems,t − lems,t )
+ 1/2 · λcms · (dcms +Dcms )︸ ︷︷ ︸
adapted 1st penalty term
)
(6.27)
s.t. constraints (6.10b)-(6.10c).
Also for the consumer, the optimality conditions of the update step coincide with
the KKT conditions of the equilibrium problem. For example, the optimality
conditions resulting from the unaugmented Lagrangian, L0,c, (6.27) and the
utility function, Πc, (6.10) are compared for the ENS, lems,t .
0 ≤ ∂L0,c(χc, λMO)
∂lems,t
+µc · ∂gc(χc)
∂lems,t
⇔ 0 ≤ −∂Πc(χc, λMO)
∂lems,t
+µc · ∂gc(χc)
∂lems,t
⇔ 0 ≤Ws,t · Ps · (λem − λems,t ) +µc ·
∂gc(χc)
∂lems,t
⊥ lems,t ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T . (6.28)
Price update – Market Operator MO
The prices are updated based on the remaining imbalance in the respective
market clearing conditions found after each iteration k. For example, the
price for energy, λem,k+1s,t , in the consecutive iteration, k+1, is reduced if there
is excess supply (
∑
i∈N gi,s,t + lems,t > Dems,t ), and vice versa (6.29a). This is
done accordingly for the capacity market (6.29b), and the RES target (6.29c).
The price update uses the remaining imbalance and the regularization terms
borrowed from the ADMM. It is restricted by the penalty factor, ρ.
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This update step emulates the utility function of the price-setting agents.
However, instead of obtaining the market prices as result of the market operator’s
optimization problem, the prices are found borrowing the iterative update step:
λem,k+1s,t = λ
em,k
s,t − ρ ·
(∑
i∈N
gi,s,t + lems,t −Dems,t
)
, ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T , (6.29a)
λcm,k+1s = λcm,ks − ρ ·
(∑
i∈N
capcmi,s − dcms
)
, ∀s ∈ S, (6.29b)
λres,k+1s = λres,ks − ρ ·
(∑
i∈N
gresi,s −Dress
)
, ∀s ∈ S. (6.29c)
A discussion on the choice of penalty parameters can be found in [147]. Typically,
it is tuned to the convergence behavior of the algorithm for the specific case to
optimize the computation time.
In case the market operator implements price caps or price floors for the market
prices, they can be incorporated in the price update step. Consequently, if
the update price would exceed or fall below a price limit, the price is adapted
accordingly.
Both approaches for computing a NE are summarized in Figure 6.6. Starting
from a model formulation of a unique non-cooperative game, the two paths to
compute the NE can be selected. The orange arrows show the required analogy
for the KKT conditions and ADMM-based iteration steps for an equilibrium to
coincide. Both approaches require different solver types (Section 3.5).
Stopping criteria
The iterative process is controlled by means of two stopping criteria for the
primal and dual residual, ψ and ψ˜. The algorithm stops if the primal and dual
stopping criteria simultaneously are below a threshold . The threshold  is
chosen based on the number of agents, scenarios and time steps [193]. Moreover,
it is parameterized with a parameter τ to control the algorithm based on the
desired precision:  = τ ·√(|N |+ 1) · |S| · |T |.
For each market clearing condition, the primal residual rk+1 is the remaining
imbalance in each scenario and time step if applicable:
rem,k+1s,t =
∑
i∈N
gk+1i,s,t + l
em,k+1
s,t −Dems,t , ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T , (6.30a)
rcm,k+1s =
∑
i∈N
capcm,k+1i,s − dcm,k+1s , ∀s ∈ S, (6.30b)
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Non-cooperative game
Market equilibrium
∀i ∈ N :
maxχi Πi(χi, λMO), maxχc Πc(χc, λMO), maxλMO ΠMO(λMO, χi, χc),
gi(χi) ≥ 0, (µi). gc(χc) ≥ 0, (µc). gMO(λMO) ≥ 0 (µMO).
Nash-Equilibrium
Reformulation
Mixed Complementarity Problem
Derive KKT-conditions
0 ≤ −∂Πi(χi,λMO)
∂χi
+ µi · ∂gi(χi)∂χi ⊥ χi ≥ 0
0 ≤ gi(χi) ⊥ µi ≥ 0
0 ≤ −∂Πc(χc,λMO)
∂χc
+ µc · ∂gc(χi)∂χc ⊥ χc ≥ 0
0 ≤ gc(χc) ⊥ µc ≥ 0
0 ≤ −∂ΠMO(λMO,χi,χc)
∂χMO
+ µMO · ∂gMO(χMO)∂χMO ⊥ χMO ≥ 0
0 ≤ gMO(χMO) ⊥ µMO ≥ 0
Solve square system
using e.g. PATH [146]
Proposed formulation
ADMM-based algorithm
Agents’ update steps
0 ≤ ∂Lρ,i(χi,λMO)
∂χi
+ µi · ∂gi(χi)∂χi ⊥ χi ≥ 0
0 ≤ gi(χi) ⊥ µi ≥ 0
0 ≤ ∂Lρ,c(χc,λMO)
∂χc
+ µc · ∂g(χc)∂χc ⊥ χc ≥ 0
0 ≤ gc(χc) ⊥ µc ≥ 0
Price update steps
λk+1MO = λkMO + ρ · (
∑
i∈N χ
k+1
i + χk+1c )
Solve quadratic problems
of agents’ update
using e.g. CPLEX
Figure 6.6: Matching of MCP reformulation and ADMM-based approach
rres,k+1s =
∑
i∈N
gres,k+1i,s −Dres, ∀s ∈ S, (6.30c)
ψk+1 = ||rem,k+1s,t ||2 + ||rcm,k+1s ||2 + ||rres,k+1s ||2. (6.30d)
In case an equilibrium is obtained, the imbalances on all market clearing
conditions converge to zero. Consequently, the primal stopping criterion ψk+1
is defined as the sum of the primal residuals normalized by an l2-norm (6.30d).
This approach follows Boyd et al. [147].
For each decision variable of each agent that is part of a market clearing
condition, a dual residual sk+1 is defined. It is a measure for the change of the
decision variable from the previous iteration to the current iteration:
sem,k+1i,s,t = ρ
[(
gk+1i,s,t − xem,k+1s,t
)
−
(
gki,s,t − xem,ks,t
)]
,
∀i ∈ N , s ∈ S, t ∈ T ,(6.32a)
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sem,k+1c,s,t = ρ
[(
lem,k+1s,t − xem,k+1s,t
)
−
(
lem,ks,t − xem,ks,t
)]
, ∀s ∈ S, t ∈ T ,(6.32b)
with: xem,ks,t =
1
|N + 1|
(∑
i∈N
gki,s,t + l
em,k
s,t
)
scm,k+1i,s = ρ
[(
capcm,k+1i,s − xcm,k+1s
)
−
(
capcm,ki,s − xcm,ks
)]
,
∀i ∈ N , s ∈ S,(6.32c)
scm,k+1c,s = ρ
[(
dcm,k+1s − xcm,k+1s
)
−
(
dcm,ks − xcm,ks
)]
, ∀s ∈ S,(6.32d)
with: xcm,ks =
1
|N + 1|
(∑
i∈N
capcm,ki,s − dcm,ks
)
sres,k+1i,s = ρ
[(
gres,k+1i,s − xres,k+1s
)
−
(
gres,ki,s − xres,ks
)]
,
∀i ∈ N , s ∈ S,(6.32e)
with: xres,ks =
1
|N + 1|
∑
i∈N
gres,ki,s
ψ˜k+1 =||sem,k+1i,s,t , sem,k+1c,s,t ||2 + ||scm,k+1i,s , scm,k+1c,s ||2 + ||sres,k+1i,s ||2. (6.32f)
The change is defined as the difference between the decision variable in iteration
k and k+1. It is corrected by the average value of the decision variables for
all agents. Hence, the residual is also linked to the change of the other agents.
It is valued with the penalty factor, ρ, in order to link the change in decision
variables to the change in prices. In case an equilibrium is obtained, the agents
do not have an incentive to deviate. Consequently, the change of each decision
variable of each agent also converges to zero.
Analogously to the primal stopping criteria, the dual stopping criterion ψ˜k+1 is
defined as the sum of the dual residuals normalized by an l2-norm (6.32f).
Simulations for small problems, show if the PATH solver finds an equilibrium,
the proposed methodology yields the same result. However, the experiments
show that the PATH solver fails to return a solution for larger problems in the
risk-averse environment. This is also described in [187]. In fact, the solving
process is terminated after several restarts by the solver returning an error. In
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Table 6.1: Setting design for the different market settings
Setting Markets Price cap RES Target Weighting CV@R
energy market target capacity demand mean-risk interval
EOM EOM, RES 300 -
20%
Not applicable γi = 0.5, βi ∈ [0, 1],
CCM EOM, RES, cCM 10000 e/MWh Dcm#s = max{Dems,t } ∀i ∈ N ∀i ∈ N
contrast, the proposed methodology reliably finds solutions for the given set of
experiments.
6.5 Model and Test System
The test system in this chapter is based on the one introduced in Section 4.2. The
input data to parameterize the generators uses the same data basis. Additional
data is introduced to set up multiple scenarios which vary in demand and RES
profiles. In this case study, two market settings are compared. The analysis
considers an EOM and a cCM. In what follows, first, the adaptations to the
modeling framework are discussed. Thereafter, the data basis for the case study
is summarized. Finally, implications of the assumptions and possible extensions
are described.
6.5.1 Modeling Framework and Scenario
The capacity expansion planning in this case study is also implemented as a
non-cooperative game (Figure 6.7).
As opposed to the previous case studies, this test system is placed in a stochastic
setting. The uncertainty parameters are the demand and availability of PV
and Wind in form of underlying RES profiles. All market participants are
located in a single market zone. In the market zone, markets for energy and
RES certificates are organized. A cCM is optional. Hence, two settings can be
distinguished based on the implementation of a cCM. Table 6.1 summarizes
their differences.
In addition, two sensitivity analyses are executed. First, the impact of the risk
aversion on the market outcome is studied. The interval of scenarios considered
in the CV@R, βi, is decreased from one (risk-neutral) to close to zero (worst-
case). This is done simultaneously for all conventional generators. As such, it
can also be interpreted as the risk aversion of the conventional generators in the
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Chapter 6
StochasticModel type
Energy-only market
RES certificates
Centralized capacity market
Market
mechanisms
Market operator
Generator
Consumer
Agents
IsolatedSpatialresolution
Risk-neutral
Risk-averse
Decision-making
Figure 6.7: Set up of the modeling framework
market. The case study models RES generators to be risk-neutral. This choice
is based on the assumption that the price for the RES certificates is sufficient.
The second sensitivity analysis is done for the price cap on the energy-based
market. It is varied from 300 to 10000e/MWh to compare the impact of risk
aversion to the impact of missing money due to capped prices in times of
scarcity.
6.5.2 Test System
Demand and market parameters
The differences in the scenarios and hence the uncertainty originate from the
different underlying profiles for load, wind and solar power. The case study
uses demand, solar and wind (onshore) profiles for 2013, 2014 and 2015 based
on Belgian data [160]. The scenarios are composed by combining the profiles
to a total of |S|=27 scenarios. For all model runs, each scenario has equal
probability Ps=1/|S|. In order to test the scalability of the algorithm, the
number of scenarios is varied between 1 and 27. Accordingly, the profiles and
probabilities are adjusted.
For each scenario, 5 or 10 representative days with associated weights are
selected. The selection is based on [148] and allows for the representation of a
full year with reduced profiles. Each day is split into hourly time steps, resulting
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Figure 6.8: Profiles for demand and RES from the Belgian system for 2013,
2014 and 2015 (based on [160])
in a total of |T |=120, respectively 240 time steps. Within each representative
day, the weight of each hour is equal. The demand and RES profiles are based
on 10 representative days (Figure 6.8).
In both settings, the energy market has a price cap of λem = 3000e/MWh. The
target for the RES certificates is set to 20% of the total energy demand. In
scenarios with a capacity market, the demand curve is determined by the target
capacity price, λcm# = 0.5 · C invPeak, and target capacity demand Dcm#, equal
to the peak demand of the respective scenario. The minimum and maximum
capacity demand Dcm, Dcm are set symmetrically at 97% and 103% of Dcm#
(Figure 3.10a).
Available Technologies
Three conventional generators (Base, Mid, Peak) and two RES generators
(PV , Wind) are available in the market (Chapter 4, Table 4.2). For RES, the
underlying profiles for the availability are as depicted in Figure 6.8.
All conventional generators have a weighting of the utility function γi = 0.5.
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Hence, the expected profit and the risk measure are weighted equally. The RES
generators have a weighting factor equal to one. As described above, they are
considered risk-neutral.
6.5.3 Implications for Results
Finally, some implications and possible developments for future case studies
can be highlighted. While the main objective of the presented case study is
to compare the different methodologies for computing an equilibrium, future
case studies could focus more on different market settings, and prioritize on the
design of the different scenarios to represent uncertainty that is perceived by
the market participants more accurate.
One adaptation could be the design of the scenarios. A more detailed study
could elaborate which demand and RES profile are realistic future outlooks.
Larger datasets with more historical time series could improve the case study
and result in an even more pronounced decision-making. Ideally, a similar
approach as applied for the representative days is used to select representative
years and assign weights, which in turn can be used to calculate probabilities.
Next to demand and RES profiles, one of the major sources of uncertainty is
the policy-making. As such, a case study that focuses on the uncertainty of,
for example, the chosen type of a CM or the capacity demand would be very
interesting for policy-makers. If the cost associated to undecided future policies
could be quantified, more profound discussion could be led. An additional
Belgian-specific case is the uncertainty about a nuclear phase-out and potential
lifetime extensions.
Moreover, the case study assumes a general risk aversion identical for all
technologies. However, the risk aversion could be better linked to the economic
characteristics of the technologies, i.e, their risk exposure. As such, a
differentiation among the market participants could be established. In turn,
this would reveal which technologies have the most benefits from a CM to
compensate for its risk. This can be extended to the modeling of companies
with multiple technologies in its portfolio as already indicated in Chapter 4.
Finally, additional steps could be taken with respect to the modeling of the
authorities and system operators. As discussed in Chapter 5, system operators
are assumed risk-averse if it comes to setting the capacity demand, or derating
of technologies. As highlighted in Chapter 5, an anticipating system operator
could be modeled together with a risk-averse decision-making. For example,
this would allow quantifying the cost of too conservative derating.
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6.6 Performance of ADMM-Based Methodology
In order to measure the performance of the developed ADMM-based
methodology, this section compares the methodology to the MCP reformulation.
The comparison uses indicators such as convergence, computation time, and
scalability1. It is done in a risk-neutral and risk-averse setting. The risk-neutral
setting is necessary because the MCP reformulation only provides reliable results
in this setting.
First, the convergence behavior of the ADMM-based methodology is analyzed.
Figures 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 illustrate the behavior of the algorithm for a risk-
averse case of 27 scenarios and 5 days. In this case, a total of 3713 iterations
are necessary to reach the stopping criteria. In general, each iteration takes
about the same time. The computation time per iteration strongly depends
on the number of scenarios and days. The number of iterations is subject to
the parameter ρ and the stopping criteria. The total computation time of this
example was 119 minutes. It was not possible to compute a NE with the MCP
formulation in this setting.
More in detail, Figure 6.9 shows that the installed capacities for all technologies
converge to a stable level already after relatively few iterations. The remainder
of the iterations, before the stopping criteria are reached, are spent on reducing
the imbalance to a minimum by adapting prices. Compared to the installed
capacities, the prices require more iterations to reach a stable level (Figure 6.10).
Two additional remarks can be made for the improvement of the computation
time. First, a scaling of the balancing constraints can further improve the
convergence behavior. In this case study, the balancing constraint for the RES
certificates is scaled due to the summation of the RES target over the time
period. It is scaled by 1/1752 based on 8760 hours and the RES target of 20%.
This scaling aligns all market clearing conditions to the same magnitude and
improves the price update step.
Second, and similar to the first approach, different step width could be
introduced via a market-specific or iteration-dependent penalty factor ρ.
However, this is not further explored. According to [147], a ρ should be chosen
such that the ratio between primal and dual residual is more or less constant
and close to 1. Experimentally, a constant penalty factor ρ=1.1 provided a
reliable and stable convergence towards an equilibrium for our case study.
1All computations are executed on an Intel i7 Quad Core at 2.7Ghz and 16GB RAM using
Julia 0.5 [155] including Complementarity [158] and JuMP [157], and the PATH 4.7 solver
[146].
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Figure 6.9: Convergence of the installed capacities for 27 scenarios and 5 days
in risk-averse setting before reaching stopping criteria.
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Figure 6.10: Convergence of selected prices for 27 scenarios and 5 days in
risk-averse setting before reaching stopping criteria.
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Figure 6.11: Primal ψ and dual stopping criteria ψ˜ for iteration k with stopping
criteria for 27 scenarios, 240 time steps (5 days) in the risk-averse setting.
Figure 6.11 shows the development of the norms for the primal ψ and dual ψ˜
residuals over the iterations. In addition, the graph shows that the local maxima
of the primal residual coincide with the local minima of the dual residual, and
vice versa: it depicts the price adaptation process and the reaction of agents to
the updated prices. Eventually, the process leads to an oscillating convergence
with continuously decreasing amplitude. The change in prices and in market
volumes decrease as the agents converge towards an equilibrium. The algorithm
stops if both residuals are simultaneously below the threshold .
Besides the fact that the algorithm reliably converges to a solution, it also
shows improvements in terms of computation time for an increasing number
of scenarios and/or representative days. Table 6.2 shows a comparison for
an increasing number of scenarios. For a limited number of scenarios, the
state-of-the-art PATH solver outperforms the implemented approach.
The reduction in computation time with growing number of scenarios is an
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Table 6.2: Comparison of computation time (in min) for PATH and developed
algorithm in risk-neutral (rn) and risk-averse (ra) settings.
Solver Scenarios 1 2 3 6 9 12 18 27
PATH 5d rn 0.45 2.43 7.11 25.03 57.59 14.67 99.36 326.1410d 1.14 6.90 21.89 15.81 42.27 119.74 367.87 *
ADMM-
based
approach
5d rn 2.66 2.84 24.11 7.77 7.73 40.74 19.40 47.98ra 2.81 29.26 12.97 14.00 17.97 30.10 20.11 118.93
10d rn 4.10 6.19 7.97 43.93 52.80 59.35 61.56 110.27ra 3.97 11.34 10.07 48.16 53.65 71.03 65.07 84.01
*: No solution, time limit reached after 720 min.
expected outcome of a decomposition algorithm. In fact, future work could
include further decomposition of the individual agent’s update step based on the
scenarios. Against expectations, the impact of risk-averse agents compared to
risk-neutral agents in terms of computation time is minor. Hence, the approach
is equally applicable in risk-neutral and risk-averse setting.
6.7 Impact of Capacity Mechanisms
on Risk-Averse Generators
Focusing on the outcome of the modeled case study, the results point out a
positive effect of a cCM in a risk-averse setting. The impact of risk aversion
is evaluated using the risk-adjusted expected cost and the installed capacities.
The risk aversion is altered along a decreasing β. As a reminder, the case study
examines a setting without and a setting with a cCM. The case study uses 27
scenarios and 10 representative days. All utility functions of the risk-averse
conventional generators are weighted with γi = 0.5,∀i ∈ {Base,Mid,Peak}.
The outcome is evaluated based on the Expected Energy Not Served (EENS).
The EENS is the sum of ENS weighted with the respective probability of the
scenario:
EENS =
∑
s∈S
Ps
∑
t∈T
Wt · lems,t [MWh] (6.33)
The risk-adjusted expected cost represents all incurred costs to the consumer in
the three markets plus the costs for ENS. The ENS is valued with a moderate
Value of Lost Load (VOLL) of 3000 e/MWh. It is set equal to the price cap
for energy:
Risk-adjusted expected cost =
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∑
s∈S
Ps
[∑
t∈T
Wt
(
VOLL · lems,t + λems,t ·
∑
i∈N
gi,s,t
)
+ λcms ·
∑
i∈N
capcmi,s + λress ·
∑
i∈N
gresi,s
]
[e] (6.34)
Assuming that the target capacity demand is parameterized properly, the case
study reveals the impact of different market parameters commonly linked to
the discussion of CMs. The findings are discussed using the following three
changing market parameters:
1. Impact of market design: EOM or cCM
2. Impact of increasing risk aversion in market (β)
3. Impact of a higher price cap for the energy-based market (λem)
Three Figures 6.12a, 6.12b, and 6.13 support the discussion. In all figures, the
x-axis displays the assumed level of risk aversion in the market reaching from
risk-neutral (β=1) to a very high level of risk aversion (β=0.1). The lines show
the relative (Figure 6.12) and the total (Figure 6.13) risk-adjusted expected
cost.
The total installed capacities for the risk-neutral case are shown in the stacked
bar plot on the left-hand side. For increasing risk aversion, the change in
installed capacity is calculated as share of the total installed capacity plus the
maximum ENS in the risk-neutral case. These changes are depicted on the
right-hand side of the figure by the stacked bars.
Figure 6.13 shows the results for the sensitivity analysis of the price cap, λem.
In order to compare the results, VOLL is set to the highest examined price cap,
i.e., 10000 e/MWh for all cases.
Energy-only market or centralized capacity market
Figure 6.12 shows the increasing expected consumer cost (dashed line) in a
more risk-averse context. With the given parameters for the capacity demand
curve, the capacity market shows a more beneficial outcome for risk-averse
market participants. The cost increase due to risk aversion with a cCM is only
5% compared to 17% with an EOM . For the EOM (Figure 6.12a) the results
show an increase in the EENS. Starting from a risk-neutral case with EENS due
to the price cap, the EENS further increases, which can be explained by the
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(a) Setting EOM without a centralized capacity market
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(b) Setting CCM with a centralized capacity market
Figure 6.12: Installed capacity per generator with increasing risk aversion
(decreasing β) relative to the risk-neutral (β=1) scenario. The risk-adjusted
expected cost for consumers aggregates all expenses of the 3 combined markets
plus the EENS valued at 3000 e/MWh. The price cap for energy is 3000
e/MWh.
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Figure 6.13: The effect of the energy-based price cap λem on the risk-adjusted
expected cost under different levels of risk aversion. EENS is valued at
10000e/MWh.
overall decrease of installed capacity. With a capacity market, EENS is avoided
for all levels of risk aversion (Figure 6.12b). The investment signals from the
capacity market remain sufficient even if the market participants become more
risk-averse. This can be explained by the additional revenue stream from a
capacity market that is available in all scenarios (while price spikes only occur
in some scenarios with scarcity). The impact of the difference in scenarios is
thus reduced and a more stable investment signal is provided.
Impact of risk aversion
In the same way, the impact of risk aversion on the risk-adjusted expected cost
can be analyzed. By comparing the dashed black and red lines in Figure 6.12
and Figure 6.13, it can be concluded that a market with a cCM is more resilient
to increased risk aversion than a market without a cCM.
For both settings, the cost increases with more risk aversion. A shift in the
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generation mix from Base and Mid towards Peak can be observed. This leads
to increasing operating costs eventually resulting in higher prices for energy. It
is Base and Mid capacity that leaves the market, as their risk exposure is higher
than for Peak because of the underlying cost structure for fixed and variable
costs. In the setting EOM , the resulting gap is filled by the Peak generator and
ENS.
For the Peak generator, changes are observed, which can be explained by
the variation in the amount of hours and levels of scarcity with increasing
risk aversion. Depending on the reaction of the competitive generators, it is
favorable to increase Peak capacity.
The capacity of Wind is not affected by the risk aversion despite the changing
behavior of the other generators as the RES target is not affected and the RES
certificate prices λres reach a sufficient level for all β. This also holds for the
setting with a capacity market.
For CCM, the total installed capacity does not decrease with increasing risk
aversion, i.e., no ENS occurs (Figure 6.12b). The unchanged capacity demand
curve leads to a full replacement of the Base and Mid capacity by Peak capacity
with lower fixed costs.
Note that the change for Base and Mid capacity is nearly the same in both
market settings. Thus, the capacity market has no direct impact on the decision
of Base and Mid. The cost difference is therefore linked to the difference in costs
for installing Peak capacity used to a limited extent and the costs associated
with EENS.
Already at a low level of risk aversion, the capacity market outperforms the
EOM . While risk aversion in the case of an EOM increases the risk-adjusted
expected cost by up to 17.8%, with a capacity market the cost increase is only
4.69% (Figure 6.12). In absolute numbers, this can also be seen from Figure 6.13
for the dashed black and red lines.
Impact of a higher energy-based price cap
Often, higher price caps are put forward to overcome the problem of inadequate
investments in an EOM. Three different price caps are tested. Next to the
default price cap of 3000 e/MWh, a very low (300 e/MWh) and a relatively
high price cap (10000 e/MWh) are tested. Figure 6.13 shows the risk-adjusted
expected cost for different price caps, λem, and increasing risk aversion. In
order to compare the results, the EENS is valued uniformly with a VOLL equal
to 10000 e/MWh for all tested price cap levels. In a market setting with a
cCM, the price never reaches the price cap. The energy-based price is limited
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to represent the operational cost (Chapter 4). Consequently, the results for the
cCM are independent of the chosen price caps.
For EOM , a low price cap (λem= 300e/MWh) leads to extremely high cost due
to very high volumes of EENS (cropped dotted line). This shows the extreme
mismatch between the VOLL and the price cap. A very low price cap certainly
leads to wrong incentives. In the case study, it merely serves to highlight the
change in result in the direction of lowered price caps.
In the other direction, a higher price cap does not have the same impact as
changing from an EOM to a capacity market. It is opposed to the stated
hypothesis at the beginning of the subsection. On the contrary, once a sufficient
high price cap is set, e.g. λem= 3000 e/MWh, a further increase to λem= 10000
e/MWh does not significantly improve the situation in terms of risk-adjusted
expected cost.
The reason is that, in contrast to leveling revenues across all scenarios in a
capacity market, increased price caps only affect outcomes with scarcity and high
prices. In a risk-averse market, the market participants value those scenarios
less. It can be concluded that for addressing investment signals in a risk-averse
market, capacity markets are more efficient than an increase of the price cap for
energy. The positive effect of a capacity market on risk-averse behavior through
providing stable revenues cannot be achieved by increasing scarcity pricing of
high residual demand.
6.8 Discussion
The purpose of the presented case study is primarily the assessment of the
proposed algorithm to compute risk-averse equilibria. The results for a market
setting with risk-averse investors only provides a first insight into how CMs can
reduce risk and overcome market distortions. Despite the constraints of the
case study, three elements can be highlighted as important findings.
First, the case study reveals how important the modeling of risk aversion in
decentralized decision-making is. In most modeling approaches today, a central
planner perspective is used to approximate risk-neutral or even risk-free decision-
making. This methodology and the resulting decision-making often differ from
observations in markets. Incorporating risk aversion allows for a more elaborate
assessment of the generators’ uncertainty such as operating hours. It allows
representing market participants’ preferences towards valuation of uncertain
market outcomes.
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Next, the sources of uncertainty should be extended beyond those of prices,
costs, RES and demand profiles. Examples for additional uncertainties are
policy-making, integration and harmonization of market rules, or technology-
choices based on regulation. The associated risks might have bigger impacts on
the decision-making.
The second important finding is that the positive impact of CMs is more visible
in a risk-averse market context. CMs overcome market distortions to the long-
term generation adequacy, as described in Section 2.2, especially in the context
of risk aversion. While the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 provide valuable insights
in how a CM affects the market, i.e., revenues changes and price adaptations,
the case study in Chapter 6 reveals the impact on the investor’s decision-making.
The results of the presented case study reveal the real value of a CM. Addressing
a long-term price signal, rather than price spikes in the energy or reserve market,
is the crucial element that helps reducing the risk of investors.
Finally, it is very important to have suitable tools to account for future market
developments. Suitable tools have two characteristics: First, the possibility to
model a multitude of market participants with different objectives. Second,
the possibility to account for subjective decision-making, e.g., in form of risk
aversion.
If the modeling choice falls on non-cooperative games and equilibrium models,
the proposed algorithm based on ADMM is suitable to reliably compute a
NE. The presented algorithm is an improved iterative process. The results
are very promising and trigger further appealing ideas that are worth to be
explored. Some ideas for improvements are the extensive use of parallelization,
asynchronous updating of decision-making, tuning of algorithm parameters, or
the further decomposition of the agent’s update step.
6.9 Conclusions
Uncertainties about demand levels, revenues, and market designs create major
risks for investment decisions. Risk aversion in capital-intensive investment
might lead to inadequate investments and might undermine generation adequacy
in the long-term. Electricity market models need to capture the interaction
of market design and risk aversion in order to assess effects for investments.
The objective of the work described in this chapter is to develop a modeling
framework that can account for this interaction. Three contributions can be
identified.
First, the model framework used throughout the thesis is extended to a stochastic
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market equilibrium and applied on a non-cooperative game. The role of
generators, price-elastic demand and a detailed modeling of the down-sloped
demand curve of the centralized Capacity Market (cCM) are incorporated.
The model combines investment decisions of generators with detailed market
operation for energy, Renewable Energy Sources (RES) certificates and
availability. In addition, the model formulation for the generator allows
accounting for risk-averse behavior by means of a risk measure. The Conditional
Value-at-Risk (CV@R) is chosen to represent the generators negative evaluation
of risk linked to outlooks with fewer profits.
Second, linked to the model development, mathematical challenges are
encountered to compute a risk-averse equilibrium for large-scale case studies
with standard Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) reformulations. In
order to overcome these challenges an innovative algorithm is proposed. Hence,
the thesis makes a contribution to the current applications of Alternating
Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) in the context of market equilibrium
models with risk-averse generation investment. The proposed algorithm is
suitable for computing a risk-averse equilibrium of a non-cooperative game
under non-restrictive assumptions. The computed solution coincides with
the MCP reformulation. Additionally, the algorithm reliably converges to a
solution, whereas the solver based on the MCP reformulation fails to compute
an equilibrium for larger models with risk-averse agents. Moreover, the ADMM
implicitly incorporates decomposition decreasing the computation time for
larger case studies. In addition, the proposed methodology is not limited to
non-cooperative games in capacity expansion planning but could also be applied
to other equilibrium models including risk measures.
Third, the modeling framework and the developed algorithm are used in a case
study to test the hypothesis that a cCM provides more beneficial outcomes
in a risk-averse market environment. The case study clearly indicates that
incorporating risk measures in the decision-making of investors in the context of
capacity mechanisms (CMs) is important. The results show that with increasing
risk aversion, paired with higher dependency on peak and scarcity pricing, a
cCM yields lower total cost at even lower levels of Energy Not Served (ENS).
The investment signals from the cCM remain sufficient even at very high risk
aversion. Moreover, the positive effect of a cCM on risk-averse behavior through
providing stable revenues cannot be evenly matched in an energy-only market
(EOM) by increasing the price cap in order to have scarcity pricing of high
residual demand.
Extensive case studies could provide valuable insights on other changing market
conditions. For example, because of the expected increasing share of RES,
the participation of RES in CMs, and their risk-averse investment decision-
making should be studied. In addition, uncertainties about disruptive events
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rather than uncertainty within a specific range should be tested in risk-averse
market settings. Most prominent examples are the regulation for technologies,
e.g., nuclear phase-out or subsidies schemes, or major changes to the market
framework itself, e.g., the introduction of a CM or the redesign of an existing
one.
Summarized, the research on long-term investments, combined with risk-averse
behavior, is crucial in order to understand the impact of market mechanisms
and possible market distortions due to uncertainty. The proposed algorithm
enables researchers to do so in a non-cooperative game setting.
In terms of development of the methodology, the level of decomposition in the
proposed algorithm can be further enhanced by decomposing the individual
agent’s update step along the scenarios. Consequently, an even higher number of
scenarios could be incorporated in the model. Alternatively, a higher temporal
resolution or more representative days could be incorporated. For example
an enhanced algorithm could be achieved by applying other decomposition
techniques in the agents’ update steps.
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7.1 Overview and Conclusions
The aim of this research is to get a better understanding of the working principle
of capacity mechanisms (CMs) and their impact on market participants. It
requires a coherent assessment of market frameworks including different types of
CMs. Therefore, the research examines the impact of a complementary CM for
all major actors in a power system including generation, transmission, storage
and demand.
The work described in the five chapters lead to a better understanding of the
role CMs play as complementary mechanisms in a market framework. The
following contributions and conclusions can be formulated:
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Modeling Framework for Capacity Mechanisms: The developed model-
ing framework is based on equilibrium models. It implements a capacity
expansion planning formulated as a non-cooperative game of agents in
both deterministic and stochastic setting. The agents are characterized
by individual and simultaneous decision-making. Consequently, it allows
simulating market-based competition of generators, storage operators,
interconnection operators and consumers. Equilibrium models allow to
capture deviations from the decision a central planner would take. As
such, it is a suitable tool to answer questions for future electricity markets
characterized by an increasing number of active market participants. At
the same time, the approach bridges the gap between well-established
long-term planning models based on optimization and economic models
focusing on the description of market mechanisms.
The thesis presents model formulations for five implementation concepts
of CMs, including capacity payments, strategic reserves, centralized and
decentralized capacity market, and reliability options. The obtained
results highlight that the different working principles require dedicated
model formulations.
Conclusions
The modeling framework includes investment decisions based on annualized
cost. They are justified with revenues from Renewable Energy Sources
(RES) certificates, flexibility markets, hourly energy markets and CMs.
The case studies clearly emphasize the importance to analyze revenue shifts
between markets triggered by an additional CM. Moreover, they reveal
the impact on technologies, both participating and non-participating in
the CM.
Impact of Capacity Mechanisms on Market Participants: The model-
ing framework is used in several case studies. Comparing market
frameworks with and without a CM, the results show that the difference
in average cost of electricity supply is small. At first sight, this follows the
theory that CMs only trigger a shift in remuneration. However, the cost
difference is increasing if two factors are neglected. First, energy-based
prices should decrease because part of the cost is covered via the CM.
Second, participation rules should not exclude technologies that could
actually contribute to generation adequacy. This is especially important
given the increasing shares of RES and demand response.
Furthermore, determining the capacity demand remains critical. Setting
the capacity demand is a trade-off between risk of Energy Not Served
(ENS) and paying for too much capacity. Risk-averse authorities tend
towards the second option. However, only if consumers individually
express their value for reliability, authorities are relieved from this task.
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Having chosen for a CM, it is important to understand the differences
between a targeted and a market-wide mechanism. A targeted mechanism,
such as strategic reserves (SR), has a single purpose and its impact is
limited to the participating capacity providers. The contracted capacity
is locked in the SR. Consequently, the technologies cannot provide other
required services based on market signals. This causes inefficiencies unique
to the targeted CMs. Alternatively, market-wide mechanisms such as
the centralized Capacity Market (cCM) affect both participating and
non-participating technologies. The market signals from the different
markets are clearly separated and the contribution to generation adequacy
has a transparent market signal via the CM. In the same way, CMs reduce
the dependency on scarcity pricing for all market participants. Assuming
risk-averse investors, this effect is even amplified.
In markets with CM, non-participating RES get an incentive to invest
in technologies with lower investment cost per energy, rather than
technologies whose intermittent profiles correlate with the demand. For
storage and demand response, the incentives from price differences are
reduced. Demand response and storage, also in combination with RES,
could regain incentives via the participation in a CM.
Role of Capacity Mechanisms in an Interconnected Market: Indepen-
dent of cross-border participation, two remarks are important in a multi-
zonal context. First, products traded in adjacent markets, which appear to
reflect the same value, might trigger different price signals. Energy-based
prices in a market zone with CM do not necessarily reflect the value of
availability, while in an energy-only market (EOM), they certainly should.
Second, in case of limited overall investments, CMs in neighboring markets
might engage into a competition for the most attractive price signals.
Similar to the harmonization process in the Internal Energy Market (IEM),
convergence of CMs offers certain benefits. Starting from a common
assessment of generation adequacy is the basis for the discussion on
interconnected CMs. The case study highlights two important elements.
First, neglecting the market response to CMs in neighboring markets when
deciding on a domestic CM leads to negative effects. Yet, anticipating
the market response is far from trivial. Experience and coordination
should help reducing negative effects. Second, facilitation of cross-border
participation is required by European market rules, yet unclear. This
should also happen in a coordinated approach so that additional benefits
can be reaped. The current developments show that the need for CMs in
European markets can be substantiated and their implementations can
comply with State Aid regulations. The European Commission should
pursue the current principles put forward in the sector inquiry report
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and insist on complying with the Internal market rules as effectively as
possible.
The determination of capacity demand and the derating of the cross-
border contribution also require a trade-off between risk of ENS and
overpaying, but in an interconnected context. A too strict derating
leads to increased cost because part of the contribution from capacities
to generation adequacy is neglected. Thus, the missing contribution
must be provided by other capacities. In contrast, a too loose derating
undermines the functioning of the CM because capacity is offered above
its contribution. This results in excessive supply, which depresses prices
and voids the working principles of the CM.
Note that even with CMs in place, national generation adequacy is neither
pursued nor a desirable approach. CMs should not be a means to
undermine the harmonization process. Instead, they should remain a
market mechanism to facilitate adequate investments when, due to shared
assets, scarcity prices become more and more uncertain.
Methodology to Compute a Risk-Averse Equilibrium: A new algorithm
is proposed to compute a risk-averse equilibrium for the non-cooperative
games. For the research of future electricity markets, with or without a
CM, the algorithm offers appealing benefits. These benefits include
the possibility to use a multitude of different agents thanks to the
decomposition of the model. More important, it offers reliable and stable
computation results. This becomes even more relevant as new individual
market participants will be included, such as aggregators, investors on
residential level, etc., whose subjective decision-making is biased by their
own perception of market signals.
If risk-averse decision-making is considered, the risk-reducing effects of
a CM become more visible. Therefore, the valuation of uncertainty
originating from prices, cost, or policy-making is critical in the discussion
of CMs. If a CM is in place, the market outcome is less affected by risk
aversion. CMs are more effective than increasing price caps. In a setting
with uncertainty, spreading the revenues outweighs the effects of increased
scarcity prices. From a systems perspective, a CM outperforms an EOM
because it results in lower costs and no ENS already for a low risk aversion
in the market.
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7.2 Recommendations for Stakeholders
Rather then proposing a unique mechanism, the doctoral research identifies
several aspects to be considered by policy makers: Should a market implement
a CM or are there alternatives like operation reserves demand curve (ORDC),
price adders to signal scarcity at an earlier stage, or even individual contracting
of capacity? While this work’s focus is solely on different CMs, many credible
researchers highlight the benefits of those alternatives. The common element
of all options is to alter the value of availability from a rarely occurring,
indistinct signal into an explicit and visible market signal for all participants.
If choosing for one of those approaches, which concepts should be used as
blue print? How do we assess potential capacity providers? And finally, how
should the mechanism act in an interconnected context? In reality however, the
decision of policy makers begins with a trade-off between an increased generation
adequacy on the one hand, and economic inefficiencies due to surplus capacities
or overpaying on the other hand. Inevitably, policy makers must position
themselves on the scale between economic efficiency and ensured generation
adequacy. Equally important is a clear communication thereof. The case
studies show that uncertainties and risk-averse market participants have a
bigger influence on the market outcome than implementation details about
participation rules or cross-border participation. Obviously, this does not imply
that from the perspective of certain emerging technologies like aggregated RES
and storage applications, participation rules are not of vital importance.
Leaning towards economic efficiency and reluctant to introduce a CM requires
that the energy-based price to be the adequate market signal necessary for
investors. Valuing security of supply in the energy market implies the acceptance
of occasional large price spikes. They would even be necessary if demand
flexibility would take up a more decisive role or if scarcity pricing is put in
place. With more RES offering energy close to zero marginal cost, the generally
lower energy price would require even more extreme scarcity signals to attract
investments.
It is often argued that prioritizing generation adequacy and tending to accept
increased costs more than ENS is unavoidable with the implementation of a
CM. However, the research has shown that a CM can be the more efficient
solution. Choosing for a CM is not a fit-and-forget solution. As any other
market mechanism, it requires monitoring and periodic updates. If chosen to
implement a CM, the market-based mechanism should reveal the consumers’
value of generation adequacy and the suppliers’ contribution to generation
adequacy. In the end, a CM could be a vehicle for (aggregated) end-consumers
to express their willingness-to-pay and for capacity providers to disclose their
own reliability. Involving consumers in determining the demand offers benefits.
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Demand flexibility can be valued for their contribution, either in form of
aggregated demand response or individual capacity subscriptions. Accessibility
of the mechanism for all capacity providers requires an assessment of the
individual technologies. However, developments like reliability options ask each
market participant to individually reveal its own assessment. Combinations
of technologies, like storage and RES, might offer contributions that are
not achievable separately. More transparency about available capacities
would support the discussion on further necessary investments. Ideally, these
developments of the mechanism are based on a stakeholder process where design
elements are chosen such that all technologies can be exploited.
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research
In order to round off the thesis, the recommendations for future research related
to CMs are suggested. They are recommendations collected during the course
of the research that could not fit in the scope of this thesis. For each stated
recommendations, a possible development is proposed.
First, in the current work, the design and configuration of the CMs are
imposed conditions of the scenarios. At the same time, considering the market
participants’ response to the CM is stated very important. In future research, the
role of the central authorities and system operator should be more emphasized.
In most CMs, the value of reliability, translated into a capacity demand, is the
result of an assessment done by central authorities and/or system operator.
This should be done assuming the reaction of market participants. Extending
the model framework to a hierarchical decision-making of market actors could
shed a light on the discussion from two directions: Which CM should a central
authority choose if the reaction from market participants could be better or
worse anticipated (with uncertainty)? In turn, how should market participants
act anticipating that central authorities have a preference to avoid ENS? In
addition, this should be supported with a dynamic modeling of the markets
over several years. As such, the CM and the capacity demand is subject to new
investments that materialize over the years. Currently, this is a drawback of the
model framework that could bridge the gaps to other more dynamic modeling
approaches, including agent-based modeling and system dynamics.
Second, an extension of the modeling framework could zoom in on the
individual decision-making and uncertainties. The presented case study included
uncertainties about the demand and the realization of RES. Consequently,
the outcome for the market participants varies only slightly between the
scenarios. Modeling decision-making based on scenarios with and without
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the implementation of CMs could result in more divergent outcomes. This
could help to understand how market participants position themselves prior
to a decision of the policy makers. Other uncertainties influence the decisions
in the short-term operation of the power system and, hence, the activation of
contracted reserves, i.e., flexibility. Several studies have shown that the revenues
from these markets can be decisive for an investment in flexible technologies.
Extending the formulation of the problem to a two-stage model could be an
evolution of the modeling framework. Such an extension could combine decisions
in investments and market clearing with a physical realization including the
activation of reserves.
Third, the current work assumes a one-to-one mapping of technologies on
individual agents. However, market participants typically have multiple
technologies at their disposal and can benefit from portfolio effects. Addressing
participation rules of CMs, storage, demand response, RES, as well as combined
portfolios could contribute to generation adequacy and should therefore be
remunerated via CMs. This emphasizes the coherent assessment of contribution
to generation adequacy. In addition, a relaxation of the fixed derating of
capacities, as exogenous parameter, towards an endogenous decision-making
of market participants could be possible. For example, interesting findings are
expected from model frameworks that include more details on the delivery of
firm capacity. Penalties for non-delivery could build further on the model for
Reliability Options. In general, opening CMs to all possible contributors is
crucial for the reduction of wrong incentives from price signals.
Fourth, the harmonization process of CMs is only described in an initial stage.
Implementing CMs in interconnected market zones, or at least complying with
the market rules of the IEM, are on the agenda of policy makers. Beyond
the common approach to system adequacy and shared assessment of capacity
providers, the research of CMs should be further elaborated. A coordinating
role on European level to define markets and targets including the capacity
demand extends the above-described role of central authorities. The spatial
extent of a European CM, i.e., the reach of non-domestic capacity contributing
to system adequacy, is to be defined. This topic is linked to the discussion of
derating capacities, considering bottlenecks in interconnection and generation.
This raises the questions of necessary local price signals from CMs to address
target-oriented investments. In terms of model developments, the case study
on multi-zonal markets could be extended. The study of different approaches
for the determination of derating non-domestic capacity providers, eventually
including grid constraints, would be very important to understand the value of
both generation and interconnection.
Finally, the discussion on CMs is linked to a large extent to the current hurdles
for end-consumers (conceptual, technical, and regulatory) to express their value
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for generation adequacy or security of supply. Until consumers are fully capable
to express their value, the current designs of CMs can be an intermediate step. As
long as Capacity Subscriptions remain a academic example, this responsibility
is still aggregated by a central entity, being the authority or retailers, in
implementations today. If long-term adequacy loses the perception of being a
public good, consumers will be required to find a value for reliability. Experiences
from similar research on capacity-based transmission and distribution tariffs
could be extended to end-consumers price components addressing adequacy, and
more generally speaking security of supply. The role of more specific consumer
groups and their access to innovative technologies should be more emphasized
in the research of CMs.
Appendix A
Additional Formulations for
Capacity Mechanisms
This section briefly covers additional mathematical formulations developed
to cover CMs not analyzed in-depth in the thesis. It includes mathematical
formulations for capacity payments, reliability options, and a decentralized
capacity market. This chapter only covers the mathematical formulations for
agents that differ to models presented in the thesis. Additional necessary
parameters and variables are listed in the additional nomenclature.
Additional Nomenclature
Parameters
λcp Capacity payments e/MW
λro,s Strike price for reliability options e/MWh
Decision Variables
λro Market price for contracted reliability options e/MW
Dual Variables
βcmp,t Dual for minimum capacity demand e/MW
µrop,t Dual for minimum price compensation -
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A.1 Capacity Payments
The mathematical formulation for capacity payments only affects the generators.
The other agents can be taken from the energy-only market model.
Generator (Gi)i∈N
An additional payment, λcp, is received by each generator based on its installed
capacity. The payment is a model parameter and case-dependent. For example,
it can be altered per underlying technology given a derating of the installed
capacity. The constraints that defines the set of strategy is not affected.
Consequently, the model formulations only relies on an adapted utility function
(A.1). Formally, it is written as follows:
max
χi∈Xi
Πi(χi, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
(λemp,t − Cgi ) · gi,p,t
]
+ λres · gresi
+
∑
p∈P
Wp · (λrrp · rrri,p + λrrp · rrri,p )
− (C invi − λcp) · capi, (A.1)
s.t.
additional constraints (3.7b)-(3.7j).
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A.2 Reliability Options
The mathematical formulation for reliability options builds on the model
for a capacity market. Direct changes are necessary for the generators and
the consumer to capture the transfer of compensation payments, λrop,t, if the
price exceeds the strike price, λro,s. The other agents can be taken from the
formulation for the centralized capacity market. The market clearing for capacity
is to be interpreted as the auction for the options resulting in a options premium,
λcm received by the generators.
Generator (Gi)i∈N
Generators receive revenues for selling the options depend on the cleared option
premium, λcm (third line). The model changes for the generators include
the introduction of a compensation that is to be paid by the generators if
the energy-based price, λemp,t , exceeds the exogenous strike price, λro,s. The
resulting compensation, λrop,t, is an additional cost (fourth line) in the utility
function of the generator. It is the compensation payment multiplied with the
offered capacity, i.e., sold options, capcmi . Hence, it is independent of the actual
generation in the given time step. Formally, the utility function changes to the
following:
max
χi∈Xi
Πi(χi, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
(λemp,t − Cgi ) · gi,p,t
]
+ λres · gresi
+
∑
p∈P
Wp · (λrrp · rrri,p + λrrp · rrri,p )
+ λcm · capcmi
−
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
λrop,t · capcmi
]
− C invi · capi, (A.2a)
s.t.
additional constraints (3.7b)-(3.7i),(3.12b)-(3.12c).
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Consumer c
The consumer receives the compensation from all generators that have sold
options. This adds an additional revenue for the consumer. However, it is
not linked to its decision variables. Consequently, the same mathematical
formulation as for the centralized capacity market can be used to derive the
Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT)-conditions. However, the total cost should take
these payments into account in a post-processing step.
Auxiliary to determine level of compensation payment
In order to calculate the compensation payment in each time step, an additional
constraint needs to be added. Formally, the compensation payment is the
difference between the energy-based price and the strike price, if the energy-
based price is higher than the strike price. The following reformulation can be
added to the model of the market operator, who formally also determines the
compensation payment, λrop,t:
λrop,t = max
p,t
{λemp,t − λro,s, 0} ⇐⇒
λrop,t ≥ λemp,t − λro,s, (µrop,t), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (A.2b)
λrop,t ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (A.2c)
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A.3 Decentralized Capacity Market
Finally, the model for the decentralized capacity requires the adaptation of
the market operator’s and the consumer’s model formulation. The model
formulation for generators can be taken from the centralized capacity market.
Market Operator MO
For the market operator, a market clearing needs to be integrated that matches
the served capacity demand, dcm, and the offered capacity from the generators,
capcmi . In case of insufficient supply, the gap is filled by not served capacity,
lcm. The market operator determines the associated price for capacity, λcm.
Formally, the utility function is as follows:
min
λMO∈XMO
ΠMO(λMO, χi, χSO, χc)
=
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
λemp,t ·
(
demp,t −
∑
i∈N
gi,p,t − dchp,t + chp,t
)
+ λres · (Dres −∑
i∈N
gresi
)
+ λcm · (dcm − lcm −∑
i∈N
capcmi
)
+
∑
p∈P
Wp ·
[
λrrp · (Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p ) + λrrp · (Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p )
]
(A.3a)
s.t.
additional constraints (3.11b)-(3.11e),(3.15b).
The decentralized element of the mechanism is captured in the link of the capacity
demand, dcm, with the peak energy demand of the individual consumers (A.4c).
This represents the characteristic of the mechanism that the demand is not set
by a central authority, but it comes forth from the decentralized consumers
based on a pre-defined methodology. Here, a simple methodology is assumed,
namely that the capacity demand must cover the peak demand. By reducing
their peak energy consumption, consumers can reduce their capacity demand
as well.
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Consumer c
The model formulation for the consumer is adapted to reflect the behavior of
the demand side as illustrated in Figure 2.18b and 2.18c. The capacity demand,
dcm, is a decision variable and depend on demand on the energy-based market.
In particular, the capacity demand must cover the peak energy demand, demp,t ,
plus the upward reserve requirement, Drrp , in all time steps. This is covered
by the additional constraint (A.4c). Because the energy demand is modeled
price-elastic, the consumer makes a trade-off between an increased surplus
from served energy demand and decreasing energy peak demand to reduce the
capacity demand. As a result, both markets are interlinked, which especially
affects the peak demand levels.
max
χc∈Xc
Πc(χc, λMO) =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
1/2 · (λem − λemp,t) · (demp,t +Demp,t )
+ (λcm − λcm) · (dcm − lcm) (A.4a)
s.t.
demp,t + lemp,t = (λemp,t − λem,0p,t )/Eem, (βemp,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (A.4b)
dcm ≥ (demp,t + lemp,t )/Lh +Drrp , (βcmp,t ), ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (A.4c)
demp,t , l
em
p,t , d
cm, lcm ∈ R+, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (A.4d)
Appendix B
Modeling Downward Sloped
Demand Curves
This chapter describes a model adaptation to handle piecewise-linear downward
sloped demand curves with one or more break points. It is shown here for one
break point. The method was published in [69].
Due to the piecewise-linear demand curve, the function describing the capacity-
based consumer surplus is not convex. Mathematically, the definition of the
consumer surplus is split into two parts at the level of the target price λcm#.
Each of the two parts CScmup and CScmlow corresponds to either the upper or lower
part of the demand curve. The objective function results in maximizing the
sum of both parts extended with a penalty term which is discussed later in the
model description. This is visualized in Figure B.1.
CScm = CScmup + CScmlow − cmd · dcm + cmλ · (λcmup + λcmlow). (B.1a)
For the purpose of modeling the non-convex consumer surplus, auxiliary decision
variables must be introduced for each of the parts. There are auxiliary variables
for demand (dcmup , dcmlow), unserved demand (lcmup , lcmlow), and prices (λcmup , λcmlow). Note
that the presented formulation is generalizable to more partitioned demand
curves by extending the set of auxiliary decision variables respectively. Similarly,
it could also be applied for the energy-based market to represent different levels
of price response.
For each part, the sum of served (dcmup , dcmlow) and unserved demand (lcmup , lcmlow)
must match the corresponding part of the demand curve given the price λcm.
Figure B.1 shows the chosen served and unserved demand for prices in either
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Figure B.1: Piecewise-linear demand curve. The demand curve consists of a
lower and upper part and is defined around the two break points. The left
subplot shows the model outcome for a price lower than the target price. The
right subplot shows the model outcome for a price higher than the target price.
of the two parts. Each part is defined by a slope (Ecmup , Ecmlow) and an intercept
(λcm,0up , λ
cm,0
low ):
dcmup + lcmup = λcm/Ecmup − λcm,0up /Ecmup , (B.1b)
with Ecmup =
λcm# − λcm
Dcm# −Dcm and λ
cm,0
up = λ
cm − Ecmup ·Dcm,
dcmlow + lcmlow = λcm/Ecmlow − λcm,0low /Ecmlow, (B.1c)
with Ecmlow =
0− λcm#
Dcm# −Dcm and λ
cm,0
low = 0− Ecmlow ·D
cm
.
Each part of consumer surplus CScmup , CScmlow is limited by a maximum. The
maximum occurs if the price λcm is lower than the minimum price of the
respective part. In other words, (B.1d) becomes a binding constraint if the
price λcm is lower than λcm#. Analogously, the maximum consumer surplus
CScmlow is reached if the price λcm is zero. The constraints are as follows:
CScmup ≤ 1/2 · (λ
cm − λcm#) · (Dcm# +Dcm), (B.1d)
CScmlow ≤ 1/2 · (λcm# − 0) · (D
cm +Dcm#). (B.1e)
The price λcm is either linked to a demand in the upper part, i.e., λcm between
λcm# and λcm, or the lower part, i.e., lower than λcm#. Consequently, each
consumer surplus is limited by the following respective constraint. Here, the
auxiliary prices (λcmup , λcmlow) are necessary to avoid the model to become infeasible
if for example the price λcm is above the target price and (λcm#−λcm) becomes
MODELING DOWNWARD SLOPED DEMAND CURVES 237
negative and consequently CScmup smaller than 0:
CScmup ≤ 1/2 · (λ
cm − λcmup ) · (dcmup +Dcm), (B.1f)
CScmlow ≤ 1/2 · (λcm# − λcmlow) · (dcmlow +Dcm#). (B.1g)
The auxiliary prices are constraint by the price, λcm, and the applicable
maximum price (λcm or λcm#) in each part. The corresponding penalty term
in the objective sets the auxiliary prices to the highest possible value at the
same time ensuring that none of the consumer surpluses becomes negative:
λcmup ≤ λcm, (B.1h)
λcmup ≤ λ
cm
, (B.1i)
λcmlow ≤ λcm, (B.1j)
λcmlow ≤ λcm#. (B.1k)
Finally, the resulting capacity demand dcm must be chosen to be larger than the
two auxiliary demands (dcmup , dcmlow). With the proposed formulation the capacity
demand is not upward bounded, hence the penalty term is necessary to let the
model choose dcm smallest. This ensures that dcm is located on the correct
sloped demand curve and ensured by the following constraints:
dcm ≥ dcmup , (B.1l)
dcm ≥ dcmlow, (B.1m)
dcm, dcmup , d
cm
low, l
cm
up , l
cm
low, CS
cm
up , CS
cm
low, λ
cm
up , λ
cm
low ∈ R+. (B.1n)
The penalty factors (cmd , cmλ ) must be chosen properly to drive the consumer
surplus to the correct value. In the case study, we chose the factors to be
cmd = 0.1 and cmλ = 105.
Figure B.2 shows the resulting consumer surplus CScm calculated with changing
cmd and cmλ . The results of our simulations emphasize that cmλ must exceed a
certain minimum value, while cmd must be chosen small to obtain the correct
value of the summarized CScmup and CScmlow given the obtained price λcm and
demand dcm (purple surface, bottom-right in Figure B.2).
Both parameters cmd and cmλ must scale the values in the penalty term, related
to the auxiliary prices λcmup , λcmlow and the demand dcm relative to the expected
range of values for the consumer surplus. This range depends on the model
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parameter and can be calculated upfront given the shape of the demand curve.
A good guideline for minimum value of cmλ is the factor between the expected
range of consumer surplus and the range of capacity-based prices making the
terms for the consumer surplus and the auxiliary prices the same order of
magnitude. The impact of cmd can be kept small, hence a small cmd should be
chosen. A too big cmd would again make the solution deviate from the desired
result (cfr. blue and purple area in Figure B.2).
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Figure B.2: Sensitivity analysis on model penalty parameters cmd and cmλ
for a set price λcm = 15 104e/MW. The purple surface on the bottom right
corresponds to the consumer surplus using the parameters of the case study.
Appendix C
Mixed Complementarity
Problem Reformulation
This chapter provides the Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP)-reformulation
for the three market settings discussed in detail in the thesis. For each of the
agents, the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT)-conditions are provided.
C.1 Energy-only Market
The MCP-reformulation for the energy-only market yields the following squared
set of equations. The equations are grouped per agent.
C.1.1 Generator (Gi)i∈N
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the generator’s strategy,
χi = (capi, gi,p,t, rrri,p , rrri,p , gresi ) ∈ Xi, are as follows:
0 ≤C invi −
∑
p∈P
∑
t∈T
[
Rhi · (ρem,i,p,t + ρem,i,p,t ) · Lh
+Ai,p,t · µemi,p,t · Lh + µrr gi,p,t
]
−Rrri ·
∑
p∈P
[
F rri · µrri,p + F rri · µrri,p
]⊥ capi ≥ 0, (C.1a)
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0 ≤Wp · (Cgi − λemp,t)−Wp · F resi · µresi
+ ρem,i,p,t − ρem,i,p,t+1 − ρem,i,p,t − ρem,i,p,t+1
+ µemi,p,t − µrr gi,p,t/Lh − µrr gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.1b)
0 ≤µrri,p +
∑
t∈T
µrr gi,p,t − λrrp ⊥ rrri,p ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, (C.1c)
0 ≤µrri,p +
∑
t∈T
µrr gi,p,t − λrrp ⊥ rrri,p ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, (C.1d)
0 ≤µresi − λres ⊥ gresi ≥ 0. (C.1e)
The constraints of the primal model formulation and the associated dual variables
result in the following conditions:
0 ≤ − gi,p,t +Ai,p,t · capi · Lh ⊥ µemi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.1f)
0 ≤ − gi,p,t + gi,p,t-1 +Rhi · capi · Lh⊥ ρem,i,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.1g)
0 ≤ gi,p,t − gi,p,t-1 +Rhi · capi · Lh ⊥ ρem,i,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.1h)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + F rri ·Rrri · capi ⊥ µrri,p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, (C.1i)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + capi − gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ µrr gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.1j)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + F rri ·Rrri · capi ⊥ µrri,p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, (C.1k)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ µrr gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.1l)
0 ≤ − gresi + F resi
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
gi,p,t ⊥ µresi ≥ 0. (C.1m)
C.1.2 Consumer c
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the consumer’s strategy,
χc = (demp,t , lemp,t ) ∈ Xc, are as follows:
0 ≤ −
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
1/2 · (λem − λemp,t) + βemp,t ⊥ demp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.2a)
0 ≤βemp,t ⊥ lemp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (C.2b)
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The constraints of the primal model formulation and the associated dual variables
result in the following conditions:
0 = − demp,t − lemp,t + (λemp,t − λem,0p,t )/Eem, βemp,t ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (C.2c)
C.1.3 Storage Operator SO
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the storage operator’s
strategy, χSO = (chp,t, dchp,t, p, e) ∈ XSO, are as follows:
0 ≤Wp · λemp,t + µchp,t
− ηch · βep,t −Wp · ηch · βe# ⊥ chp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.3a)
0 ≤ −Wp · λemp,t + µdchp,t
+ βep,t/ηdch +Wp · βe#/ηdch ⊥ dchp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.3b)
0 ≤C inv,p −
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
(µchp,t + µdchp,t ) · Lh⊥ p ≥ 0, (C.3c)
0 ≤C inv,e −
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
µep,t ⊥ e ≥ 0. (C.3d)
The constraints of the primal model formulation and the associated dual variables
result in the following conditions:
0 ≤µep,t + βep,t − βep,t+1 ⊥ ep,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.3e)
0 ≤ − chp,t + p · Lh ⊥ µchp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.3f)
0 ≤ − dchp,t + p · Lh ⊥ µdchp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.3g)
0 ≤ − ep,t + e ⊥ µep,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.3h)
0 = − ep,t + ep,t-1 + chp,t · ηch − dchp,t/ηdch, βep,t ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.3i)
0 =
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
[
chp,t · ηch − dchp,t/ηdch
]
, βe# ∈ R. (C.3j)
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C.1.4 Market Operator MO
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the market operator’s
strategy, λMO = (λemp,t , λres, λrrp , λrrp ) ∈ XMO, are as follows. For readability,
the price floors and caps are omitted:
0 = demp,t −
∑
i∈N
gi,p,t − dchp,t + chp,t, λemp,t ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.4a)
0 =Dres −
∑
i∈N
gresi , λ
res ∈ R, (C.4b)
0 =Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p , λ
rr
p ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, (C.4c)
0 =Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p , λ
rr
p ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P. (C.4d)
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C.2 Centralized Capacity Market
The MCP-reformulation for the centralized capacity market yields the following
squared set of equations. The equations are grouped per agent.
C.2.1 Generator (Gi)i∈N
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the generator’s strategy,
χi = (capi, capcmi , gi,p,t, rrri,p , rrri,p , gresi ) ∈ Xi, are as follows:
0 ≤C invi − F cmi · µcmi −
∑
p∈P
∑
t∈T
[
Rhi · (ρem,i,p,t + ρem,i,p,t ) · Lh
+Ai,p,t · µemi,p,t · Lh + µrr gi,p,t
]
−Rrri ·
∑
p∈P
[
F rri · µrri,p + F rri · µrri,p
]⊥ capi ≥ 0, (C.5a)
0 ≤Wp · (Cgi − λemp,t)−Wp · F resi · µresi
+ ρem,i,p,t − ρem,i,p,t+1 − ρem,i,p,t − ρem,i,p,t+1
+ µemi,p,t − µrr gi,p,t/Lh − µrr gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.5b)
0 ≤µcmi − λcm ⊥ capcmi ≥ 0, (C.5c)
0 ≤µrri,p +
∑
t∈T
µrr gi,p,t − λrrp ⊥ rrri,p ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, (C.5d)
0 ≤µrri,p +
∑
t∈T
µrr gi,p,t − λrrp ⊥ rrri,p ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, (C.5e)
0 ≤µresi − λres ⊥ gresi ≥ 0. (C.5f)
The constraints of the primal model formulation and the associated dual variables
result in the following conditions:
0 ≤ − gi,p,t +Ai,p,t · capi · Lh ⊥ µemi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.5g)
0 ≤ − gi,p,t + gi,p,t-1 +Rhi · capi · Lh⊥ ρem,i,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.5h)
0 ≤ gi,p,t − gi,p,t-1 +Rhi · capi · Lh ⊥ ρem,i,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.5i)
0 ≤ − capcmi + F cmi · capi, ⊥ µcmi ≥ 0, (C.5j)
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0 ≤ − rrri,p + F rri ·Rrri · capi ⊥ µrri,p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, (C.5k)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + capi − gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ µrr gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.5l)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + F rri ·Rrri · capi ⊥ µrri,p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, (C.5m)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ µrr gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.5n)
0 ≤ − gresi + F resi
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
gi,p,t ⊥ µresi ≥ 0. (C.5o)
C.2.2 Consumer c
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the consumer’s strategy,
χc = (demp,t , lemp,t , dcm, lcm) ∈ Xc, are as follows:
0 ≤ −
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
1/2 · (λem − λemp,t) + βemp,t ⊥ demp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.6a)
0 ≤βemp,t ⊥ lemp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.6b)
0 ≤ − 1/2 · (λcm − λcm) + βcm ⊥ dcm ≥ 0, (C.6c)
0 ≤βcm ⊥ lcm ≥ 0. (C.6d)
The constraints of the primal model formulation and the associated dual variables
result in the following conditions:
0 = − demp,t − lemp,t + (λemp,t − λem,0p,t )/Eem, βemp,t ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.6e)
0 = − dcm − lcm + (λcm − λcm,0)/Ecm, βcm ∈ R. (C.6f)
C.2.3 Storage Operator SO
see Appendix C.1.3
C.2.4 Market Operator MO
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the market operator’s
strategy, λMO = (λemp,t , λcm, λres, λrrp , λrrp ) ∈ XMO, are as follows. For
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readability, the price floors and caps are omitted:
0 = demp,t −
∑
i∈N
gi,p,t − dchp,t + chp,t, λemp,t ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.7a)
0 = dcm −
∑
i∈N
capcmi , λ
cm ∈ R, (C.7b)
0 =Dres −
∑
i∈N
gresi , λ
res ∈ R, (C.7c)
0 =Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p , λ
rr
p ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, (C.7d)
0 =Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p , λ
rr
p ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P. (C.7e)
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C.3 Strategic Reserves
The MCP-reformulation for strategic reserves yields the following squared set
of equations. The equations are grouped per agent.
C.3.1 Generator (Gi)i∈N
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the generator’s strategy,
χi = (capi, capsri , gi,p,t, rrri,p , rrri,p , gresi ) ∈ Xi, are as follows:
0 ≤C invi − F sri · µsri −
∑
p∈P
∑
t∈T
[
Rhi · (ρem,i,p,t + ρem,i,p,t ) · Lh
+Ai,p,t · µemi,p,t · Lh + µrr gi,p,t
]
−Rrri ·
∑
p∈P
[
F rri · µrri,p + F rri · µrri,p
]⊥ capi ≥ 0, (C.8a)
0 ≤Wp · (Cgi − λemp,t)−Wp · F resi · µresi
+ ρem,i,p,t − ρem,i,p,t+1 − ρem,i,p,t − ρem,i,p,t+1
+ µemi,p,t − µrr gi,p,t/Lh − µrr gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.8b)
0 ≤ − λsr + µsri +
∑
p∈P
∑
t∈T
[
Rhi · (ρem,i,p,t + ρem,i,p,t ) · Lh
+Ai,p,t · µemi,p,t · Lh + µrr gi,p,t
]
+Rrri ·
∑
p∈P
[
F rri · µrri,p + F rri · µrri,p
]⊥ capsri ≥ 0, (C.8c)
0 ≤µrri,p +
∑
t∈T
µrr gi,p,t − λrrp ⊥ rrri,p ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, (C.8d)
0 ≤µrri,p +
∑
t∈T
µrr gi,p,t − λrrp ⊥ rrri,p ≥ 0, ∀, p ∈ P, (C.8e)
0 ≤µresi − λres ⊥ gresi ≥ 0. (C.8f)
The constraints of the primal model formulation and the associated dual variables
result in the following conditions:
0 ≤ − gi,p,t +Ai,p,t · (capi − capsri ) · Lh ⊥ µemi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.8g)
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0 ≤ − gi,p,t + gi,p,t-1 +Rhi · (capi − capsri ) · Lh⊥ ρem,i,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.8h)
0 ≤ gi,p,t − gi,p,t-1 +Rhi · (capi − capsri ) · Lh ⊥ ρem,i,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.8i)
0 ≤ − capsri + F sri · capi, ⊥ µsri ≥ 0, (C.8j)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + F rri ·Rrri · (capi − capsri ) ⊥ µrri,p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, (C.8k)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + (capi − capsri )− gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ µrr gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.8l)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + F rri ·Rrri · (capi − capsri ) ⊥ µrri,p ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, (C.8m)
0 ≤ − rrri,p + gi,p,t/Lh ⊥ µrr gi,p,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.8n)
0 ≤ − gresi + F resi
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
gi,p,t ⊥ µresi ≥ 0. (C.8o)
C.3.2 Consumer c
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the consumer’s strategy,
χc = (demp,t , lemp,t , lsr, gsrp,t) ∈ Xc, are as follows:
0 ≤ −
∑
p∈P
Wp
∑
t∈T
1/2 · (λem − λemp,t) + βemp,t ⊥ demp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.9a)
0 ≤βemp,t ⊥ lemp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.9b)
0 ≤λsr − λsr + µgsrp,t · Lh ⊥ lsr ≥ 0, (C.9c)
0 ≤ −Wp · (λemp,t − (λ
em − )) + µgsrp,t ⊥ gsrp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (C.9d)
The constraints of the primal model formulation and the associated dual variables
result in the following conditions:
0 = − demp,t − lemp,t + (λemp,t − λem,0p,t )/Eem, βemp,t ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T , (C.9e)
0 ≤ − gsrp,t + (Dsr − lsr) · Lh ⊥ µgsrp,t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T . (C.9f)
C.3.3 Storage Operator SO
see Appendix C.1.3
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C.3.4 Market Operator MO
The optimality conditions for each decision variable of the market operator’s
strategy, λMO = (λemp,t , λsr, λres, λrrp , λrrp ) ∈ XMO, are as follows. For readability,
the price floors and caps are omitted:
0 = demp,t − gsrp,t −
∑
i∈N
gi,p,t − dchp,t + chp,t, λemp,t ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T ,(C.10a)
0 =Dsr − lsr −
∑
i∈N
capsri , λ
sr ∈ R, (C.10b)
0 =Dres −
∑
i∈N
gresi , λ
res ∈ R, (C.10c)
0 =Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p , λ
rr
p ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P, (C.10d)
0 =Drrp −
∑
i∈N
rrri,p , λ
rr
p ∈ R, ∀p ∈ P. (C.10e)
Appendix D
Selecting Representative
Periods for Generation
Expansion Planning
This chapter provides a short summary of the developed methodology to select
representative days. The methodology is published in the journal article [148]:
• K. Poncelet, H. Höschle, E. Delarue, A. Virag, and W. D’haeseleer. “Se-
lecting Representative Days for Capturing the Implications of Integrating
Intermittent Renewables in Generation Expansion Planning Problems”.
In: IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 32.3 (May 2016), pp. 1936–1948. issn:
0885-8950. doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2016.2596803.
The methodology has the purpose to select a subset of representative periods
and assign associated weights from a larger set of available data. For generation
expansion models, the data is typically time series. The objective is the best
possible approximation of the full data by the reduced data set of representative
periods. For example, representative periods can be 10 days out of a full year.
The motivation is to enable generation expansion problem to achieve the best
possible results given the need to reduce the temporal resolution because of
computational feasibility.
The steps of the methodology involve a preprocessing, a grouping of the data
in bins and a optimization problem as shown in the flow chart in Figure D.1.
In the given example, three different time series for load, PV and wind are
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Figure D.1: Schematic of the different steps
processed. All three time series are taken into account for the selection process.
Additionally, supporting time series are possible to account for dynamics of the
time series or the pairwise correlation of time series.
In a next step the time series, c ∈ C, are transformed into a bin representation.
The number of bins, b ∈ B, is to be chosen as trade-off between accuracy and
computational challenge of the following optimization problem. In the given
example, ten bins are used. The resulting matrix, Ac,b,p, represents a kind of
cumulative distribution of the values in the bins per day. Figure D.2 shows the
result for a load time series. The considered periods are days, i.e., 365 days for
a full year.
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Figure D.2: Representation of the parameter Ac,b,p for the quarterly Belgian
load during all days of 2014 and a number of bins equal to 10.
After the matrix Ac,b,p is calculate for all time series, c ∈ C, an optimization
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problem is solved. The optimization is given by the equations (D.1b)-(D.1g) The
decision variables of the optimization problem is a binary variable per period,
up, stating if a period is considered a representative period, and the associated
weight, wp. In short, the number of selected day is set to the parameter, N repr.
The sum of the weights is equal to the number of all periods, Nall.
min
up,wp
∑
c∈C
∑
b∈B
errc,b, (D.1a)
s.t.
errc,b = |
∑
p∈P
Ac,b,p −
∑
p∈P
wp
Nall
·Ac,b,p|, ∀c ∈ C, b ∈ B, (D.1b)
∑
p∈P
up = N repr, (D.1c)
wp ≤ up ·Nall, ∀p ∈ P, (D.1d)∑
p∈P
wp = Nall, (D.1e)
up ∈ {0, 1}, p ∈ P, (D.1f)
wp ∈ R+0 , ∀p ∈ P. (D.1g)
By interpreting the matrix Ac,b,p as the duration curve, the objective is the sum
of absolute errors, errc,b at the end of each bin. This is shown in Figure D.3.
By calculating the bins before the optimization, a computational challenging
sorting within the optimization can be omitted. The optimization problem can
also be extended by preselecting certain periods, for example, to ensure that
minimum or maximum values of the initial time series are represented in the
selected periods.
The resulting methodology has been implemented in a software tool by the
Energy Technology Systems Analysis Program (ETSAP) community of the
International Energy Agency (IEA) in a follow-up project entitled “Time-slice
tool for capturing the characteristics of intermittent renewables”. The tool can
be downloaded from https://iea-etsap.org/index.php/etsap-projects.
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Figure D.3: Representation of the error term errc,b. The duration curve is
divided into 10 bins. The error at the bottom of the bin is displayed for bin
b = 8.
Appendix E
Update Steps of
ADMM-Based Algorithm
During the update step for the decision variables of the generators and the
consumer, the augmented Lagrangian is used. This chapter provides the
complete formulation of the objective function including the penalty terms,
which is minimized during each update step to obtain the new values for the
decision variables.
E.1 Risk-Averse Generator (Gi)i∈N
First, the optimization problem for each generator is shown. The constraints
are omitted as they are already provided in equations (6.9b)-(6.9l).
For the update step of χi, the augmented Lagrangian, Lρ,i, is minimized. It
includes the first and second penalty term. The update step for iteration k + 1
uses the prices, λkMO, and the generator’s decision variables, χki , of the previous
iteration k to parameterize the augmented Lagrangian. The minimization is
subject to the constraints to determine the set of strategies. Formally, the
augmented Lagrangian is written as follows:
χk+1i = argmin
χi∈Xi
Lρ,i(χi, λkMO) =
γi ·
(
C invi · capi +
∑
s∈S
Ps
∑
t∈T
Ws,t · Cgi · gi,s,t
)
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− (1− γi) · CV@Ri(χi, λkMO)
− γi
∑
s∈S
Ps
(∑
t∈T
Ws,t · λem,ks,t · gi,s,t + λcm,ks · capcmi,s + λres,ks · gresi,s
)
+ ρ/2 ·
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
[
gi,s,t −
(
gki,s,t −
1
|N |+ 1
(∑
i∈N
gki,s,t + l
em,k
s,t −Dems,t
))]2
+ ρ/2 ·
∑
s∈S
[
capcmi,s −
(
capcm,ki,s −
1
|N |+ 1
(∑
i∈N
capcm,ki,s − dcm,ks
))]2
+ ρ/2 ·
∑
s∈S
[
gresi,s −
(
gres,ki,s −
1
|N |
(∑
i∈N
gres,ki,s −Dress
))]2
(E.1)
E.2 Consumer c
First, the optimization problem for the consumer is shown. The constraints are
omitted as they are already provided in equations (6.10b)-(6.10c).
For the update step of χc, the augmented Lagrangian, Lρ,c, is minimized. It
includes the first and second penalty term. The update step for iteration k + 1
uses the prices, λkMO, and the consumer’s decision variables, χkc , of the previous
iteration k to parameterize the augmented Lagrangian. The minimization is
subject to the constraints to determine the set of strategies. Formally, the
augmented Lagrangian is written as follows:
χk+1c = argmin
χc∈Xc
Lρ,c(χc, λkMO) =
−
∑
s∈S
Ps ·
(∑
t∈T
Ws,t · λem · (Dems,t − lems,t ) + 1/2 · λ
cm · (dcms +Dcms )
)
+
∑
s∈S
Ps
(∑
t∈T
Ws,t · λems,t · (Dems,t − lems,t ) + 1/2 · λcms · (dcms +Dcms )
)
+ ρ/2 ·
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
[
lems,t −
(
lem,ks,t −
1
|N |+ 1
(∑
i∈N
gki,s,t + l
em,k
s,t −Dems,t
))]2
+ ρ/2 ·
∑
s∈S
[
dcms −
(
dcm,ks −
1
|N |+ 1
(∑
i∈N
capcm,ki,s − dcm,ks
))]2
(E.2)
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